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ABSTRACT

This pamphlet contains the text of and hearings on a House bill for improving the security of schools. The bill is designed to provide financial assistance to aid local educational agencies to meet special needs incident to providing security for children, employees, and facilities in elementary and secondary schools through the reduction and prevention of school-based crimes. (JF)

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SAFE SCHOOLS ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

GENERAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H.R. 2650

A BILL TO AMEND THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT OF 1965 TO ASSIST SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO CARRY OUT LOCALLY APPROVED SCHOOL SECURITY PLANS TO REDUCE CRIME AGAINST CHILDREN, EMPLOYEES, AND FACILITIES OF THEIR SCHOOLS

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C., FEBRUARY 26, 1973

Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and Labor

CARL D. PERKINS, *Chairman*

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CONTENTS

Page
Text of H.R. 2650 — 1

Statement of—

- Bingham, Hon. Jonathan B., a Representative in Congress from the State of New York — 6
- Grealy, Joseph I., president, International Association of School Security Directors, accompanied by L. W. Burton and Edward D. Brady — 26
- Kelly, James, director of research, International Association of Chiefs of Police — 27
- Moon, Rex, senior vice president and study director, Academy for Educational Development, Inc — 31

Prepared statements, letters, supplemental material, etc.,

- Academy for Educational Development, Inc. "The Need for Immediate Action," report entitled — 89
- Bevis, Donald D., associate superintendent of schools for business affairs, Minneapolis Public Schools:
  - Letter to Chairman Perkins, dated April 27, 1973 — 75
  - Statement of glass breakage, burglary and vandalism, comparative costs for the years 1965–71 (table) — 78
  - Weekly Break-In — 76
- Bingham, Hon. Jonathan B., a Representative in Congress from the State of New York:
  - "Bomb Incidents," a compilation of dates and cities — 7
  - "Crackdown on Weapons in Schools," a newspaper editorial — 20
  - "For Safer Campuses," a newspaper editorial — 21
  - "Problem: Guns in High Schools," an article from The Congressional Record — 19
  - "Safety on Campus," a newsletter — 21
  - "School Violence," a newspaper editorial — 20
  - Statement of — 3
- Carlton, Stephen A., director, Security Analysts, Minneapolis, Minn., letter to Chairman Perkins, dated April 1, 1973 — 83
- Farmer, Ashley, director of security, Jefferson County Public Schools, Louisville, Ky., letter to Chairman Perkins, dated April 20, 1973 — 86
- Gibson, John S., director, Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship and Public Affairs, Tufts University, letter to Chairman Perkins, dated April 23, 1973, enclosing clippings — 78
- Goldberg, I. Ira, Ph.D., Associate professor of education, Harvard University, paper entitled, "The Problem of Safety in Our Inner-City Schools: A View from the Bottom" — 88
- Grass, Amzie, administrative director, Civil Defense Education, State of Nebraska Department of Education, letter to Chairman Perkins, dated April 17, 1973, enclosing excerpts of statistical report — 87
- Grealy, Joseph I., president, The National Association of School Security Directors, letter to Chairman Perkins, dated August 2, 1973, enclosing official position, and resolution — 69
- Johnston, William J., Los Angeles City Schools, letter to Chairman Perkins, dated April 25, 1973 — 82
- Lehman, Hon. William, a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida, statement of — 68

Prepared statements, letters, supplemental material, etc.—Continued

	Page
Moon, Rexford G., Jr., senior vice president, director of studies, Academy for Educational Development, Inc., "A Safer Environment for Learning," a report	34
Patterson, Roland N., superintendent, public instruction, Baltimore City Public Schools, letter to Chairman Perkins, dated May 29, 1973, enclosing resolution	74
Rosser, John, director, Division of Field Services, State of New Jersey Department of Education, memorandum from, dated May 2, 1973	74
Rykert, Wilbur, director, National Crime Prevention Institute, Louisville, Ky., letter to Senator Huddleston, dated July 26, 1973	99
Wyngard, Robert L., Jr., director of instruction, California Specialized Training Institute, letter to Chairman Perkins, dated April 17, 1973	84

SAFE SCHOOLS ACT

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1973

House of Representatives,
General Subcommittee on Education
of the Committee on Education and Labor,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 9:40 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Carl D. Perkins (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Perkins and Meeds.

Staff members present: John F. Jennings, majority counsel; and Christopher Cross, minority legislative associate counsel.

Mr. Perkins. The committee will come to order.

I am glad to welcome you here Congressman Bingham.

The General Subcommittee on Education is conducting a hearing today on H.R. 2650, the Safe Schools Act of 1973.

(H.R. 2650 follows:)

[H.R. 2650, 93d Cong., 1st sess.]

A BILL To amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to assist school districts to carry out locally approved school security plans to reduce crime against children, employees, and facilities of their schools

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Safe Schools Act of 1973".

Sec. 2. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 is amended by inserting after part C thereof the following new part:

"Part D—Special Grants for Safe Schools

"PURPOSE

"Sec. 141. The purpose of this part is to provide financial assistance to aid local educational agencies throughout the Nation to meet special needs incident to providing security for children, employees, and facilities in elementary and secondary schools by reducing and preventing crimes against them.

"AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

"Sec. 142. There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this part, the sum of $——— for the fiscal year 1974, and $——— for the fiscal year 1975.

"ALLOTMENTS TO LOCAL EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES

"Sec. 143. (a) From the sums appropriated to carry out this part for a fiscal year, the Commissioner shall reserve not to exceed 3 per centum thereof and allot such amount among Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands according to their respective needs for grants under this part. In addition he shall allot to the Secretary of the

Interior from such amount, such sums as he may determine for elementary and secondary schools operated for Indian children by the Department of the Interior.

"(b) The remainder of the sums appropriated to carry out this part for a fiscal year shall be allotted by the Commissioner among other local educational agencies in a manner which gives consideration to the following criteria:

"(1) the need for assistance, taking into account such factors as—

"(A) the extent and impact upon elementary and secondary education of crime in the schools of the district to be served;

"(B) the financial need of such local educational agency;

"(C) the expense and difficulty of effectively carrying out a plan described in section 144(a) in such school district; and

"(D) the degree to which measurable deficiencies in the quality of public education afforded in such district exceed those of other school districts within the State;

"(2) the degree to which the plan described in section 144(a), and the program or project to be assisted, are likely to effect a decrease in crime in the schools;

"(3) the degree to which the plan described in section 144(a) enjoys the support and approval of parents, professional school employees, and the community at large in the school district affected; and

"(4) the degree to which the plan described in section 144(a) affords full protection of the civil and constitutional rights of students and employees of the school district affected.

"APPLICATION

"SEC. 144. (a) A local educational agency may receive a grant under this part for any fiscal year only upon application therefor approved by the Commissioner, with the consent of the appropriate State educational agency, upon his determination that the local educational agency has adopted and is implementing, or will, if assistance is made available to it under this part, adopt and implement, a plan to reduce crime and increase the safety and security of the students, employees, and facilities of its elementary and secondary schools through programs and projects designed to carry out the purpose of this part, including—

"(1) the provision of additional professional or other staff members (including staff members specially trained in problems incident to crime control) and the training and retraining of staff for schools which are affected by such plan;

"(2) the provision of services to meet the special needs of students and employees in such schools;

"(3) community activities, including public education and participation efforts, in support of such plan;

"(4) special administrative activities, such as the rescheduling of students or employees;

"(5) provision of information to parents and other members of the general public incident to the development or to the implementation of such plan;

"(6) planning and evaluation activities;

"(7) acquisition, installation, modernization, or replacement of appropriate equipment and supplies;

"(8) minor alterations of school plants and facilities; and

"(9) other specially designed programs or projects that meet the purpose of this part.

"(b) No funds authorized for assistance under this part shall be used to support the introduction, presence, or use of firearms, other weapons, or chemical agents in any school."

SEC. 3. (a) Part D of title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 is redesignated as part E, and sections 141 through 144 of such title are redesignated as sections 151 through 154, respectively, and sections 146 through 150 are redesignated as sections 155 through 159, respectively. Cross references to such part and such title are redesignated accordingly.

(b) The provisions of part E of title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (as redesignated by subsection (a)) are amended as follows:

(1) The material preceding paragraph (1) in section 151(a) is amended by inserting "part A, B, or C of" before "this title".

(2) Section 151(a)(1) is amended by inserting "part A, B, or C of " before "this title" the first time it appears.

(3) Section 151(a)(2) is amended by inserting after "such agency" the following: ", in the case of assistance under part A, B, or C".

(4) Section 151(a)(6) is amended by inserting after "the programs" the following: "assisted under part A, B, or C".

(5) Section 152(a)(1) is amended by inserting before "and which meet" the following: "or 144", by inserting after "103(a)(5)" the following: "and of part D", and by inserting before the semicolon at the end thereof the following: "or part D".

(6) Section 153(a)(2) is amended by inserting "part A, B, and C of" before "this title", and by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "From the funds paid to it pursuant to paargraph (1), each State educational agency shall distribute to each local educational agency of the State which has submitted an application approved under section 144 the amount for which such application has been approved, except that this amount shall not exceed the agency's allotment under section 143."

(7) The first sentence of section 154 is amended by inserting "parts A, B, and C of" before "this title".

(8) The third, fifth, and sixth sentences of section 154 are amended by striking out "this title" and inserting "such parts".

SEC. 4. Section 303 of the Act of September 30, 1950 (20 U.S.C. 244), is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"(16) The term 'crime' means any unlawful act or activity, not including any violation of any rule, regulation, or code of behavior established by any organization, agency, or institution not enacted into law."

Mr. PERKINS. That act, introduced by our colleague from New York, Jonathan Bingham, would create a new Federal categorical program of aid to local educational agencies for the purpose of implementing plans to reduce crime in the schools.

Congressman Bingham is our first witness on H.R. 2650. But before he begins, I would just like to congratulate him for so energetically bringing before this committee his proposal for solving a very real problem in many of the schools of this country. Your dedication to securing a safe and good education for the children of this country are well known and well appreciated by this committee, Congressman Bingham.

Your statement will be included in the record and you proceed in any manner you prefer.

[The statement referred to follows:]

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear again before this Subcommittee which has been so greatly responsible for the formulation and enactment over the years of the Federal education assistance programs that have helped make the American educational system the finest in the world. Our considerable success in developing an admittedly imperfect but also enviably fine system of public education in this country is due in no small part, in my judgment, to the work of this Committee, and particularly to its adherence to a strategy of directing Federal assistance to specific needs and goals through categorical programs. While some of these programs may require better administration, and some from time to time may need to be terminated or reoriented as educational needs and priorities change, let me say at the outset that I sincerely hope this Committee will not yield to pressures to abandon this approach to educational funding. On the whole, existing categorical programs have been most successful, and should certainly not be put aside entirely in favor of a plan of unstructured funding which is still experimental and of questionable value and impact in the field of education.

The particular purpose for my appearance this morning, Mr. Chairman, is to remind the Committee of a serious and growing need of the schools which, in my judgment, is not being met or even adequately attended to under current educational assistance programs. I refer, of course, to the problem of crime and criminal violence in the schools.

I know, Mr. Chairman, that this Committee shares my concern about this problem. Late in 1971, the General Subcommittee on Education chaired at that time by our former colleague from Illinois, Mr. Pucinski, conducted hearings in New York City and Boston on the problem of crime in the schools and on the Safe Schools Act, a bill which I introduced in the 92nd Congress (H.R. 3101 and H.R. 10641) to provide a program of Federal assistance to enable school districts to better cope with this problem. I have reintroduced this bill in the current Congress (H.R. 2650) with the cosponsorship to date of 20 Members of the House, including the Chairman and a number of Members of this Committee. A bill identical to mine has recently been introduced in the Senate (S. 485) by Senators Cranston and Gurney.

Since those earlier hearings, Mr. Chairman, incidents of crime against students, staff, and facilities in schools across the nation have continued. Fear on the part of teachers and students has spread and intensified, and more and more school systems have been faced with the difficult task of trying to develop an organized response to the problem.

The incidents which are occurring, and about which we must be concerned, are not mere infractions of school rules—dunking pigtails in inkwells, talking out of turn, or pushing and shoving in hallways. They are serious violations of law.

As illustrations, Mr. Chairman, bomb threats and actual bombings have become relatively frequent occurrences in schools, and are among the most costly and disruptive. Similarly, the presence of guns, while not common, appears to be increasing in schools. If the Committee agrees, I will submit for the hearings record at this point a list of reported school bomb incidents during 1970 and 1971, and a summary of a recent survey by the Associated Press of incidents of violence in schools in which guns were present.

In some cases, lacking any means of coping with problems of crime and violence themselves, educators have simply called the police into the schools—a step which, in many instances, has proved more an invitation to violence than a solution to it.

Finances are another problem. With schools budgets strained in order to provide the direct educational facilities and services needed and demanded by students and parents, few school systems can marshall the funds needed to take on the added burden of providing organized security services for students, personnel, and facilities. Yet in many school systems the learning process cannot go on without effective security provisions.

The Safe Schools Act I have developed and introduced is designed to meet these problems. It would earmark Federal funds for the purpose of learning more about the school crime problem, developing and testing techniques for dealing with it, and assisting the most vulnerable school districts in formulating and implementing organized programs to achieve a secure learning environment for students and a secure working environmet for staff.

The Los Angeles, area, Mr. Chairman, is one where the problem appears to have reached crisis proportions most recently. As an illustration of the financial and other pressures a school system faces when violence erupts and becomes commonplace, I should like to submit for the hearing record several editorials that have appeared in the Los Angeles papers on the incidents there, and a newsletter published by the Los Angels United School District Board of Education outlining how the Board proposes to respond to the problem.

The proposed response of the Los Angeles School Board is unusually imaginative and comprehensive. Most school systems have little notion how to deal with outbreaks of violence. Teachers and school administrators have for years disclaimed any responsibility on the part of the schools to assure security. As a result, little in the way of special knowledge about providing security in schools has been developed. As I'm sure Mr. Kelly of the International Association of Chiefs of Police will verify, much of the thinking that has been done recently on this problem, as more and more school systems have been forced to think about it has been borrowed from the methods and philosophies used by police—some appropriate for schools, but many not so.

The most commonly expressed doubts about the Safe Schools proposal, Mr. Chairman, are the following: first, that to devote Federal funds to preventing and dealing with crime and violence in the schools is, so to speak, treating the symptom rather than the disease; and, second, that the proposal, worthy as it might be in substance, adds to the already excessive number of categorical programs of educational assistance rather than eliminating categorical limitations on the use of education funds.

I agree, Mr. Chairman, with those who believe that crime and violence in the schools are symptoms of basic problems in our schools and, even more importantly, in society at large. Who would deny it?

I also agree with those who contend that there is need for sweeping changes to make education more interesting, involving, and relevant to young people. I believe that we should proceed with these and other major improvements, difficult as they are to make, with all possible speed, and that the bulk of our energy and funds for education should be devoted to these reforms. We are, in fact, already doing so. Many of the programs recommended by the Committee and approved by the Congress are making such reforms possible, and those programs should be continued and expanded if at all possible.

But I cannot agree with those who suggest that in light of the need for these reforms, which will hopefully do away with crime and violence by erasing their underlying causes, there is no need or justification for reserving and devoting even a fraction of our resources to try to provide as much security as possible for those who are in the educational stream while basic reforms are being effected.

A great many of the crimes committed in schools are committed by outsiders—individuals who don't belong in the schools in the first place. Similarly, many of the conditions that lead to crime in the schools are community conditions outside the control of the schools. Improvements in these conditions through basic reforms, while no less pressing than reforms within the schools, will be longer in coming. To argue that we should not undertake to provide reasonable security for those now in the schools is like arguing that immediately available treatments for cancer should not be used pending discovery of a total cure. Such an argument ignores the fact that there are many students and teachers in even our most uninspiring schools who are trying to get the best education they can. We owe it to them to make a reasonable effort to provide an atmosphere free of fear.

With regard to the matter of categorical programs versus less directive funding in education, even the President's Commission on School Finance, while urging a greater State role in general education funding, also recommended "continuing financial support" on the part of the Federal government to stimulate "State and local public and private activity to meet national concerns and interest . . ." It noted further:

"School children need to be able to walk from their home or bus to the school building in safety and need to be free from physical violence and extortion while attending schools. Until the atmosphere of terror is removed from these schools, little progress can be made in restructuring and maintaining environment (sic) conducive to learning."

Federal leadership is essential for the achievement of security without repression in all our schools. The task of developing and testing appropriate school security methods is often beyond the capability of local and state school systems. The fact that inappropriate activities may threaten constitutionally guaranteed rights argues for close Federal guidance in this area. Finally, by enactment of the Safe Streets Act and other legislation, the Congress has identified crime as a matter of overriding national urgency and concern in which the Federal government must play a major role. This should be no less the case with regard to crime in the schools than it is with regard to crime in the streets.

Mr. Chairman, this Committee, the Congress, and the Executive branch invest slightly over $3-billion a year in elementary and secondary education. Though data are incomplete, responsible estimates are that as much as $500-million a year in equipment, supplies, and facilities are lost by the nation's schools through vandalism alone, and that figure does not include the dollar value of resulting losses in teaching and learning time and efficiency, particularly when vital learning materials are vandalized. Mr. Chairman, there is not a major corporation in the private sector that would hestitate or fail to invest substantially in security if for every $6 it was investing in an enterprise, $1 or more were being lost as a result of criminal activity.

The human cost of crime in the schools, of course, is even more significant than the dollar cost. It may be a long time before this society can provide an atmosphere free of fear for every citizen, in every institution and on every street in every community across the land. It should be possible, however, with a concerted effort employing a proper combination of new and existing techniques, to make the schools a refuge from crime and violence. Certainly there is no more important institution in our society within which to preserve and protect personal security and individual rights. Indeed the schools should serve as enclaves from which this society can move toward ridding itself entirely of crime.

In the longer run, that will require basic reforms to rid the schools and the society at large of conditions that elicit violence and crime, and again I urge this Committee to continue and expand programs to provide such reforms. But in the shorter run, much can and must be done to provide immediate relief in the schools from fear and deprivation as a result of criminal assaults upon persons and property, and I urge this Committee to take the leadership in that respect by enacting the Safe Schools Act or a similar program of Federal assistance for the purpose of increasing school security.

STATEMENT OF HON. JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate those kind words very much. I have a prepared statement and I will summarize it.

It is indeed a pleasure to appear again before this distinguished subcommittee. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the subcommittee for this opportunity to express my views on the very serious problem of crime in the schools.

Let me say at the outset on the general question before this committee of categorical versus special revenue sharing for education, that I sincerely hope the committee will not yield to the pressures to abandon successful categorical programs in favor of unstructured funding which in my judgment is still experimental and of questionable value as a method of providing assistance for education.

I know, Mr. Chairman, that this committee shares my concern about the serious and growing problem of crime in the schools. Unfortunately we don't have up-to-date statistics on this problem, and some of the witnesses who are appearing before you today will touch on the reasons for that.

I would like, however, to call attention to some figures that I have not included in my statement this year, but that were included in my statement in 1971, and which appear on page 10 of the 1971 hearings. These figures were compiled by the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency showing the trend in crime in elementary and secondary schools from 1964 to 1968 and some of the figures are relatively startling. I would like to call the committee's attention to them.

For example, in that 5-year period, robberies increased from 369 to 1,508. That was, I should say, a survey of 110 urban school districts, for a percentage increase of 376. Narcotics offenses increased from 75 to 855, a percentage increase of 1,069.

Crimes by nonstudents, and I want to stress that because I think it is a major part of the problem and one of the reasons why this kind of bill is needed in addition to bills that deal with educational problems as such, crimes by nonstudents went up from 142 to 3,894 in that period, a percentage increase of 2,600.

It is almost unbelievable. And vandalism increases, that is the largest single category, the percentage increase is 35 percent, but the figures went up in 68 to over 250,000 incidents. The largest percentage increase, and this is something we have been very aware of in New York, New York City particularly, is assaults on teachers. They went up from 29 in 1964 to 1,081 in 1968, or a percentage increase of 7,100.

Now, from all of the evidence that problem has been getting worse rather than better in the period since then.

In 1971, I first introduced the Safe Schools Act and this subcommittee held hearings on it that year in New York City and Boston under the chairmanship of our former colleague, Mr. Pucinski. We have reintroduced the bill in its revised form in the current Congress as H.R. 2650 and I am proud to have you, Mr. Chairman, as a cosponsor along with 19 other members.

The same bill has recently been introduced in the Senate by Senators Cranston and Gurney. We are always glad when the other body follows along in something we are taking a lead on over here.

As illustrations, Mr. Chairman, of the seriousness of the incidents that are continuing to occur in the schools and the need for an organized professional response to the problem by school systems, I have several documents I would like to submit for the record.

The first is a list of bomb threats and actual bombings that were reported in the schools across the Nation in 1970 and 1971. This list was developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and Mr. Kelly who is here and will be testifying shortly will be able to comment in some detail on the seriousness of such incidents.

The second document I would like to submit for the record has to do with the presence of guns in the schools. While this is not common, it appears to be increasing and I submit a summary of the survey by the Associated Press of recent incidents of violence in schools in which guns were involved.

Third, a set of documents dealing with the crime problem in the Los Angeles area which has reached crisis proportions. This includes several editorials that have appeared in the Los Angeles papers and a newsletter published by the Los Angeles Unified School District Board of Education outlining how the board proposes to respond to the problem.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, those documents will be received as part of the record.

Mr. PERKINS. Without objection they are inserted in the record.

[The documents referred to follow:]

BOMB INCIDENTS

1970:

- July 8: Illinois, Rolling Meadows. Two or three unidentified youths threw a fire bomb at the east door of the Jonas E. Salk School. Minor damage resulted.
- July 3: Connecticut, New Haven. Fire bomb was thrown through second floor window of school building.
- July 5: Texas, Longview. Thirty-six school buses were damaged by bombs. Estimated damage, $36,000. Longview schools scheduled to begin busing Negro pupils in September. Estimated 2½ to 5 pounds of plastic explosive per vehicle.
- July 8: New Jersey, Franklin Township. Fire bombs damaged offices of the Board of Education, a lumber company, and the Eagles Club.

July 12: California, Danville. A homemade pipe bomb containing gun powder and improvised fuse was found at San Ramon Valley High School. The device was dismantled by Navy EOD personnel.

July 16: Illinois, Chicago. Two fire bombs were thrown through the windows of Tinley Park High School offices. Damage was put at $1,500. This was the eleventh fire in the suburb in a week, most of which were set by arsonists.

July 22: California, Oakland. A fire bomb was thrown against the wall of a portable classroom at Garfield Elementary School, damaging an exterior wall and the roof.

August 27: North Carolina, Rocky Mount. Two explosive bombs exploded outside Bullock School near Rocky Mount. The school was empty at the time; no injuries reported. Bombing suspected related to school desegregation in the South.

September 1: California, Stockton. The side of an elementary classroom building was scorched by a fire bomb. Damage was said to be negligible.

September 4: Colorado, Denver. A fire bomb consisting of a beer bottle filled with flammable liquid was thrown through the window of the office of a high school guidance counselor. Damage was estimated at $250.

September 11: California, Comton. A fire bomb was thrown into the Dominguez High School Administration Building at approximately 3 A.M. Two men were seen fleeing from the scene.

September 16: New York, Newfane. Four juveniles were arrested in connection with a fire bombing incident at Newfane Central Senior High School. Fire bombs were thrown on the grounds of the school. No damage was reported.

September 17: Pennsylvania, Lancaster. Three fire bombs were tossed into three first floor rooms at the McCaskey High School around 10:40 P.M. Only two of the bombs ignited causing an estimated $1,000 damage.

September 18: Idaho, Lewiston. Two fire bombs were thrown against the side of the Whitman Elementary School at 10 p.m. but did no damage. Several youngsters were seen running from the scene.

September 20: California, Merced. An unexploded fire bomb, consisting of a peanut butter jar filled with gasoline and a tissue paper wick, was found near the Planada Elementary School.

September 20: Pennsylvania, Pricedale. What was believed to be a fire bomb caused $1,000 damage to Rostraver High School. The fire was discovered around 3 A.M.

September 20: Maryland, Cumberland. A device which produced acrid smoke was hurled through a window of the cafeteria of East Side School during the night. The school remained closed for two days.

September 28: California, Los Angeles. A "powerful" explosive device damaged a classroom and shattered several windows at Roosevelt High School. Although night classes were in session, there were no reported injuries.

October 7: Indiana, South Bend. Fire bombs were thrown at the Nu-Way Feed Store and at La Salle High School during disorders on the city's west side. Damage in the feed store was estimated at $230,000. "Considerable" damage was also caused to classrooms in the high school.

October 15: California, Fillmore. What might have been a giant firecracker or a small explosive device blew up a water fountain at Fillmore High School about 12:30 P.M. The blast did $130 in damage but injured no one.

October 22: New York, Lancaster. A fire bomb, consisting of a two-gallon can partially filled with gasoline, was thrown into the unlocked door of a Lancaster Central High School bus. Damage was estimated at $3,000. Two teenage boys have been arrested in connection with the incident.

October 26: New York, Kingston. Following three telephone bomb threats that day, fire bombs were thrown through windows at Kingston High School, driving some 700 people who were attending a concert from the building. Police reported taking one person into custody for questioning, and seeking a second.

October 29: Maryland, Oxon Hill. A small explosive device was detonated by a prankster at Oxon Hill Senior High School. Damage was minor but one student was cut by flying glass. The student responsible for the blast was apprehended.

October 31: Michigan, Ann Arbor. Two fire bombs were placed against the rear of Forsythe Junior High School and ignited. The devices burned harmlessly.

November 2: Missouri, Gladstone. A pipe bomb, secured behind two door handles, detonated at the Meadowbrook Elementary School. Two juveniles were arrested in connection with the incident.

November 3: Indiana, South Bend. A small explosive device caused minor damage at Pierre Navarre School about 4 p.m. At the time, custodians thought they had only heard a fire cracker. The slight damage, caused by fragmentation, was not discovered until two days later.

November 6: New York, Nassau County. Three ounces of a liquid explosive were discovered in a school locker following an anonymous phone warning, giving the locker number. The material was removed and destroyed.

November 9: Massachusetts, Worcester. The detonation of two grenade simulators set fire to a pile of leaves behind the Providence Street Junior High School about 10:30 p.m. No real damage was reported in the incident.

November 10: Massachusetts, Wilmington. Possibly as many as eleven fire bombs were hurled into the West Intermediate School. Two of the devices caused extensive damage to the offices of the school's guidance counselors. Police subsequently arrested five people in connection with the incident.

November 11: Massachusetts, Woburn. Two adjacent schools, the Linscott Elementary and the Rumford Primary Schools, were damaged by fire bombs tossed into the buildings from a courtyard which they share. The Rumford School, a 95-year-old wooden structure, was heavily damaged. The loss was set at over $100,000.

November 11: New York, Nassau County. An anonymous male caller alerted authorities to the existence of a timed explosive device placed in a school library. The bomb, contained in a lunch box, was rendered safe.

November 12: Texas, Kerrville. A fire bomb was reportedly the cause of a fire which damaged the auditorium and a classroom at Ingram School. The custodian discovered the blaze when he arrived at 7 a.m.

November 15: Ohio, Youngstown. At least three fire bombs were thrown into an office at East High School. The fire was confined to the office; damage was estimated at $350.

November 15: Connecticut, Milford. A $3,500 fire resulted when two incendiary devices were thrown into the Jonathan Law High School minutes before midnight.

November 16: California, San Jose. A shoe box, discovered under a counter in the admissions office of Del Mar High School, was found to contain a timed incendiary device. It had failed to function, however, and was dismantled by police bomb technicians.

November 17: Michigan, Flint. A small fire bomb was thrown through an open window of a high school while a second device was left on the window ledge. The fire was discovered before any major damage occurred.

November 18: Florida, National City. A small, homemade explosive device detonated in the bleachers during a high school football game. No one was believed to have been injured.

November 22: Florida, Leon County. An attempt was made to throw two fire bombs into the Leon High School. Both devices struck a window frame, fell to the ground, and burst into flames.

November 23: New York, Elnora. What was described as a highly sophisticated device, with a clockwork timer and some form of dynamite, was found secreted in a ceiling at the Shenendehowa Central School. There was no warning of the device's existence; a teacher heard the loud ticking and a janitor subsequently uncovered it. Two 15-year-old students were implicated.

November 30: Illinois, Chicago. The detonation of a pipe bomb, placed in a garbage can, caused minor damage to the home of an assistant elementary school principal. No injuries were reported.

November 30: California, San Jose. An explosive device with a chemical delay fuze was discovered on the grounds of Overfelt High School two days after it was placed there. The device had apparently been rendered safe by rain.

December 1: California, Downey. The detonation of a small pipe bomb caused an estimated $100 damage to the outside of a junior high school. Juveniles were believed responsible.

December 8: New Jersey, Vineland. Following racial disturbances at Vineland High School, fire bombs were tossed into a clothing plant owned by the father of the school board president. Damage estimates ranged from $10,000 to $50,000.

December 9: New York, Jamaica. Three fire bombs were thrown through windows at Robert A. Van Wyck Junior High School, starting several fires. The flames were quickly extinguished.

December 9: New York, Briarwood. A junior high school sustained minor damage from two fire bombs thrown at the building. The incident was observed at 2 A.M.

December 9: California, Pasadena. Gasoline-filled fire bombs ignited and started three fires in the administration building of John Muir High School early in the evening. A fourth device was discovered and rendered safe.

December 15: Minnesota, New Hope. What was believed to be nitroglycerin was found in a small jar placed on a shelf in a school cafeteria. The substance was removed by police bomb technicians.

December 31: California, Downey. Juvenile vandals were believed to be responsible for the detonation of a pipe bomb placed in a trash storage area at a grade school. Damage was minor.

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January 1: Iowa, Sioux City. A pipe bomb detonated in front of a retaining wall at the Everett Elementary School. The explosion shattered several windows, but no structural damage was reported

January 4: New York, Pearl River. A timed explosive device detonated outside the office of the dean of women at Pearl River High School at 8:50 A.M. The two people in the office at the time were not injured.

January 14: Indiana, Anderson. Two kerosene fire bombs were tossed through the windows of a Columbia School classroom resulting in $400 damage. Officials believe the two male suspects in the incident are the same two who failed in a subsequent attempt to fire bomb the Otterbien United Methodist Church.

January 16: California, Downey. A pipe bomb exploded at 2:45 P.M. causing slight damage to a fountain at Rancho Santa Gertrudes Elementary School. Three youths were arrested. They admitted to the bombing and to the placement of another bomb, that failed to detonate, at East Junior High School the previous night.

January 19: California, Fountain Valley. A fire bomb was thrown through a window of the Los Amigos High School at 3 A.M. The resultant blaze caused an estimated $1,000 damage to an office and equipment.

January 19: Wisconsin, Wauwatosa. Juveniles were believed to be responsible for the detonation of a small explosive device placed on a window ledge at a high school. No injuries were reported and damage was estimated at $100.

January 24: California, Palos Verdes. The Valmonte Elementary School conference room was fire bombed and sustained damage estimated at $2,000.

January 29: Louisiana, Monroe. A 16-year-old youth constructed a small experimental bomb and detonated the device in the playground area of a school. No damage resulted.

January 29: Nevada, Reno. A public telephone mounted on an outside wall of Reno High School was damaged by a small explosive device. The incident occurred at approximately 10:30 P.M.

February 1: Connecticut, Stratford. At 7:02 A.M., it was discovered that five fire bombs had been thrown into the Stratford High School cafeteria. Three of the bombs ignited causing damage reported at $3,000. The other two bombs were recovered intact.

February 2: New Jersey, Newark. A fire bomb slightly damaged a car owned by the president of the Newark Teachers' Union whose members went on strike the day before. There were no injuries.

February 5: California, Long Beach. A pipe bomb exploded on the windowsill of a rest room in an elementary school. Damage was set at $50. Four juveniles were arrested in connection with the attack.

February 8: North Carolina, Wilmington. Three local businesses and the high school field house were fire bombed following six days of racial violence. Damages in the incidents were not reported.

February 9: Florida, West Palm Beach. An explosive device, consisting of six sticks of dynamite wired to a clock and battery, was found outside the home of the principal of Twin Lakes North High School. The fuse malfunctioned and the bomb failed to explode. Two weeks earlier a similar device detonated and caused an estimated $10,000 damage to the high school boiler room. The school has been the scene of racial disturbances earlier in the year.

February 10: California, Stanger. The attendance office of Stanger High School sustained several hundred dollars in damage as a result of a fire bombing.

February 10: Missouri, Rosedale. A fire bomb was thrown through the doorway of Rosedale High School damaging the door and a stairwell.

February 14: Colorado, Denver. A fire bomb was hurled through the window of the principal's office at the John F. Kennedy High School, causing an estimated $2,000 damage. Four youths were arrested in connection with the incident.

February 17: California, Anderson. The office of the superintendent of schools at the Anderson Union High School was hit with a fire bomb. Moderate damage was sustained but no estimates were available.

February 23: Florida, Riviera Beach. A bomb consisting of one stick of dynamite, a blasting cap, and a flashlight battery wired to a clock, was discovered tied to the rear axle of a school bus. A telephone warning claiming a school bus could be bombed precipitated a search of all such vehicles in that area. The bomb was located and disarmed twenty minutes before it was set to detonate.

February 28: Pennsylvania New Castle. The home of an assistant principal of Shenango High School was fire bombed. The device landed on the porch and caused slight damage. Two youths were seen fleeing the scene.

March 4: Kansas, Overland Park. A small explosive device detonated in a fire extinguisher well at a high school. There were no injuries and only minor damage was reported.

March 5: New York, Mineola. A pipe bomb, placed in a first-floor rest room of the McCleary Junior High School, failed to detonate. Two juveniles were arrested in connection with the attempted bombing.

March 7: North Dakota, Fargo. A timed incendiary device was found in a high school locker following a telephoned warning giving the locker number. Upon examination, the item was determined to be harmless.

March 9: Michigan, Wyandotte. A fire bomb was thrown through a window at the Roosevelt High School chemistry laboratory. There were no injuries and damage was light.

March 10: California, Anaheim. Four young men were reportedly responsible for the detonation of a small explosive device in the boy's rest room at Ketella High School. The blast caused $100 damage but injured no one.

March 10: California, Sunnyvale. A fire bomb was thrown against the door of a "portable classroom" public elementary school. Fire caused $50 damage. Three juveniles were arrested in connection with the attack.

March 11: Oregon, Salem. Nine sticks of dynamite were concealed in four locations in a high school. None detonated. Six students were taken into temporary custody. The apparent reason for the incident was a "mock" protest against the school administration.

March 12: Indiana, Fort Wayne. A bomb blast inflicted $600 in damage to the Northwood Junior High School. The explosion, which occurred near entrance to the building, caused no injuries. Police considered the attack the work of pranksters.

March 12: Texas, Dallas. An incendiary device was tossed into the Carey Junior High School office. Ignition of the device caused damage estimated at $200.

March 15: Minnesota, St. Paul. A smokeless powder bomb, placed at the front door of a school, was initiated but failed to function properly. The explosive was confined only by a plastic bag and burned rather than detonated. Property damage was limited to $25.

March 19: Virginia, Norfolk. A M116 A1 hand grenade simulator was discovered by a student on his way to night class.

March 20: Maryland, Glenelg. The detonation of a small explosive device blew out a window at Glenelg High School but caused little other damage. No injuries were reported.

March 20: Ohio, Lakewood. A fire bomb was thrown onto the driveway of a girl's school. There were no damages or injuries.

March 23: California, Pasadena. A youth suffered slight injury when he attempted to detonate a homemade bomb at a school bus stop. Following the arrest of five juveniles in connection with the incident, it was determined that the time fuse for the device had been purchased through an ad in a national magazine.

March 23: Michigan, Detroit. Following the shooting of a juvenile on a bus, a fire bomb was discovered in the possession of another juvenile passenger. The bus was en route to a school which had been the object of considerable protest and vandalism by students.

March 26: North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Seven youths were arrested for their alleged part in the fire bombing of Northside Elementary School, which reportedly burned to the ground. The incident was believed to be in protest of the killing of a black youth by members of a white motocycle gang. Damage to the structure was set at $116,000.

March 26: North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Two fire bombs extensively damaged the administration office of the Chapel Hill Public School System. This incident and the one which occurred on the North Carolina University campus the night before, were attributed to the outcome of the Stormtrooper's trial in Hillsburgh the previous week.

March 28: Minnesota, St. Paul. A 15-year-old juvenile was arrested for allegedly throwing a small blast and fragmentation device into the principal's office at Murray High School. The bomb had failed to detonate, however, and was rendered safe.

March 29: New York, New York. The George Westinghouse Technical and Vocational High School was closed in mid-afternoon after a tear gas bomb exploded in the school's cafeteria. School authorities reported that three suspects were being questioned about the incident

March 29: New York, Nassau County. Juveniles were thought to be responsible for the detonation of a pipe bomb in a high school classroom. There were no reported injuries.

March 29: Florida, Dade County. A public high school was the target of a fire bomb which ignited but caused only minor damage. An unidentified male was reportedly responsible for the vandalism.

April 1: California, El Segundo. An explosive device, consisting of a shotgun shell casing filled with smokeless powder, detonated in the boys' washroom at El Segundo High School. Damage was reported at $10.00.

April 4: California, Long Beach. A juvenile suspect was arrested following the ignition of an incendiary device in a public school playground area. Minor damage was reported.

April 6: California, El Segundo. A small explosive device, taped to the outer door of the El Segundo High School library, detonated causing an estimated $50.00 damage. This was believed to be the work of the same person who detonated a similar device at the high school the week before.

April 9: Connecticut, Groton. A fire bomb was thrown against the outer wall of the Eastern Point School. The device ignited but caused only minor damage. Another bomb and the remains of two others were found some hours later on a nearby street corner.

April 11: Florida, St. Cloud. A $1,900 fire resulted when two fire bombs were tossed into the principal's office at St. Cloud High School.

April 13: Michigan, Battle Creek. The fire bombs were thrown at Northwestern Junior High School. Only one of the devices functioned as intended, causing an undetermined amount of damage. Two boys were seen fleeing from the scene.

April 14: North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Following a night of racial protest. six youths were arrested for the fire bombing of Chapel Hill High School which caused about $1,000 damage. The suspects admitted to the bombing and to the fire bombings which occurred the previous night.

April 15: Louisiana, New Orleans. An elementary school was the target of a fire bomb thrown from a passing car. Damage was confined to a burnt area on the lawn.

April 17: Oregon, Weiser. A hand grenade simulator detonated on the Weiser Junior High School grounds between the junior high building and the gymnasium. Damage amounted to 12 windows on both buildings being broken while the junior-senior prom was in progress.

April 18: Florida, Gainesville. An unsuccessful attempt was made to fire bomb the Alachua County School Administration Building. No further details were available.

April 19: Wisconsin, Eau Claire. A fire bomb was thrown against Randall Elementary School scorching an exterior wall and damaging a classroom. The loss was set at nearly $5,000.

April 20: Michigan, Detroit. Police apprehended three juveniles in connection with the fire bombing of a junior high school which caused damage estimated at $100. The youths reportedly had been suspended from the school shortly before the incident.

April 20: California, San Diego. Minor damage resulted when a CO_2 cartridge filled with black powder detonated in a restroom at Einstein Junior High School.

April 21: Florida, Gainsville. The A. Quinn Jones School for adult education sustained heavy fire damage from two fire bombs hurled into the building. Damage estimates in the predawn incident ranged between $35,000 and $100,000.

April 25: New York, Williston Park. A parochial elementary school was the scene of a $1,000 fire attributed to a fire bomb.

April 25: Louisiana, New Orleans. An attempt was made to throw a fire bomb into Live Oak Elementary School. The device struck a window frame, fell to the ground, and burst into flames.

April 25: Georgia, Augusta. An attempt to fire bomb the home of a high school principal failed when the device deflected off a screened window and burned itself out.

April 27: Maryland, Wheaton. A military tear gas riot grenade exploded in a metal locker in a high school. The 10:45 a.m. explosion was attributed to vandalism.

April 27: California, Ventura. A teacher opening Driffill Elementary School in the morning discovered a burned-out fire bomb that had been hurled through a window sometime during the night. Ignition of the device reportedly caused about $200 worth of damage to a classroom used by mentally retarded children.

April 27: California, Mill Valley. At 11:36 a.m., a pipe bomb detonated in a boys' restroom at Tamalpais High School, slightly injuring a student.

April 27: Maryland, Rockville. In what was termed a prank, a tear gas grenade exploded inside a vacant wall locker located in the main corridor of a high school. No damage resulted.

April 28: Alabama, Birmingham. Two fire bombs were tossed at Inglenook Junior High School during the night. Both bombs failed to explode.

April 28: California, San Diego. A black powder pipe bomb detonated at Einstein Junior High School during the lunch hour, causing considerable damage to two outside metal lockers. There were no injuries, but the bomb was the second explosive device set off at the school in the last nine days.

April 28: California, West Covina. A junior high school was hit by a fire bomb which was tossed onto the roof of the building. The fire was extinguished before any significant damage resulted.

April 29: New Jersey, Hammonton. Four timed incendiary devices were placed in a boys' restroom at Hammonton High School. The items failed to function.

Apirl 29: California, Rialto. An incendiary device, consisting of gasoline soaked rags contained in a two-pound coffee can, was discovered on the ground of Boyd Elementary School. The fuse had been lighted, but the device failed to ignite.

May 1: New York, Nassau County. A fire bomb which failed to ignite was discovered in the playground area of an elementary school.

May 1: California, Woodland. A fire bomb exploded outside the home of a school teacher, causing no damage. Three teenage boys were seen in the area immediately before the incident.

May 1: New York, Nassau County. A fire bomb was placed against the outside wall of a high school in what was believed to be a racially motivated protest. The device ignited but damage was negligible.

May 2: Ohio, Columbus. During a locker inspection at McGuffey Junior High School, a fire bomb was discovered in the possession of a student who is an alleged member of the Black Vanguard. The youth was arrested.

May 2: New York, Nassau County. After having placed two fire bombs on the floor of a high school gymnasium, would-be bombers were apparently frightened off by police. The devices were recovered intact.

May 10: Indiana, Lafayette. An unignited fire bomb was recovered by a sandpile in the playground area of an elementary school.

May 11: New Jersey, Newark. A doorway of Miller Street School was damaged by a fire bomb which ignited shortly after 9 p.m. Police were seeking two youths for questioning.

May 12: Florida, West Palm Beach. A time explosive device detonated underneath the automobile of the County School Superintendent while he was attending a school board meeting. The explosion destroyed the electrical system of the car.

May 14: New York, New York. Police technicians deactivated a pipe bomb left on the rear window ledge of a junior high school.

May 14: South Carolina, Fort Jackson. After an anonymous telephone call, an incendiary device was discovered on a vent shaft in a boys' restroom at a high school. A 16-year-old boy was arrested as a suspect.

May 18: California, Chino. Two fire bombs were thrown into the offices of a weekly newspaper editor and an attorney, as they were meeting with other school board members to discuss the suspension of a Mexican-American high school student. An estimated $25,000 damage was done to the editor's office and his hands were burned while closing a door.

May 18: Arizona, Phoenix. A timed explosive/incendiary device detonated on a window ledge of the attendance office at Cortez High School, causing $500 damage. Three juveniles were arrested and charged in connection with the 8:30 p.m. incident.

May 19: New York, New York. A bomb exploded in a second floor restroom of a high school at 8:35 a.m. causing the building to be evacuated for two hours. Slight damage resulted, but there were no injuries.

May 20: Minnesota, Owatonna. A lighted incendiary device was discovered by a teacher in a washroom on the local high school. The device was rendered safe.

May 21: Michigan, East Lansing. Three suspects were arrested in connection with the pipe bombing of a high-jump mat located in a school yard.

May 28: Tennessee, Memphis. Two unignited fire bombs were discovered in Carver High School which has been the frequent object of vandalism by students.

June 1: Massachusetts, Easton. An explosion struck a locker room at Oliver Ames High School, destroying a dozen lockers and shattering seven ceiling-high windows across the room. No one was injured in the blast which occurred shortly before none.

June 2: Louisiana, New Orleans. Three students were arrested following the detonation of a small bomb at Colton Junior High School. The bomb, a homemade device employing black powder in a plastic container, exploded about 10 a.m. inside a student locker in the cafeteria. No one was injured, but damage was estimated at $400.

June 3: Missouri, Maplewood. Two small explosive devices were detonated backstage in a high school auditorium, causing no damage. A student was determined to be responsible for the incident.

June 4: California, East Los Angeles. A time bomb set to detonate after teachers and pupils left for the day exploded at Roosevelt High School causing $500 damage. The Chicano Liberation Front claimed responsibility for the incident. It was the second bombing at the school during the school term. Another device was detonated in a stairwell on September 28.

June 5: New York, Nassau County. No attempt was made to detonate a small fragmentation bomb which had been placed on the front porch of a home owned by a school teacher. The device consisted of a pint-size glass jar filled with firecracker powder and small stones.

June 6: New York, Nassau County. Two fire bombs were thrown at the home of an assistant high school principal. One of the bombs caused an estimated $1,000 damage to the property; the other failed to ignite.

June 7: California, Oakland. A meeting of a local teachers union was disrupted by the explosion of a cherry bomb thrown into a portable classroom by two unidentified youths. Two Lockwood Elementary teachers were treated for minor injuries sustained from metal pellets attached to the device.

June 9: California, Los Angeles. In an apparent celebration of the end of the school year, juveniles hurled two incendiary devices through a window at El Serreno Junior High School. Property damage was estimated at $500.

June 14: Ohio, Cleveland Heights. Shortly after noon, a signal flare was ignited in a basement locker at Heights High School. Damage was $20.

June 14: California, Pasadena. Juveniles were believed responsible for the detonation of a pipe bomb placed on an outside window ledge of a high school. $50 damage was reported.

June 15: Ohio, Cleveland. A smoke bomb placed behind a door leading to the upper floor at Roxboro Junior High School exploded shortly before noon. Only minor damage resulted.

June 16: Illinois, Northfield. Police officers responding to a telephoned report that a suspicious object was discovered on the New Trier High School grounds, found a homemade radio-controlled bomb. A juvenile suspect admitted to making the device as a prank to celerbrate the end of the school year.

June 16: California, South Pasadena. A small bomb set to explode following graduation exercises at a high school was discovered and rendered safe.

June 17: California, Oakland. A bomb was disarmed five minutes before it was set to explode. The device, constructed from three sticks of dynamite, was discovered between two portable classrooms at a junior high school while classes were in session.

June 17: Ohio, Columbus. An incendiary device, tossed against the side of an elementary school at 9:53 p.m., caused an estimated $50 damage.

June 18: California, San Francisco. On the last day of school, a bomb consisting of a cardboard cylinder filled with firecracker powder, damaged a hall locker in a high school.

June 20: Ohio, Fairview. An attempt to bomb an occupied grade school failed when a smoke bomb ignited in a window well but caused no damage to the building.

June 21: California, Torrance. Observed from a distance, three juveniles were seen tossing an incendiary device into the playground area at Hickory Elementary School. Ignition of the device caused no reported damage.

June 23: California, East Los Angeles. A bomb exploded at 11:28 p.m. severely damaging the administrative offices at Belevedere Junior High School.

June 23: California, Los Angeles. At 8:45 p.m., an explosive device knocked out windows and extensively damaged the combination facility mailroom and counseling office at Lincoln High School. Three custodians, in the building when the explosion occurred, were not injured.

June 26: Maryland, Montgomery County. A fire bomb was tossed onto the floor of a high school gymnasium scorching the floor. Damage was estimated at $200.

June 28: Tennessee, Memphis. An incendiary device was placed on a coach's chair during the lunch hour at a high school. The incident was believed to have been committed by juvenile pranksters since the clock was not working and it had no fuse.

July 5: California, San Jose. A juvenile was seriously injured when a homemade bomb he had constructed exploded prematurely. The victim was attempting to place the device under a row of bleachers at a high school. Two other youths were arrested in connection with the incident.

July 7: New York, Nassau County. A cardboard cylinder filled with firecracker power was discovered on a window ledge outside of a high school. Rain extinguished the fuse.

July 8: Ohio, Fairview. A juvenile suspect was arrested following the ignition of a smoke bomb in a public school playground area. There was no damage or injury.

July 12: California, El Monte. A homemade bomb exploded outside an elementary school classroom at approximately 11 p.m. Nearby windows were shattered, but no structural damage was reported.

July 13: Maryland, Montgomery County. A custodian discovered an incendiary device which had failed to ignite in a room housing stage scenery at a high school.

July 13: Tennessee, Memphis. Five military flare devices were discovered in the grass next to an elementary school.

July 14: California, Los Angeles. An elementary school was the target of an attempted fire bombing. A gasoline-filled bottle was thrown onto the roof of the building but did not break.

July 19: California, San Jose. An incendiary device was tossed through a window at Mildred Goss Elementary School causing an undetermined amount of damage. Several boys were seen running from the scene just before the fire.

July 19: North Dakota, Fargo. Police bomb technicians defused a fire bomb placed in the alcove of an elementary school. Five juveniles were arrested in connection with the incident.

July 19: Tennessee, Memphis. Two fire bombs were hurled into the music room of a high school, igniting a blaze which caused an estimated $600 damage.

July 19: California, Riverside. A fire bomb was thrown at a project Head Start school building scorching a wall but causing no other damage.

July 21: Oregon, Salem. A state police bomb technician dismantled a pipe bomb containing black powder after it had been placed in a high school classroom.

July 22: California, South Pasadena. What was described as a highly sophisticated device, with a clockwork timer and some form of explosive was found on the roof of a high school gymnasium several hours before commencement exercises were scheduled to begin. The device was uncovered by a student who noticed a string hanging over the roof.

July 23: California, Sacramento. Two incendiary devices were hurled against an elementary school building scorching an exterior wall.

July 25: Michigan, Posen. The entrance to a high school was scorched by a fire bomb thrown at the building about 7 a.m.

July 29: Iowa, Des Moines. A fire bomb thrown through the window of a parochial elementary school failed to function. Two suspects were subsequently arrested by police.

August 3: Indiana, Chesterton. Two fire bombs were thrown at Garyton Elementary School during the night. Neither device caused any damage.

August 7: Illinois, Rantoul. A home owned by a husband and wife who were active in the negotiations for Rantoul Township High School teachers, was damaged by an explosive device. The bomb shattered the bedroom window where the couple was sleeping.

August 9: Minnesota, White Bear Lake. An incendiary device, thrown at Sunrise Park Junior High School, caused only minor damage to the property.

August 9: New York, Nassau County. An elementary school was the target of an attempted fire bombing. Damage was confined to a scorched brick wall.

August 21: Ohio, Shaker Heights. Two incendiary devices were hurled through the classroom window of an elementary school. The damage estimate was $100.

August 24: Missouri, St. Louis. A homemade bomb exploded at 2 p.m. at an elementary school, causing minor damage to a waterspout located outside the building.

August 28: Georgia, Decatur. In what was believed to be part of a labor dispute, a black powder explosive device caused $1,500 damage to a school under construction.

August 29: Maryland, Dundalk. A high school sustained $25 damage as the result of the ignition of an incendiary device hurled at the front door of the structure.

August 29: Texas, West Columbia. Three explosive devices knocked out windows and damaged the front entrance of a high school at 11:30 a.m.

The loss was placed at $600. There was no one in the building when the incident occurred.

August 29: New Jersey, Montclair. Four boys were arrested after several fire bombs were thrown against the outside brick wall of an elementary school at approximately 9:15 p.m. There was no damage reported.

August 30: Michigan, Pontiac. Six explosive devices extensively damaged ten school buses in an incident stemming from a local school segregation controversy. Total loss to the vehicles was estimated at $150,000.

August 30: Virginia, Richmond. A 16-year-old boy was arrested after a blast and fragmentation device which he had constructed was found hidden underneath steps in an elementary school.

August 30: California, Los Angeles. El Sereno Junior High School was the scene of a $2,500 fire reportedly caused by an incendiary device hurled through a window.

September 1: North Carolina, Greenville. In an incident believed to be racially motivated, a dynamite bomb exploded at a high school. Damage was set at $2,000.

September 6: Washington, Cosmopolis. Juveniles were believed responsible for the detonation of explosive powder contained in a fire extinguisher shell on the street in front of an elementary school.

September 8: Minnesota, Minneapolis. A girls' restroom in a high school sustained approximately $1,000 damage from several small explosive devices thrown into it.

September 9: Florida, Fort Lauderdale. Eight juveniles were arrested after having thrown six fire bombs around a football field at a high school during racial disorders. No one was injured.

September 10: Florida, Jacksonville. Dynamite, rigged with a timing device, was discovered underneath a school bus. The incident was believed to have been a protest against integration by bussing of school children.

September 10: North Carolina, Pitt County. In an apparent protest of a police shooting, a dynamite bomb, placed in a high school while classes were in session, caused $30,000 damage to the structure. No one was injured.

September 12: Illinois, Chicago. A pipe bomb, which exploded on the window sill of a high school, shattered glass and damaged the ceiling of one of the administrative offices.

September 13: California, Los Angeles. An incendiary device was tossed into a storage shed at a public playground and caused $250 damage.

September 14: California, El Segundo. During a routine period patrol, a police officer discovered an incendiary device burning in the playground area of an elementary school at 9:22 p.m.

September 19: Minnesota, Minneapolis. Three young juveniles were reportedly responsible for the detonation of a pipe bomb at a parochial school. The loss was placed at $100.

September 20: California, San Jose. A fire bomb exploded in the parking lot behind a grade school, causing no damage.

September 23: Oregon, Bend. A homemade bomb exploded in a boys' restroom at Bend Junior High School 15 minutes before classes were scheduled to begin. No one was injured and damage was limited to the room where the device was planted.

September 24: New York, White Plains. Minutes after a warning was telephoned to the switchboard, a small explosive device detonated near a stairwell at White Plains High School. The blast, which occurred at about 10 a.m., caused little damage and injured no one.

September 24: California, Pasadena. An automobile owned by an assistant high school principal was the target of an incendiary device. Damage was estimated to be more than $3,000.

September 27: Michigan, Kalamazoo. One of several buses being used in a school desegregation program was slightly damaged by a fire bomb around 2 a.m. The device was thrown through a fence and landed near the rear of the vehicle. The flames were quickly extinguished by a guard on duty.

September 29: New York, Suffolk County. The ignition of a fire bomb caused $30 damage to the East Islip High School.

September 29: Michigan, Ferndale. In a series of racially motivated incidents, a fire bomb was placed near an elementary school, but failed to ignite. A suspect was arrested following a tip to police; six additional devices were discovered stored in his garage.

September 30: Ohio, Columbus. Minor damage resulted when a fire bomb was thrown at Linmore Junior High School. No injuries were reported.

October 2: Maryland, Hyattsville. An incendiary device was placed on the recreation field at Tulip Grove Elementary School. Although the device ignited, no damage resulted. The incident was believed to be experimental in nature.

October 5: California, Torrance. Two juveniles were arrested in connection with a fire bombing incident at an elementary school. A fire bomb was thrown onto the school grounds, but no real damage was reported.

October 7: California, Merced. In a racially motivated action, a high school was the target of an incendiary bomb which caused an estimated $200 damage. A suspect was apprehended a short time later.

October 9: Iowa, Davenport. A pipe bomb, reportedly constructed by three teenage boys detonated on the roof of Battendorf High School. Damage was estimated at $400.

October 11: California, El Cajon. A firecracker device was placed in an empty locker at El Cajon High School and exploded. Estimated damage was $50.

October 12: Washington, Vancouver. A commercially made smoke Bomb set fire to a waste basket in a restroom at McLaughlin Junior High School Two juveniles were subsequently apprehended.

October 13: California, San Francisco. A small explosive device detonated in a restroom of a high school at approximately 9:30 a.m., causing minor damage.

October 15: California, Downey. An explosive device, consisting of a cardboard cylinder filled with black powder, detonated inside a wall locker at East Junior High School. Damage was estimated at $300.

October 21: Tennessee, Memphis. An elementary school was damaged by the explosion of a fire bomb during another night of racial disturbances. No one was injured.

October 22: California, Pasadena. Police apprehended two brothers in connection with three pipe bombings. Two of the devices were detonated in a street and the third one exploded near a classroom in session, causing $50 damage. No one was injured.

October 23: New York, Mahopac. Two pipe bombs were hurled into the administrative offices of Mahopac High School, resulting in an estimated $50 damage.

October 25: Tennessee, Memphis. A junior high school was fire bombed during the fifth night of racial disorders.

October 27: Virginia, Fairfax County. A homemade bomb, consisting of two sticks of dynamite, was found 200 feet from an elementary school. Two juveniles were arrested.

October 27: Virginia, Alexandria. A homemade explosive device was discovered inside an elementary school. Two teenage boys were subsequently arrested.

November 2: Missouri, Scott. Two explosive devices caused $30,000 damage to a new wing of an elementary school under construction by a nonunion company. No injuries were reported.

November 12: New York, Nassau County. Juveniles were believed to be responsible for a fire bomb thrown through a window of a high school. The device failed to explode.

November 22: Connecticut, Bridgeport. An incendiary device ignited outside a high school. No damage was reported.

November 25: Utah, Salt Lake City. An explosive device was taped to the rear window of a station wagon owned by the vice-principal of Hillcrest High School. Detonation of the device caused $100 damage. Five juveniles were apprehended near the scene of the incident.

November 30: Connecticut, Bridgeport. A fire bomb was thrown onto a sidewalk at the rear of Central High School marking the second time in eight days that fire bombs have been ignited on school property. No damage to the building resulted.

December 1: New York, Nassau County. After receiving a bomb threat at a high school, a member of the staff uncovered an explosive device in a locker. A 1[illegible]-year-old boy, who had constructed the device for use in an experiment, was arrested.

December 1: California, Petaluma. A student was arrested in connection with a fire bombing incident at Petaluma Junior High School. A glass bottle filled with gasoline was thrown against an outside wall of the school around 10:30 a.m. but failed to ignite.

December 3: Michigan, Lansing. A stick of dynamite was discovered in a high school locker following an anonymous telephone warning, giving the locker number. The item was removed and destroyed.

December 3: New York, New York. A fire bomb ignited in a classroom of a Hebrew School in Brooklyn at 12:30 p.m. An instructor and three students present in the room were not injured and damage was described as minor.

December 9: Michigan, Detroit. Juveniles were thought to be responsible for a fire bomb thrown at an elementary school. Damage was slight.

December 13: New Jersey, Nutley. Two fire bombs were hurled through a classroom window of a high school. Damage was confined to a scorched floor.

December 14: Pennsylvania, York. An explosive device detonated behind a curtain in the cafeteria at York Suburban High School, slightly injuring a student. The bomb consisted of a metal cartridge casing filled with some form of explosive and wrapped in electrical tape.

December 16: Maryland, Hyattsville. Juvenile vandals were believed to be responsible for a fire bomb thrown through a classroom window at a high school. Damage was estimated at $500.

December 17: Washington, Tacoma. An incendiary device, dropped onto a concrete floor inside a high school, burned itself out. The incident appeared to be racially motivated.

December 20: Virginia, Bristol. A homemade pipe bomb exploded in the main electrical switchbox at a high school, knocking out the power for about two hours and disrupting classes. No one was injured in the 9 a.m. blast.

December 21: California, Glendale. A pipe bomb exploded in a corridor at Glendale High School, destroying one locker and damaging ten others.

[From the Congressional Record, Feb. 5, 1973]

PROBLEM: GUNS IN HIGH SCHOOLS

Gunfire in U.S. high schools is becoming more frequent.

Students are carrying and using more guns in school, and some school guards have armed themselves as a result.

Most incidents occur at inner-city high schools. The weapons are usually cheap small-caliber handguns, the so-called "Saturday night specials." Officials relate the increase to the revival of juvenile gangs in some cities and the persistence of racial tension.

An Associated Press survey around the country indicates the scope of the problem:

There have been 60 gun episodes in Los Angeles schools since September. Shots from a passing car killed a 16-year-old pupil near Locke High School. The car sped into the school parking lot, and three pupils were later arrested.

Fifteen handguns were confiscated last year in Atlanta schools. A 12-year-old boy, angered when school mates chided him for disobeying a traffic signal, got a pistol from home and opened fire on the school playground. He hit no one

Four high-school pupils, three of them girls, were expelled in January in San Francisco for carrying guns.

School officials in Topeka, Kan., took a gun from a girl who had said she needed it for protection.

There were 15 school gun cases in Detroit and in Seattle during the last year. Since September, 15 incidents were reported in New York and 16 in Kansas City.

"We have a problem and it is increasing," says Everett Copeland, security manager for Kansas City schools. "Kids carry guns for different reasons. Some say they have been threatened. Some involve extortion attempts. Some kids just say it's a status symbol."

[From the Los Angeles Times, Oct. 11, 1972]

CRACKDOWN ON WEAPONS IN SCHOOLS

Many residents undoubtedly will be shocked by a pending crackdown of the Los Angeles Board of Education on students carrying guns and other deadly weapons with them to school. Yet they shouldn't be too surprised.

With disturbing frequency, especially in the years since the middle 1960s, violence has become an unwelcome intruder into the classroom and the schoolyard. There has been an increase in physical attacks of student against student and student against teacher. Verbal abuse and verbal threat are not so rare anymore.

By no means is such violence confined to any one area or neighborhood, nor to Los Angeles alone, although recent incidents involving firearms have occurred in the southern sector of the city. Violence is no stranger to schools in many parts of the unified district. School authorities, with the cooperation of the Police Department, have been coping as best they can. Now the board, upset by the off-campus shooting of a teen-ager that led to campus arrests, has decided on a get-tough policy.

Proposed for adoption later this week is a revision of the current policy dealing with student possession of deadly weapons, ranging from guns and knives to brass knuckles and metal bars. The schools have long had adequate authority under the state Penal Code to confiscate such weapons from the student or from his locker. And the code has been enforced when necessary by campus authorities and district security officers.

Still, the board feels it is time to make it quite clear that the increase in violent incidents will be handled firmly and swifty. The get-tough policy is aimed primarily at a small number of troubleprone students who bring their quarrels from the outside onto the compus. It is meant, also, to assure administrators and teachers that they can count on the complete backing of the board and Schools Supt. William Johnston in putting down violence both before and when it surfaces.

From now on, the board intends to say, student possession of any deadly weapon will be viewed as a violent threat toward other students and teachers. Such threats will result in immediate suspension and initiation of expulsion procedures.

It is unfortunate that a crackdown on violence is even necessary. But it *is* necessary. The classroom must be maintained for learning. Terror must be banned by all possible and legal methods.

[From the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, Nov. 16, 1972]

SCHOOL VIOLENCE

The worsening situation of violence on Los Angeles city school campuses has drawn strong response from school district authorities supported by law enforcement officials.

Five students were shot last week (Nov. 10) in the latest of the senseless, vicious attacks that have particularly plagued schools in the South Central area.

"The task of finding solutions to this tragic problem is troublesome and difficult," said School Supt. William Johnston, "but solutions we must find for the sake of our young people, teachers and staff."

Solutions must indeed be found. For no community can tolerate so brazen a threat to the safety of the schools.

Johnston proposed a seven-point program, which marks a commendable start on coping with school violence:

Hiring 100 "campus safety aides" to help supervise buildings and grounds in critical areas of South Central and East Los Angeles.

Urging parents to volunteer to assist in campus supervision.

Instituting an improved system of student identification.

Strengthening communications providing additional phone lines and radio equipment for supervisory personnel.

Providing more money for necessary alterations and improvements in schools for greater safety and security.

Calling upon the City Council and Board of Supervisors for greater assistance.

Meeting with Los Angeles Police Chief Edward Davis and Sheriff Peter Pitchess to determine ways in which law enforcement agencies and the schools can work more effectively together.

The meeting of school officials with Davis and Pitchess was held earlier this week, and another will be held soon with representatives of the courts, district attorney's office and probation department .

"We must recognize that we are dealing with a problem whose roots are not in the school," said Johnston. "The roots of the problem are in the community—and the school ground eventually becomes the battleground where a resolution of conflicts is attempted."

Schoolgrounds must not become battlegrounds.

Strong action is needed to prevent any further ugly incidents. We dare not leave the schools and school children exposed to such a terrible threat.

[From the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, Nov. 28, 1972]

FOR SAFER CAMPUSES

The Los Angeles Board of Education should waste no time in providing the necessary funds for programs to combat violence on city school campuses.

To deal with the worsening situation, School Supt. William Johnston recommended $180,000 in school safety measures to the board. Most of the money could be spent to hire 100 campus "safety aides" at the most critical school locations.

In one week recently five students were shot at schools in the South Central area. That kind of vicious lawlessness cannot be tolerated.

In addition to the $180,000 proposed to fund hiring of the safety aids, the superintendent asked for money for an improved student identification program and for the improvement of security facilities on key campuses.

School officials also have acted commendably in meeting with Police Chief Edward Davis and Sheriff Peter Pitchess to find ways in which law enforcement and school authorities can work more closely together.

We strongly agree with Supt. Johnston that everything must be done "to maintain an atmosphere of safety, an environment for learning on our compuses."

"This is our commitment," said the superintendent, "to provide secure places, free from fear, for our students and teachers. We can do no less."

[From the publication Spotlight, Tuesday, Feb. 6, 1973]

SAFETY ON CAMPUS

REVIEWING THE STEPS BEING TAKEN TO MAINTAIN A "CLIMATE FOR LEARNING"

While there is no doubt that education is the very first duty of a school district, and that other activities are subordinate to that responsibility, the Los Angeles City Schools are still faced with the unattractive realization that other activities do loom to unusual proportions, at times.

Currently, this school district is confronting a situation where the "climate of learning" is nearly as important as the learning process itself. To be sure, the atmosphere in a classroom and on the campus does influence education and schools are called upon to provide a proper environment for students. As Superintendent of Schools *William J. Johnston* has said, "This is our commitment—to provide secure places, free from fear, for our students and teachers. We can do no less."

As a news item, violence on the campus has grabbed the headlines during the last few months. The recent rise in gang activity in communities has spilled over into the campus. School grounds have become battlegrounds. Young people use the school as a place to resolve their differences.

The district position is that these problems are the problems of the entire community and solutions will only result if a coordinated and planned effort is conducted by all community agencies that deal with juvenile crime and delinquency.

Many persons are irate over what is happening and are anxious that the community dig in and help minimize the problem if not completely erase it. The Los Angeles Times published an editorial (reprinted in this issue) that reflects that feeling.

VIOLENCE IN THE SCHOOLS

Another ugly shooting incident has increased the unease that has hung over Los Angles city secondary schools since the gunfire death last month of a teen-age student near a South-Central area high school.

This time, gang warfare disrupted homecoming activities at Jefferson High School. Five youths—two girls and three boys—were shot. All will recover, but three teen-age boys have been arrested and are being held by police as suspects in what has now been definitely linked to another encounter between rival youth gangs.

Parents are outraged and concerned. The roots of the problem are deeper than schoolhouse and schoolyard. But both Supt. William Johnston and State Supt. of Public Instruction Wilson Riles agree that there are steps the schools must take to keep violence from the schools.

"The schools have served as involuntary battlegrounds for society's ills," Riles insists, "and while the schools are not usually responsible for the causes, they are responsible for helping communities seek positive solutions."

Some positive actions have been taken. Riles has named a task force to seek ways of curbing school tensions stemming from student, racial and employment conflicts. The City Board of Education has adopted a get-tough expulsion policy against students bringing deadly weapons onto campuses. Task-force studies, the traditional pathway into complex problems, and expanded suspension powers are useful weapons in the war on schoolground violence. But, as Johnston made clear to the board, they are not enough. He has proposed another series of practical steps—steps the board should approve.

Johnston is asking for funds to hire 100 campus safety aides to bolster corridor, classroom and campus security at 15 troubled South-Central and East Los Angeles senior and junior highs. The safety aides would be recruited from parents, young adults and concerned residents of the endangered school neighborhoods. Additional funds are sought for extra fencing, locks, student identification and communication tools. And the schools have gone to law enforcement for assistance and propose asking the city and county for their counsel and help.

Enlisting the entire community is prudent and necessary, if an atmosphere of safety and learning is to be maintained. For without safety there will be more violence, more tragedies and less learning, first in the trouble-prone schools and later at other institutions.

Still, the task must not be left to the endangered communities alone. If the small number of troublemakers cannot be cured in the classroom, on the campus or on the streets and sidewalks, they will have to be removed from the general community. This unpleasant task, though, is the responsibility of the whole community—parents, nonparents, law enforcement, the courts and the schools.

WHAT ARE THE SOLUTIONS

What is being done about campus safety? Actually, a number of things have either been accomplished, are now in operation or are expected to be put into effect in the very near future. The board is very conscious of the problem that exists in the schools and is anxious to find a workable set of solutions.

Involvement of other agencies

In November of last year Dr. Johnston arranged for a meeting with Los Angeles Police Chief Edward Davis and Los Angeles County Sheriff Peter Pitchess to enlist their support in dealing with the delinquency and crime problems in and around schools. A few weeks later, a similar meeting was held with representatives of other agencies.

As a result, the district can expect a closer alliance with a number of concerned agencies throughout the area in dealing with problems. A city-wide committee has been established for just that purpose. In addition, principals have received memos and directives on the subject of law enforcement agencies and on dealing with violence.

Employment of campus safety aides

One of our newest programs, mentioned in the Los Angeles Times editorial, involves the hiring of 100 additional education aides whose prime responsibility is to assist the principal in campus safety. One of the key features in this program is the use of community persons, residents of the immediate area in which the school is located. This has the effect of assuring direct involvement with the community on matters of safety and vandalism in the schools.

The program is concentrated at inner-city schools where recent occurrences warrant additional adult supervision during school hours.

In order to strengthen this program even further, the district has applied for Model Cities money to fund another 136 education aides for school safety.

A tougher "deadly weapon" policy

A sudden increase in incidents on campuses involving weapons has resulted in broad action which strengthens the policy on deadly weapons on school grounds. Any student found to be carrying a deadly weapon while on school property, will have the weapon confiscated, be suspended from school and be immediately subject to expulsion.

Since the beginning of the school year, 113 expulsion cases have been either acted upon or are under consideration. Several of these reflect the "deadly weapon" policy.

Experimentation of mobile alarm system

This project is in the embryonic stage. However, the Board of Education has approved the concept and has directed the staff to experiment with a system in three high schools. We will be seeking funds from the federal government to implement the project.

The system most often discussed employs a tiny instrument which the teacher carries and activates in case of trouble in the classroom. A series of signals alerts security personnel assigned to the school, giving exact location where assistance is needed.

A force of security personnel

The core of the school district's security program is its staff of security agents and assistant agents. Their work is roughly divided between property protection and protection of students and district employees.

Most of the security activity takes place during the day with teams of personnel who are assigned to specific schools, roving security teams and investigators. When a man is assigned to a school, in most respects he becomes part of the staff. Getting to know the students on a one-to-one basis is not unusual and does much in maintaining the rapport necessary to carry out an effective security job on campus.

During after school hours, security activity is concentrated on property protection and is carried out by more than 40 security agents who conduct regular patrols or stand by to respond to alarms.

The Security Section is in the process of filling 24 additional positions for security agent. Also, recruitment is being carried out to fill 40 assistant security agent positions under the Emergency Employment Act Program.

Intrusion alarms and security hardware

Vandalism, burglary and arson occur during the off hours—in the night and on weekends. Intrusion alarms have been found to be extremely effective against this kind of loss and have been responsible for dramatic decreases in such crimes.

A quarter-million dollars have been allocated to provide security hardware to supplement the intrusion alarm. These are items such as screens, grills and fences. This work is well underway.

Student identification

A pilot program is now being conducted to determine the cost and feasibility of providing identification cards for secondary school students. The cards will include the following information: student's name, address, school, photograph and grade level. The project will be piloted at three high schools, and is expected to begin within the next few weeks.

Restitution of losses

The district conducts an active campaign to seek restitution for damages caused to school property. Naturally, this can be done only when suspects are apprehended and the names of parents or guardians are available.

First, attempts are made to settle out of court, but when this fails, the district takes cases to small claims court to attempt recovery of damages. Since July 1, 1972, the district has filed 72 such cases.

Use of plant protection animals

The Security Section has been studying the use of security dogs and is currently preparing to contract with trainers. A small experiment at one school has given the district reason to believe that security men, paired with trained dogs, make effective teams during the night hours for plant protection duties. There is no thought at this time to try such teams during school hours.

Mr. BINGHAM. The most common doubt is that it treats the symptom rather than the disease and second that it adds to the already excessive number of categorical programs of assistance. To argue that we should not undertake to provide reasonable security for school students, staff, and facilities, because of the need for more basic reforms, is like arguing that immediately available treatments for cancer should not be used pending discovery of a total cure.

And besides, as I mentioned before, a great many of the crimes committed in school are committed by outsiders who don't belong in the schools, and you obviously can't reach them entirely through better programs of education.

Similarly, many of the conditions that lead to crime in the schools are community conditions outside the control of the schools. With regard to the matter of categorical programs versus less structured funding, I would like to draw the subcommittee's attention to the recommendation of the President's Commission on School Finance.

While urging a greater State role in general education funding, the Commission also recommended continuing financial support on the part of the Federal Government to stimulate State and local public and private activity to meet national educational concerns and interests.

The Commission also made a specific point of need to remove the atmosphere of terror from the schools.

Federal leadership is essential in the achievement of security without repression in all of our schools. The task of developing and testing proper school security methods is beyond the capability of local and State school systems.

The fact that security activities could threaten constitutionally guaranteed rights of students, teachers, and staff, argues for close Federal guidance.

Finally, by enactment of the Safe Streets Act and other legislation, the Congress had identified crime as a matter of overriding national urgency and concern in which the Federal Government must play a major role. This should be no less the case with regard to crime in the schools than it is with regard to crime in the streets.

Mr. Chairman, the Federal Government invests over $3 billion a year in elementary and secondary education. Responsible estimates, and you will hear more of that later today, are that as much as $500 million a year in equipment, supplies, and facilities are lost through vandalism alone.

But the human cost of crime in the schools is even more significant than the dollar cost. Certainly there is no more important institution in our society than our school system within which to preserve and protect personal security and individual rights.

I believe the Safe Schools Act or similar Federal legislation would greatly contribute to that pressing goal.

Mr. Chairman, let me point out some of the particularly important provisions of the Safe Schools Act. First, the legislation is drafted as an amendment in the form of an additional special grant program under title I of the Elementary and Secondary Act.

Second, school systems are provided with great latitude in the type of security activities they may implement with Federal funds.

Three, the use of Federal funds under the act to support a security program involving the use of firearms or other weapons in the school is explicitly prohibited. Obviously we don't want a garrison State in our schools with a lot of firearms and so forth.

Four, criteria for Federal approval of grant applications includes, in addition to general eligibility under title I, the impact of crime on the school district. The degree to which the proposed security program enjoys parent, faculty, and community support and assurance that student and staff civil rights will be preserved.

Crime is specifically defined as "any unlawful act or activity not including any violation of any rule, regular code of behavior established by any organization not enacted into law." In other words, what we are trying to get at here are things that really are violations of law, really are crimes, and not just mischief and loud talk or disorder in the corridors, or that kind of thing.

Mr. Chairman, I don't know how you would care to proceed. We have some distinguished witnesses here from different parts of the country.

Mr. PERKINS. You may call your witnesses to make their statements and then we can question them following the testimony.

Mr. BINGHAM. The first gentleman I would like to introduce is Mr. Joseph Grealy. Mr. Grealy is currently president of the International School Directors Association. He is a former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He is presently security director for the Broward County school system, which includes Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

Mr. Grealy is accompanied today by Mr. Lou Burton, security director for Alexandria, Va. public schools and Washington representative of the International School Security Directors Association; and Mr. Edward D. Brady, a founder and past president of the association and currently director of security for the Chicago, Ill., public schools.

Gentlemen, would you come up to the table. Mr. Burton and Mr. Brady.

Mr. PERKINS. Without objection, all of the prepared statements will be inserted in the record. As the witnesses proceed with their testimony, I would like for them to keep in mind one thought—whether we have such data to legislate now, or whether we should further study this most important problem.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH I. GREALY, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL SECURITY DIRECTORS, ACCOMPANIED BY L. W. BURTON, SECURITY DIRECTOR FOR ALEXANDRIA, VA. PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND WASHINGTON, D.C. REPRESENTATIVE, THE INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL SECURITY DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION; AND EDWARD D. BRADY, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY FOR THE CHICAGO, ILL., PUBLIC SCHOOLS, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, IASSD

Mr. Grealy. First I would like to recognize two other people in the audience, my daughter, Mary Grealy, who is a teacher in the Alexandria school system where she is a speech therapist, and the boy she is engaged to, Charles Zappala, a student of Georgetown Law School.

Mr. Perkins. We welcome you here this morning.

Mr. Grealy. Mr. Chairman and members of the General Subcommittee on Education, we thank you so much for your courtesy in having us here today. Our Association of School Security Directors as you know, consists of school officials with direct responsibility for the safety of our children, teachers and schools from all over the country. These officials have banded together to combat what has become a drastic destructive situation of violence, major crime, arson, robbery and vandalism in most of the school districts of the Nation.

Per our letter of February 8, 1973, to you. Mr. Chairman, and our meeting with you and the general counsel, also on that date, we are hopeful of having the opportunity to present detailed testimony on the Safe Schools Act which you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Bingham and a considerable number of Members of Congress in the House and Senate have introduced legislation pertaining thereto.

We are hopeful of bringing, at the pleasure of the Chairman and the general subcommittee, major officials or members of our organization from such places where information is especially pertinent, such as: Houston, Tex.; Lexington, Ky.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Miami, Fla.; Chicago, Ill.; Atlanta, Ga.; New Orleans, La.; Baltimore, Md.; San Diego, Calif.; Seattle, Wash.; and Detroit, Mich.

We also are hoping to hear from cosponsor Members of Congress, both the House and Senate.

We also would welcome the imput of other major organizations, such as NEA; AFT; PTA; the Chief State School Officers; the American Association of School Administrators and others.

We do urge the general subcommittee to accept our view that we have a critical situation facing our schools today.

Our own estimates are at about one-half billion dollars are being lost annually in our schools due to arson, robbery, violence, and vandalism.

We are now in the process of setting up a report system on crimes occurring in the schools which is patterned after the FBI uniform crime reporting. This will give us a current picture of the crime that is taking place in school systems throughout the country. We are surveying reports coming in and data being developed.

We are concerned about Federal expenditures and inflation, as are you in the Congress. Perhaps the first step in dealing with the safety in schools should be a series of pilot projects * * * urban, suburban, inner city and rural * * * plus a special committee staff effort for further developing nationally for Congress the loss and crime data we mentioned earlier. This could be done with a few million dollars rather than calling for an immediate expenditure of real large grant funds, for example, 50 to 100 million.

The State/Federal role can then be more properly determined.

Personnel in the area of dealing with this problem should be especially trained and capable * * * security, safety * * * yes. Uniformed armed police in our schools * * * no.

We deplore the increasing incidents of crime and violence involving our schoolchildren, teachers and other school personnel and property which seriously disrupts the educational process. Major energies and resources are being deflected from the quest of quality education.

We do support the proposed legislation, Mr. Chairman.

We further respectfully petition the opportunity of being heard later with more detailed testimony and varied expert witnesses.

[The resolution follows:]

THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL SECURITY DIRECTORS FORMAL RESOLUTION FOR THE ASSOCIATION

Whereas the security problems facing school systems throughout the United States are costing hundreds of millions of dollars; and

Whereas the increasing incidence of violence involving school children, teachers and other school personnel is seriously disrupting the educational process; and

Whereas the limited current statistics show a startling increase in monetary and material losses attributable to acts of vandalism, theft and arson, much of this equipment being Federally funded; and

Whereas the general school security situation is deflecting major energies and resources from the quest for quality education, which is the primary goal of any school system: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the International Association of school security directors, which consists of School Security Directors from more than forty States throughout the United States, and who are directly responsible for the safety and security of both students and faculty, and the protection of the physical plant of school systems, respectfully call upon the power and influence of the U.S. House of Representatives to initiate legislation and programs, as well as to direct revenue from existing programs, toward helping us combat the national problem of controlling and reducing the rapidly increasing number of school security problems which now seriously threaten the primary mission of the public schools and the safety of our children.

Mr. PERKINS. Thank you for an excellent statement.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Grealy.

Our next witness is Mr. James Kelly. He is assistant director of research for the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Mr. Kelly has directed that association's response to requests for assistance from schools on crime and he has conducted a number of training sessions for school security personnel on behalf of the association. Mr. Kelly, would you come up please.

STATEMENT OF JAMES KELLY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE

Mr. KELLY. Mr. Perkins, we welcome the opportunity to speak to you today in behalf of children across the country who are facing a serious problem. The staff of the International Association of Chiefs of Police is charged with the task of identifying critical issues in law enforcement and public security, and designing methods of addressing those issues.

One such issue is crime in our schools. This serious threat to a safe and secure learning environment within our school systems was recognized through studies conducted by IACP's National Bomb Data Center. It was discovered that, between July 1970 and June 1971, 297 actual bomb devices were either placed or were detonated at educational institutions. This placed educational institutions as the third hardest hit bomb target in the Nation. Approximately two-thirds of these attacks were in elementary or secondary public schools. The threats were too numerous to count.

This information caused the Public Security Center of IACP to give school security a high priority position on the list of critical issues to be addressed. The first step toward providing some assistance in the area of school security was to announce through the American Association of School Administrators that literature in this area was available. Booklets on bomb incident policy, prevention and response were made available by the IACP and to date 937 school administrators have requested this information.

In April of 1972, the IACP, in cooperation with the American Association of School Administrators and the International Association of School Security Directors, held a conference in Denver, Colo. Ninety-four school administrators and school principals attended. The main concern of that conference was "School Bombings."

A major point surfaced in conjunction with preparing and conducting this conference. That point was that as serious as the bombing issue was, school security problems went much deeper. This consensus developed through: Reports submitted by the conference attendees; statements made by the lecturers; a review of the literature conducted in preparation for the conference; phone calls and letters received from interested school authorities who did not attend the conference.

It would appear that this information is masked because:

1. The National Crime Information Center does not collect offense statistics on a target category basis.
2. The FBI Uniform Crime reports do not report crime statistics on a target category basis.
3. Local law enforcement agencies base their reporting methods on the reporting systems mentioned above.
4. Many of the offenses are handled informally by school authorities and are not reported to the police.
5. Many of the offenders apprehended are juveniles and fall outside the normal crime reporting methods.
6. Presently no agency beyond the school district level collects this information on a routine basis.

Based on the information collected by the IACP, security problems for schools can be listed as:

1. Unlawful intrusion resulting in (*a*) Severe losses through arson, (*b*) Costly and disruptive vandalism, and (*c*) Larceny of teaching and office equipment.
2. Trespassing resulting in (*a*) Promotion and sale of narcotics,

(*b*) Assaults on teachers and students, and (*c*) Extortion of money from students.

3. Disorders caused by or resulting in (*a*) Communications breakdown between administration, teacher, students, and parents, (*b*) Disruption of the educational process, (*c*) The creation of a circuslike atmosphere in the school setting, (*d*) The breakdown of authority, and (*e*) Destruction of property.

The evidence available gave the IACP new direction. In November 1972, a second conference was held in Washington, D.C. The subject of that conference was broader in scope, attempting to convey particular concepts of security systems design and security related procedures. Eighty-two school administrators, school principals, and police officials were present. At the conference, the Public Security Center of IACP offered to the school systems, onsite technical assistance on a cost reimbursable basis.

These experiences with the school systems' personnel further solidified the IACP's course of direction. Our approach has been strengthened, and during 1973 the Public Security Center will offer school security clinics at six locations throughout the United States. These clinics will be teaching experiences where knowledge will be transferred to school authorities in the following areas:

(1) Contemporary American social problems as the setting for school security.
(2) Legal issues.
(3) Preparing a school security program.
(4) The role of a school security unit.
(5) Civil disorders in the school.
(6) Crowd control and athletic events.
(7) Bomb threats and incidents.
(8) Arson.
(9) Architectural considerations.
(10) Designing a intrusion detection system.
(11) Complementary target hardening techniques.
(12) Property control and accountability.
(13) Incident reporting.
(14) Special programs.
(15) Applying for security related Federal and State grants.

We will attempt at that time to provide information on how school administrators can relate through the law enforcement agencies to seek security-related funding.

Since April of 1972, the IACP has attempted to interest the Office of Education and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in resolving the problem of school security, a great deal of sympathy has been offered, but no action has been forthcoming. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare representatives respond that it is a local law enforcement problem. The Justice Department responds that it is an educational problem.

The police chiefs believe that it is quite clear that crime in the schools is a shared problem between the educators and the police. However, just as educators cannot be expected to provide the direction for all of our social institutions, neither should it be expected that the role of the police is to control our schools. Indeed, in a democratic society such a step could only be counterproductive.

A school whose environment requires patrolling of the halls by a brace of armed and uniformed police officers, needs to make an agonizing reappraisal of its worth.

The IACP thinks the role of the police should be to provide security training and technical assistance to school administrators, to respond to emergencies, and to make external crime prevention patrols. Police are interested in communicating with teachers and students in positive human programs, which in some cases could lead to constructive police assignments to schools as teachers and counselors.

The IACP concurs with the Office of Education, that school security is essentially a local problem, but unfortunately it is not quite that simple. No basic doctrine for school security exists. The need for it is a relatively new phenomena. As family life and other social controls deteriorate, the maintenance of order in the schools becomes more difficult.

The problems of order in the schools are not exclusive to the urban areas. They tend to vary between communities and therefore, no single overall solution can be offered.

It is significant to recall that the maintenance of order and security procedures are not among the subjects offered in the colleges training educators. Experience reflects that these concepts are foreign to educators.

The very large school systems often have the financial resources available to employ individuals and consultants to design security programs for them. Unfortunately, less than 100 systems out of approximately 18,000 can afford this solution. But the vast majority of the school districts have limited resources, and are unable to take this approach. They depend on local law enforcement for security. But, the school districts tend not to be consistent with police jurisdictional lines, and help to these schools must be split or shared. It should also be noted that school security concepts and alternatives are beyond the scope of the training received by most local police officials.

The IACP plans to continue to offer instructional programs concerning security to those school authorities and police officials who desire it.

The association also plans to continue to make onsite technical assistance available to those school districts so requesting.

The IACP's Public Security Center is currently examining the financial feasibility of preparing a school security manual for educators. The purpose of providing such a document is to offer to school administrators a reference source which will assit them in designing security programs to meet the unique needs of their particular community.

It is the belief of the IACP that some central leadership must be provided to collect information about crime in the schools. Timely, pertinent and practical information about human programs and hardware systems should be disseminated to the local level.

I offer to you as an example, a study made by Research Analysis Corp., funded by the Justice Department. This important report rests now in obscurity in somebody's file cabinet.

Mr. Perkins. If you can furnish the committee several copies of that report, we would like to have them.

Mr. Kelly. I will furnish to you the one that I have.

Mr. Perkins. It is too large to make it a part of the record but we would like to have a copy for the use of the committee members.

Mr. Kelly. The point is that we think this kind of information needs to be disseminated to those people who are on the front lines of the local school districts and local police departments.

In conclusion, the IACP offers some recommendations concerning the future direction to be taken in providing assistance to local school systems and law enforcement agencies relative to crime in the schools. They are as follows:

1. The creation of a voluntary program to collect (*a*) school related crime statistics, (*b*) case histories of crime in the schools, (*c*) experiences gained while coping with school security issues, (*d*) results of school security programs, and (*e*) school security operational information.
2. An extension of the information collections program that would quickly process the data into practical and useful information to be disseminated in bulletin fashion on a continuing basis to (*a*) State and local school authorities, (*b*) State and local law enforcement officials, (*c*) colleges of education, and (*d*) researchers.
3. The design and implementation of several different experiments in security programing to be conducted on a voluntary basis in school systems of differing size, environment and problem depth.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. Bingham. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.

Our last witness, Mr. Chairman, is Mr. Rex Moon, who is senior vice president and director of studies, Academy for Educational Development, a nonprofit planning and consulting organization. He was formerly director of the College Scholarship Service of the College Entrance Examination Board and he comes from my own State of New York.

Accompanying Mr. Moon is Ms. Mary Goodman, who has worked with Mr. Moon in examining school security programs on a consulting basis for several major school systems.

STATEMENT OF REXFORD G. MOON, JR., SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INC.

Mr. Moon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As Congressman Bingham indicated, I am associated with the Academy for Educational Development which is a nonprofit, tax exempted educational research and study organization. I am not speaking on behalf of the academy today but as a person knowledgeable and interested in the future of today's schools. I am here at your invitation and will address my remarks to school safety and will suggest what I view as very important long term remedies for this problem.

I have appeared before this committee and some of its subcommittees in the past as an expert witness for the American Council on Education. My knowledge gleaned from research which I was doing in higher education in the early sixties enabled me to help this committee in its efforts to produce much needed support for higher education. I hope that my remarks today will be of equal assistance to you in your important work on behalf of the public schools.

Personal safety in the Nation's largest public schools today has become a more than casual concern of a great many people. There is a tremendous sense of urgency abroad to do something about this problem. Educators in the earliest schools in the country were confronted and had to cope with disruptive behavior of all kinds. At one time in American society it was sufficient in most cases to say "I'll tell your mother on you."

When that failed, suspension, dismissal and corporal punishment measures were available to every person in the school, from janitor to principal. Each was a kind of safety officer and the laying on of hands was not infrequently practiced. In a major way we have tried to build fear-free environments because our research told us that there would be more cognitive and affective learning with positive rather than with negative rewards.

Unfortunately, while we were reducing tensions between the child, teacher and the school, tensions were building increasingly in society on the outside, especially in the big cities of our Nation where personal safety is a big problem in the schools.

Today, large city schools with relatively few exceptions, are oversized, impersonal, dehumanizing centers where 3,000 to 6,000 children assemble every day to follow the same daily routine, obey the same regulations, and seemingly carry on the same fights.

Attending schools today is one of the least attractive alternatives open to many youngsters. I have had students tell me that doing time in Vietnam or even in prison seems to be no less attractive than going to school. In fact, I am thinking seriously of asking the National Institute of Education for a grant to study the similarity between school unrest and prison strife.

Besides the problems that students bring to school with them, today's schools are contributing their fair share to the frustration levels of youth. The failure of the schools to reach these youngsters with an education is the thread which binds all disruptions and disruptors. The statistics on school violence and disruption are utterly undependable, and this lack of sound data is one area to which national attention might be given. However. even without accurate figures, no one questions that the so-called "intruder" is the source of most trouble in the schools. But if we look carefully, this intruder is most frequently a youngster who is or should be on the register of another school. Unfortunately, the unbelievable educational and social retardation with which the big city school has to deal makes a mockery of ordinary instruction and instructional groupings. In this failure lies the seeds of most school "unsafety".

On the other hand. in spite of Christopher Jenck's theories. I can enumerate scores of big city efforts where large amounts of money are paying dividends. These are generally schools where the impact of specially trained and committed people is responsive to the social and educational deficiencies of the student. In the innercity environment it takes $2,500 to $3,000 expenditure per youngster to provide an adequate level of service. You and I both know, Mr. Chairman, that that is an expenditure few school systems are able to undertake.

In simplest terms then, the school that turns off and turns out kids develops its own problems of personal safety in the schools.

I think every one in this room today would agree that the best answer to school safety is more teachers; more counselors; smaller more cheerful buildings, and at the end of the school road: a guarantee of a job, more education, or both. These continue to be the long-range objectives of the American economic and social system. They represent values that have held up well in our 200 years as a nation, and they probably are the principal reason that as a nation we have done so well.

My contention is that we will find the solutions for school safety in trying to do better what we as educators know best—how to work with young people as individuals. To return the schools to physical tranquillity in the midst of intellectual ferment, there will have to be further efforts at humanizing the school, increasing the service to students, and attempting to turn on kids through human efforts as substitutes for the increasingly prevalent artificial means. There will also have to be increased efforts to improve and diversify the processes by which children increase their affective as well as cognitive foundation for life.

Let me be more specific. A long time ago the Nation's big cities found that educated young people could be enlisted to help cool the streets, to serve as parent substitutes for those kids for whom the streets are more a home than the two-room apartments in which they live. These children don't turn off their "life-of-the-streets" when they come to school. Their value systems, frustrations, aspirations are with them as they are with all of us no matter where we are—in school, in the Congress, or at home. My belief, the one that I preach whenever given an opportunity to do so, is that increased student service is the answer to school safety.

The student service concept, in my view, is characterized by: (*a*) outreach, (*b*) advocacy, (*c*) negotiations, and (*d*) counseling. Mr. Chairman, this means putting more people in our schools, call them student service workers if you will. It means new expenditures for school systems.

Above all, it means that administrators will have to rethink their relationships with young people, a process long overdue, because, Mr. Chairman, educators cease to be educators when they have to use the police as a substitute or as a replacement for the educational process. Please understand, Mr. Chairman, that I do not delude myself into thinking that there will not be people in the schools who will have to be restrained, who may have to be expelled, who may have to be arrested, and remanded to prison. What I am advocating, however, is a system of dealing with problems in the schools by people who have a broader role than restraint. They must be people trained to attempt to achieve their mission through persuasion and not through power, who have the confidence of the youth of the school, and who can play the variety of "substitute" roles which so many of our students need but cannot find in the absentee parent, the overworked teacher, the nonexistent guidance counselors, and the paper-shuffling administrator.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit as support for this testimony a set of plans that we have recently developed which outlines the philosophy herein expressed in greater detail.

[The information follows:]

A SAFER ENVIRONMENT FOR LEARNING—A REPORT BY THE PANEL ON SCHOOL SAFETY, APPOINTED BY THE ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

OCTOBER 31, 1972.

Dr. HARVEY SCRIBNER,
Chancellor, New York Board of Education, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Mr. HENRY RUTH,
Director, Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, New York, N.Y.

GENTLEMEN: As the Panel appointed by the Academy for Educational Development to evaluate the safety program in the New York City Schools, we are pleased to submit this final report containing the results of our study and our recommendations concerning many aspects of the school system as they relate to school safety.

School budgets across the country are being pared to the bone, but funds devoted solely to security personnel and hardware are increasing. While we recognize the need for increased funding to effect improved safety, we believe that greater investments in safety personnel and hardware alone are neither educationally productive nor likely to bring about the desired end. Thus, in addition to personnel and hardware, our recommendations include several educational improvements which, we believe, will make a major contribution toward making the schools safer places in which to teach and learn.

Your speedy acceptance and implementation of our Interim Report on safety personnel has suggested the high priority that you accord this problem area. In this report, we have elaborated further on the type of safety staff required, examined the safety functions and roles of other members of the school community and the community at large, and have suggested revision of the curriculum and modification of the physical plant.

We believe that this integrated, humanizing approach to the critical problem faced by school systems all over the country will be most likely to provide a sound, safe atmosphere for education.

We want to thank both of you and your organizations for the substantial assistance you have given us in the conduct of this study. Not only has the personnel at the Board of Education given freely of its time, but they have opened doors all over the City so that we have been able to talk with municipal, police, and agency officials to get the broadest possible picture of the problem and the greatest number of suggestions for solutions.

In addition, Madelyn Heintz, Peter Grey, and Tobias Berman of the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council have been ready at all times to lend counsel and encouragement to our work and to suggest further avenues of exploration.

We know, therefore, that you and your staffs share our sense of urgency about the problem of school safety and our desire to find innovative, constructive solutions. We hope you will feel free to continue to call on us for any further assistance we may offer.

Thank you for giving us this opportunity to be of service to you and to the children of New York City in this vital area.

Sincerely,

SAMUEL M. BROWNELL.
STEPHEN BAILEY.
EUGENE CALLENDER.
BIAGIO DI LIETO.
EDMUND GORDON.
MARY KOHLER.

I. INTRODUCTION

The New York City public schools, like those of other cities and towns throughout the nation, reflect the lawlessness and violence which is evident in society at large. The schools which report the highest number of incidents are located where police reports show crime rates are the highest.

Yet Americans have always expected of their schools that they will lead the way to a better life through education—to greater income, greater social mobility, greater acceptance, and now to a greater atmosphere of safety and tranquility.

In an effort to achieve this optimum atmosphere for learning and teaching, free of fear for personal safety and for the safety of equipment and plant, the New York City Board of Education asked the Academy for Educational Development, Inc. to evaluate its existing safety program and to make both short-range and long-range recommendations for its improvement. The Academy conducted a series of studies covering many aspects of school safety in New York as well as in Chicago, Washington, Flint, Michigan, and other cities throughout the country. The results of these investigations were presented to a panel of distinguished citizens who have reviewed the Academy's findings and are submitting them in this report with accompanying recommendations.

The study led the Panel to the unanimous conclusion that the learning environment in the schools could best be made safe by:

1. PROVIDING A FLEXIBLE AND RELEVANT CURRICULUM

Oversized, overcrowded schools which offer irrelevant courses to disinterested students inevitably turn off these young people. They leave the classroom in boredom and become disruptive in the halls, or quit the building and disrupt other schools. If the system is to provide them with the education they need to function effectively in our society, it must provide them with an education that they want and will accept. Indeed, the earlier study conducted by the Academy for Educational Development for the Guidance Advisory Council and the recently released Fleischmann Report documented dramatically the extent to which the current curriculum fails to meet the needs of the students.

2. CREATING MORE PERSONALIZED SCHOOL ENVIRONMENTS

Required along with a flexible curriculum are smaller, more personalized school units (until less overwhelming school edifices can be built), more student involvement in curriculum and decision making, alternate educational and attendance opportunities, and an effective grievance procedure which will assure students that injustices committed against them—as well as by them—will be fairly adjudicated.

That these elements make for more viable schools is evidenced by the vocational schools. Their average enrollment is 1,650, their students have opted to attend, and enrollees are motivated by achievement goals which are meaningful to them. The record shows that these schools are relatively trouble free—only 25 safety personnel are assigned to the 25 vocational schools while 275 are assigned to the other 71 high schools.

The prisonlike atmosphere that prevails in many of the schools must be reduced, not increased by a greater police or guard presence.

3. INVOLVING THE ENTIRE SCHOOL AND OUTSIDE COMMUNITY IN THE SAFETY PROGRAM

Recognizing that most trouble in the school is a reflection of the society beyond the schoolroom door, the Panel agreed that the primary emphasis must be on community involvement to engender community respect for its educational institutions. Such involvement and respect will provide more security than any number of police, guards, or other security personnel.

A school safety program must involve definition of and acceptance of some responsibility not only by the school administrators and public and school safety officials and specialists, but by school employees, parents and the students themselves. At the same time, it is important to insure protection of individual rights of alleged offenders as well as to safeguard possible victims and to recognize that human values take precedence over property where it is necessary to make such a determination.

4. CONCENTRATING ON THE PREVENTION OF CRISES BEFORE THEY DEVELOP

An effective program to resolve the problems of school safety must involve both responses to crises and ongoing provisions aimed at preventing the development of crises. At the same time, actions taken to deal with sudden emergencies must be consistent with plans to meet long-range safety objectives and must not merely delay attention to alleviating the causes of unsafe conditions. It is equally important to avoid the build-up of a security structure which could prevent the development of more effective safety measures. Reasonable safety for all who go to the schools on legitimate business or who attend school by law places upon public safety officials, budget authorities, school administrators, and other school employees, a mandate to provide essential safeguards for the person and property of pupils and school employees while in school or on their way to and from performing their required responsibilities.

In considering ways to establish a fear-free learning environment, the Panel was unanimous in its feeling that the emphasis must be on an understanding and forewarning of problems rather than on punitive action against perpetrators.

This report, by assignment, deals with only a small segment, but a very important part, of the total safety problems and responsibilities of the school system. In dealing primarily with personal safety, the Panel has attempted to keep in mind the total safety responsibility of the school system and the relationship of the safety program to other functions in the school system.

II. Summary of Recommendations

With respect to providing a more flexible curriculum, the Panel has made the following recommendations:

1. The Panel joins the Fleischmann Commission in recommending that the New York State Board of Regents propose to the State Legislature that it revise its regulations to permit reimbursement on the basis of all types of school enrollment, not just average daily attendance at a traditional school.
2. The opportunities for alternate study should be greatly expanded so that students feel a sense of relatedness to the curriculum offered them.
3. Career and work-study opportunities should be expanded and modernized regulations to permit reimbursement on the basis of all types of school enrollment, inspiration.
4. The Board of Education should make provision for tutoring by high school students wherever it seems feasible and desirable.
5. The curriculum and scheduling offered in New York City schools should be made more flexible to meet a wider variety of student needs.

The Panel made the following recommendations for creating a more personalized school environment:

1. The number of students registered in the average school unit should be sharply reduced.
2. The School Planning and Research Division should explore various internal improvements which might make school facilities less imposing and more welcoming.
3. All new school facilities should require the approval of the Administrator for School Safety regarding these features related to his responsibilities.
4. An exhaustive study should be made to determine the optimum size, educationally, of any schools to be built in the future.

The Panel made the following recommendations regarding involvement of the entire school and outside community:

1. The principal should establish a School Safety Committee with broad representation from the school community and the community-at-large.
2. The Chancellor should require each school principal and School Safety Committee to prepare a comprehensive Safety Plan for the school and that this plan should be submitted for approval to the School Safety Office.
3. Teacher contact hours with students in the classroom, the halls, the lunchroom, etc. should be maximized in order to build better interpersonal relationships between faculty and students.
4. The role and responsibilities of the teachers in the school safety program should be precisely delineated and made clear to both faculty and students.
5. Custodial and maintenance staff should be given an active role in the school safety program.
6. The School Safety Office should develop a training course to make custodial staff aware of the safety-related features of their job.
7. Students should play an active role in the safety program if they themselves opt to do so through their representation on the School Safety Committee.
8. A training program for Student Service Aides should be developed.

9. The Panel urges the Board of Education to request the reassignment of police to the schools until such time as the principals and the local precinct commander agree that continued police presence is no longer necessary.

10. Regular meetings should be held with the precinct commander, the principal, the staff member in charge of safety, the narcotics coordinator, and the custodian.

Following is a summary of the recommendations on safety administration and personnel from the Interim Report:

1. Responsibility for the application of the guidelines designed to meet the designated objectives should be delegated by the Chancellor to an Administrator for School Safety whose sole responsibility would be to administer the safety program.

2. Specialized personnel should be assigned in the schools to work in the safety program. It is not desirable to build a paramilitary force which would have a tendency to become institutionalized and thus might persist long after the societal conditions which called it into being have disappeared. Personnel to be selected should include:

   a. Student Service Officers—in the number to be determined by the Assistant Chancellor for School Safety in consultation with high school principals and District Superintendents.

   b. Student Service Coordinators—twenty professionals—former teachers, lawyers, policemen, etc.—to serve in teams of two as sources of information, advice, supervision, and emergency aid. They would provide a continuing liaison between the Central board and the high schools and Community Districts on matters of safety.

3. All Student Service personnel should be hired on the same basis as other non-teaching school staff. They should have the same job security and fringe benefits.

4. Student Service Officers and Coordinators should not wear uniforms nor carry arms.

5. Separate training programs should be developed so that Student Service Officers and Student Service Coordinators can each have a thorough grounding in community relations and people management as well as City and school laws and regulations.

6. Principals should receive special training on how to respond to the new types of problems arising in schools today. The course should include sensitivity training focused on such problem areas as the disaffected student and the community expressing hostility to the school. It should also cover such topics as how to recognize a brewing crisis, how to respond to a non-negotiable demand, and when to call the police.

7. Attendance at safety workshops by high school principals should be required of all present principals and be a prerequisite to appointment for all future principals.

As a result of further study, the Panel now adds the following recommendations:

1. The Safety Office should include two assistants to the Administrator, one for operations and one for administration.

2. The Board of Education and the Administrator for School Safety should enlarge the corps of Student Service Coordinators.

3. Community School Districts should be urged to participate in the new safety program and training which is being offered to them by the Central Board.

4. In-school safety personnel should be selected by each school principal, subject to screening and hiring by the Administrator for School Safety.

The Panel also made the following recommendations:

1. A task force of principals should meet with representatives from the Chancellor's office to seek more effective ways of dealing with cases of suspension, while mindful of the rights of the suspended student and those of the rest of the student body.

2. The Board of Education should acquire the camera and laminating machinery which will enable every student and teacher have a plastic I.D. card containing both his photograph and program.

3. Increased psychological and psychiatric services should be established within the school system.

4. An effective grievance machinery should be established in each school.

5. Safety personnel should use every available resource to reduce the amount of drug use in the schools.

III. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM

In establishing a program of school safety, the Panel had to consider not only the actual problems, but the problems as they are perceived by the public including members of the school community. Students cannot learn and teachers cannot teach in an atmosphere where they fear for their personal safety. Whether their fears are grounded in reality or are a reaction to exaggerated rumors, these fears must be reduced to a minimum if the education provided by the schools is not to be seriously impaired.

School safety is a real problem, certainly, to those who have been mugged or robbed or had their authority aggressively challenged. It is a real problem also to the taxpayer who, in 1971, paid $1,300,000 for security guards, over $3,500,000 for police stationed in the schools, and suffered $3,700,000 worth of damage from vandalism, arson, and unlawful entries. This does not include the many unreported losses, the labor spent on washing or repairing graffiti-covered walls, nor the educational loss suffered due to equipment stolen from the classroom. It is also a deeply felt problem to many who have never been confronted but who have read or heard about or viewed incidents which may or may not have been greatly exaggerated. The school safety program must alleviate these perceptions and fears, as well as reduce the actual level of incidence.

A survey of the literature on school safety shows a mass of data and opinion on the failure of the "system" to hold student interest, producing an increasingly large number of dropouts or class cutters. The turned-off students represent a major threat to school safety. Not only do non-attenders damage people and property in their own school, they usually make up the vast majority of the intruders in other schools. That is, those who invade and thereby threaten the tranquility of the schools, as in the recent rash of robberies, usually found to be of school age and often on the register of some other school. As the literature says repeatedly, if their teachers could interest them in staying in class and in school, the safety problem would decrease sharply. In the elementary schools and some junior high schools, the age level of intruders is apparently no different although the Community School Boards, even more than the General Board, lack reliable data.

The literature also includes specific suggestions regarding smaller school size, better drug programs, universally available day care centers to give children a better start in school, and greater vocational and other educational alternatives. Virtually all of the books and articles surveyed emphasized the need for a broader range of options to satisfy the many needs of the vast student population. When education is restricted to rigid teaching and narrow curriculum requirements, and takes place in massive imposing buildings, students tend to feel they are in prison and react accordingly.

Specific case studies were conducted in four large New York City high schools all with troubled histories. The study staff questioned more than 300 people within four groups—administrators, faculty, students, and security personnel. The perceptions of these groups were sought regarding the causes of disruption and crime in the schools.

The major problem areas with respect to school safety mentioned by more than four of these 16 groups of respondents (4 groups in each of 4 schools) were:

The large number of exits and entrances in the building and the impossibility of keeping out intruders;

Class cutters;

Low reading scores and the consequent frustration with or apathy toward learning among turned-off students;

Teacher insensitivity to students, particularly minority students or those not highly motivated;

Laxness of discipline on the part of courts, teachers and administrators;

Insufficient counseling personnel; and

Too few guards.

It is interesting to note that no student groups mentioned low reading scores as a factor in school safety and no administration group mentioned laxness of discipline. All student groups mentioned teacher insensitivity.

All four groups in two of the schools and three in a third school agreed that the level of disruption and drug abuse had lessened in 1971–1972 compared with the previous year. This coincides with other evidence obtained by the study staff such as:

1. The Police Department's Crime Analysis Report of Complaints in the public schools which shows fewer complaints in almost every category—anti-personnel crimes, anti-property crimes, larceny and drugs and other felonies as well as misdemeanors and violations for January to May 1972 compared with January to May 1971. Only arrests for loitering and possession of dangerous weapons showed any increase.

2. Two-thirds of the 93 high schools responded to a questionnaire asking whether there had been less, the same, or more incidents of vandalism, assault, theft, weapons, narcotics, bombs, and general disturbances. In every category except paint damage, theft of school property, and drugs other than marijuana, "same" was the largest category. There was "more" paint damage and theft but "less" pushing and possession of hard drugs reported.

3. The staff interviewed school security directors from Chicago, Washington, Baltimore, New Orleans, Houston, and Seattle. In every case these men indicated a drop in drug abuse (which neither they nor the respondents in New York could explain) and all but the Houston director indicated a general decrease in school crime and violence in 1971–1972 compared with the previous year.

That the cry for a greatly expanded safety program should have come to a crescendo in the fact of these data, however "soft" they may be, is one part of the difficulty of developing a program. While there are real fears on the part of many people who have been personally involved in school-related incidents, the public perception is that school violence is increasing at a time when it appears, in fact, to be decreasing. A school safety program is an obvious necessity and school safety is clearly a major problem. However, deployment of safety personnel must be based on a realistic appraisal of more accurate data and an analysis of long-range trends, rather than on local and current hysteria.

The problem of getting an accurate picture of the nature and dimensions of the school safety problem is compounded by political considerations. Because the media tend to play up incidents of violence, many groups have publicized school problems for their own ends. For instance, from reading or viewing, the average New Yorker may believe that teacher rape is a common every day occurrence. Yet a compilation of principals' reports released by the High School Principals Association shows one rape and twelve attempts from September 1971 through April 1972. Considering a high school teacher population of more than 10,000, this is a lower rate for that particular crime than is found in many cities of that size.

However, the general public and the teachers' perception of school safety problems is such that school safety became a major issue in the negotiations between the Board of Education and the United Federation of Teachers. A much-publicized provision of the resultant contract calls for 1200 para professionals to provide additional security in the schools. Unless these 1200 men and women are carefully screened and trained there is a real danger that implementation of the contract provision could result in introducing potential safety violators into the schools rather than in bringing in personnel who will make schools safer.

Some principals tend to downplay safety problems and refuse to file complaints or permit arrests in their schools fearing that such incidents will reflect poorly on them as chief administrators. However, these same principals, when seeking more safety personnel, tend to exaggerate the safety problems in their schools.

One school security director in a major city reported that he had gone so far as to threaten to invoke the law which makes it criminal to conceal a crime. After he hinted to two or three principals he would take this kind of action if they did not report all criminal incidents, they apparently spread the word. It is his belief that, at this point, he is hearing about any reportable incident in the schools.

On a more clearly political level, several elected officials on both the city and the national level have held hearings on violence in the schools which have made headline news. However, a close reading of the testimony indicates that it has been heavily weighted in favor of horror stories with few dispassionate witnesses attempting to make an objective assessment of the problem.

When, in response to the Interim Report of this study, the Board of Education appointed Eldrige Waith as Chief Administrator for School Safety, it was front-page news. Only a few weeks later, one local official, without having talked to Mr. Waith, claimed that his appointment had been nothing but a publicity gimmick. Once again, the media had been used to get personal publicity and the seriousness of Mr. Waith's mission was ignored.

IV. CURRICULUM AND SCHEDULING

Only 55 percent of those who entered the freshman class in New York City high schools in 1965 graduated in 1969. This was pointed out in the guidance study conducted by the Academy for Educational Development and confirmed by the Fleischmann Report. The Fleischmann Report emphasized that those who received a general diploma (35 percent of the class of 1971) have neither "the skills to continue their education nor occupational training of any kind." Within this massive failure, whether academic or socio-psychological, lie the seeds of much of the disruption in the schools.

Students assigned to history and English classes who are incapable of reading the texts, students who feel anonymous among their 4,000 or more fellows, and students who can see no useful purpose in the courses in which they are enrolled, are likely to cut class or drop out. And it is these non-attenders who represent a major source of school incidents. Thus school unrest has roots that go back long before the disruption occurs and any efforts to provide school safety must encompass this reality.

Innumerable studies and experiments have demonstrated that students who cannot or will not learn by traditional methods of teaching can be reached through one or more of the several innovative approaches that have been tried.

Not only would more flexible curricula and scheduling serve to siphon off the non-class-attending troublemakers, but alternatives would make school and learning a happier and more productive experience for many who now sit docilely through the standardized school routine.

While the Panel believes that some students, particularly in the 18- to 21-year-old range, probably should not be on the school register at all. They should be regarded as trespassers if they enter the school. However, many of these in-school dropouts would probably attend class if what was offered in class was made meaningful to them. Others would attend an alternate facility as the Auxiliary Services for High Schools proper counseling made them aware of the program.

Many start with the basic handicap that they are unable to read. Again, the Fleischmann report addresses itself to this problem, suggesting that 8th, 9th, and 10th grades should stress reading, writing, and mathematical skills. It should be noted that the requirement for a high school diploma in New York City is reading at the eighth grade level! The Panel feels that 8th grade may already be late to concentrate on reading skills, but for the 30 or 40 percent in some schools who have not achieved even the minimum degree of proficiency by 8th grade, remediation is clearly indicated to compensate for earlier failures in the system. Care must be taken that remediation does not appear infantile but is geared to a teenage interest level.

At Morris High School, for instance, in a mini-school organized for popular music lovers, hitherto disaffected students built an electric organ which involved reading plans, making mathematical calculations—and achieving success. School attendance among this group rose from 50 to 81 percent.

Many of those who have or could easily acquire the basic skills are turned off by the rigidity of the curriculum offered and the absolute demands for attendance at prescribed hours. One ongoing program which is reaching 8,000 to 10,000 students per year with apparent success is the Auxiliary Services for High Schools. At present, this program helps dropouts further their education, develop work skills, and generally bridge the gap between school and the world of work. In addition to counseling and job training or placement, the program provides basic education and remediation leading to a high school equivalency diploma. No safety personnel have been requested or asigned to this service. There is no compulsion upon students to attend the center where they are enrolled which may be the reason why they do continue the education they had terminated in regular school.

It is an anomaly of the New York State law that local school systems are reimbursed least where they need it most. There is no reimbursement at all for those who attend the Auxiliary Services since they are technically dropouts. But even if they were enrolled in a regular high school, the system would only be reimbursed for the days they attended. There is a higher rate for high schools where education is more expensive than for grade schools. This is known as weighted average daily attendance (WADA). Thus, under present rules, the penalty for non-attending students falls most heavily on inner city high schools where truancy and illness are high and costs and needs are greatest.

The Panel joins the Fleischmann Commission in recommending that the New York State Board of Regents propose to the State Legislature that it revise its regulations to permit reimbursement on the basis of all types of school enrollment, not just average daily attendance in traditional schools.

Another type of non-traditional education which would probably appeal to far more students than can now enroll is the Alternative High School. Such a school, generally an off-shot of a regular high school, is one to which streetworkers or aides refer students who are unable to cope with the standard routine. The particular value of this type of educational opportunity is that the students are involved in planning the curriculum and have a sense of participation and relevance. To too many students, the standard curriculum seems totally unrelated to their concerns and realities whereas reading, even of Shakespeare, can seem meaningful if taught, for instance, in terms of authority figures or gang wars or other concepts familiar to the student. Student participation in determining what and how to learn, and teacher sensitivity to the realities in the lives of the students are the key to the success of this type of program.

The Panel recommends that the opportunities for alternate study be greatly expanded so that students feel a sense of relatedness to the curriculum offered them.

Looking at the relative safety of the vocational schools, it is apparent that such goal-oriented education is also extremely appealing to certain students. More opportunities for career education or for some form of work-study would undoubtedly provide a satisfying educational experience for many who are turned off by a general education. Again referring to the Fleischmann Report, the Panel agreed that career education should be updated and should be offered in areas of manpower shortage so that those who complete their training can find a market for their skills.

The Panel recommends expansion and modernization of career and work-study opportunities for those students for whom such tangible goals would serve as an educational inspiration.

One way to encourage the underachieving student is to offer him the opportunity to tutor a younger child. Experiments with cross-age tutoring have shown that such programs can have a powerful educational impact on the students who do the teaching, often far beyond the effect on those receiving instruction. The sense of success and responsibility which this offers the often failing and irresponsible tutor may divert his potential for disruption while making the "system" seem far less rigid.

The Panel recommends that the Board of Education make provision for cross-age tutoring by high school students wherever it seems feasible and desirable.

Among other educational options which should be explored and expanded are street academies which provide temporary "sheltered" facilities for troubled students expected to return to their regular schools; credit for experiential learning; satellite academies designed to provide unmotivated high school students with specific opportunities for on-the-job training; evening schools for the chronic latecomer; other flexible scheduling to meet personal or employment needs; skill centers; independent study opportunities; and intensive courses taking as little as three weeks to master a specific subject.

While implementation of any of these suggestions will require considerable effort on the part of the school system, the potential benefits to be realized by continuing to engage the interest of those who now cut class or cut school altogether may more than warrant not only the effort but the expense. (In some cases, the Academy's study on guidance points out, more efficient use of existing staff and facilities may minimize costs.) If such programs do, in fact, reduce safety hazards by decreasing the number of potential perpetrators, any costs may be more than offset by a reduction in the costs related to disruption, violence, and vandalism.

In addition, the Panel believes that a substantial investment by the school system in extensive psychological referral services would "pay off" in terms of lessened tension and disruption.

In summary, the Panel recommends that the curriculum and scheduling offered in New York City high schools be made more flexible to meet a wider variety of student needs.

V. PERSONALIZING THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT

Just as the curriculum and scheduling frequently fail to meet students' needs, so the size of the school buildings and of the student register serve to turn students off. Schools with large enrollment, organized as one big operating unit, tend to be mechanized and impersonal and to lean more heavily on structure and authority to control behavior than do smaller units. The 96 high schools in New York City have an *average* register of nearly 4,000 students with as many as 6,200 in one school. Many of the pupils also must exist in home circumstances which crush, or at least ignore, their individuality. To be thrust into another alienating environment where they are only names on a list can only increase their frustrations. Yet in a community of such magnitude, the principal, the teachers, staff and fellow students cannot know all of those registered. Students cannot be expected to feel any great allegiance to an institution at which they are not recognized as individuals. On the other hand, the smaller educational centers such as vocational schools, mini-schools, and satellite academies, seem to have a lower incidence of school disruption. *Therefore, the Panel recommends that the number of students registered in the average school unit be sharply reduced.*

While existing buildings obviously cannot be razed, several adjustments could be made to reduce the operating size and to produce a less depersonalized atmosphere. The number of students involved in a single school unit might be reduced by:

1. Utilizing several of the programs described in the guidance report prepared by the Academy for Educational Development. College, Bound, College Discovery, Toward Upward Mobility, and Satellite Academies among others involve from 300 to 10,500 students in special programs throughout the city's public high schools. Groups of these students could easily be housed in vacant stores, church basements and other unused community facilities thus reducing the overload on present school structures. This type of space which has been used for a few programs could be expanded to provide for far more than the maximum of 20,000 students now attending classes in non-school facilities.

2. Assigning groups of approximately 100 students to four or five teachers with the mandate to accomplish a body of work within the school year. Time and place of study could be determined mutually by teachers and students—but teachers would be held accountable for student progress by the end of the year.

In an earlier study conducted for the Atlanta University Center the Academy for Educational Development recommended such groupings of college students. The Panel making the recommendations for that study concluded that this would be the best way to cut student attrition rates which at the Atlanta Center, were comparable to high school dropout rates in New York City.

3. Physically partitioning school buildings so that a building now housing 4,000 students would have two completely separate entrances. The gymnasium and food services might still have to be shared but it is strongly recommended that separate eating facilities be established or that the existing facility be partitioned. Cafeterias have been the scene of disruption in an overwhelming number of instances—and this is generally attributed to the noise level and the open exposure so that trouble in one area can quickly spread throughout the room.

4. On the other hand, since large size is an asset to the extent that a large school can offer a wider range of courses and extracurricular activities, and superior equipment and supplies it may be possible to reap both the benefits of bigness and the advantages of smallness by creating mini-schools within the large school. "House plans" of this type have been successful in several cities. One such experiment is now under way at Haaren High School where 2,500 students are each assigned to one of 14 subject or theme-oriented mini-schools. This represents the Board of Education's only attempt at wholesale, top-to-bottom reorganization of an entire high school. While this venture appears to be having some positive effects; it still is a long way from realizing its objective.

5. Another type of mini-school might call for students entering the first year of high school to be assigned randomly to one of several sub-groups which would be maintained through the high school grades. Each sub-group would keep its same homeroom teacher throughout high school.

These small, randomly selected, student bodies might make it possible to experiment more freely with new ideas in curriculum, student-staff relations, school-community relations and other areas of school life. As matters stand, the expense and the amount of communication, preparation ,and evaluation needed to carry out experiments in a high school of several thousand students weigh heavily against testing new ideas.

Random selection would eliminate any possibility of using special interests as a tracking device. Heterogeneity of student grouping in terms of both abilities and interests can be a major asset to the educational process. There are obvious advantages in making schools as similar as possible in terms of diversity and competition to the larger society in which students must learn to function. Special interests and abilities would be recognized and nourished, but by the offering of elective courses and extra-curricular activities, not by segregation in the required curriculum.

The Panel recommends an exhaustive study of the optimum size, educationally, of any schools to be built in the future. To make the existing schools, and the 12 now in various stages of construction more welcoming, several improvements and amenities might be considered. Among them are use of attractive colors on walls, doors, and furniture; carpeting to muffle noise; and air conditioning to increase efficiency and comfort. In addition there should be several student lounges for rapping and studying. Acoustical tile should be installed wherever possible as a further aid to noise reduction. Toilet facilities should be kept to a minimum, particularly since many schools have already opted to lock all but one or two in the building.

One specific school area in obvious need of improvement is the cafeteria. Cafeterias, filled with the thunder of hundreds of voices and the clatter of thousands of utensils, are not conducive to either digestion or civility. Even a small incident can ignite into a chain reaction within such vast, confused and noisy spaces. One way to reduce those problems that are inherent in the typical high school would be to clear the cafeteria several minutes before allowing new groups of students to enter. I.D. cards could be clearly stamped with the periods to which pupils are assigned. Some large cafeterias could be partitioned into smaller units which would help to prevent mass disruptions.

Student participation in cafeteria improvement might be elicited by holding contests in each high school for the best designs for creating smaller groupings, reducing noise level, and adding visual appeal in the cafeteria.

With students more and more eager to "rap" with each other and with teachers, and less and less willing to listen to lectures, the Board of Education might consider far more drastic innovations when it plans schools of the future. Books and materials might be kept at a central location from which students or teachers could take them to one of a series of lounge-like rooms. There they could be discussed with others interested in the subject. Such self-motivated education might better serve the needs of the large number of students who are not inspired by a fixed curriculum.

The Panel recommends that the School Planning and Research Division explore various internal improvements which might make school facilities less imposing and more welcoming.

The physical features of school buildings are also directly involved in school safety; the number of entrances to a school building presents one of the greatest safety hazards. Since fire laws require a multitude of doors in most buildings, and students frequently jam open those that are only supposed to give egress not ingress, intruders can use side doors to gain access. The school might consider installing an alarm system which will ring whenever any but the main door is opened. This would eliminate unauthorized persons from entering the building, not only drug pushers and thieves, but dropouts and class cutters from other schools who congregate in the halls and distract others from their educational goals. This is a single example of a building feature related to safety—there are many others. *The Panel recommends that all new school facilities require the approval of the Administrator for School Safety regarding those features related to his responsibilities.*

VI. Role of the Principal

The principal is the single most important individual in any school. He or she is responsible for the effective functionng of every phase of school activity including education, attendance, janitorial service, food handling, and of course discipline and safety. In order to manage this multifaceted enterprise the principal has available the resources of a series of experts—teachers, custodians, dieticians—and safety personnel. They serve as advisors and as working staff, but it is the principal who is responsible and is held accountable for the successful operation of the school.

Thus any program of school safety, specifically, depends upon the principals' enthusiasm, sense of commitment, and competence. Unfortunately, as safety problems have mounted during the past decade, principals have tended to become defensive and to feel that all disruptions reflected on them personally; whereas, in fact disruptions have increased in all parts of society.

The study staff found that, all too often, principals felt unsure of themselves in handling disruptive or violent situations, apparently because they had some feeling of shame about discussing certain types of incidents. To overcome these feelings through shared experiences, the Chancellor should consult with the Academic and Vocational High School Principals Associations about establishing a committee to set up an information exchange on safety problems and workable techniques. This committee should also plan to create a workshop or seminar in which experts would discuss responses to certain types of school disorders, breaches of discipline, and crime. Whether conducted wholly inside the system preferably outside expertise, *the Panel recommends the establishment of a Committee of Principals to work with the Administrator to develop a safety training workshop for principals.* To the best of the Panel's knowledge no such program exists to provide principals with opportunities for:

Exploring possible trouble areas and developing preventive measures;

Determining the elements of a School Safety Plan covering both minor and major disturbances and allocating responsibility for safety measures to specific personnel;

Roleplaying and reacting to mock incidents including assignment of personnel;

Discussing and developing safety guidelines for when to call the police, when to close school, and when incidents are to be reported (to minimize occurrences where safety personnel or principals have to use discretion);

Exchanging information on successful safety practices; and

Becoming acquainted with the total resources of the Board of Education and the City as they relate to school safety.

Once such a workshop has been developed, *the Panel recommends that attendance at such workshops by high school principals be required of all present principals and be a prerequisite to appointment for all future principals.* District principals should be encouraged to attend. The principals should be reassured that this workshop is no reflection on their competence or pivotal position but rather is to help them to adapt to a changed situation which requires additional training. The course should be designed to help principals develop the judgmental tools to know when to call for supplemental help. Their understanding and acceptance must be obtained in ways which do not erode their confidence or make them feel that they are inadequate if they are unable to direct all aspects of a complex security operation alone.

While the principal has the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the school, there may come a time when, in the best judgment of the safety expert, the principal is not taking those steps most likely to maintain or restore safe conditions in the school. At that point, the safety officer has a duty to call upon the District Superintendent or the police to supersede the principal, thus taking on himself the responsibility for preventing a breakdown in the safety system. The safety officer is then accountable for the correctness of the decision to remove responsibility from the principal.

In addition to the safety workshop there are several other steps that should be taken to give the principal both strength and assurance in his role as safety chief in his school.

At present most New York City school administrators do not have an in-school organizational framework for anticipating and managing security incidents. For this reason, the responses that officials do make often appear merely reactive. To make proper responses, those in immediate operating charge of schools must recognize that safety incidents are not scattered events to be dealt with *ad hoc* apart from the main business of education, but events which require sustained planning and management in relation to specific conditions in the school. After they have recognized this, they must then equip themselves with the organizational tools—specifically a Safety Committee and a Safety Plan—needed to deal with safety problems.

The Panel recommends that the principal establish a School Safety Committee with broad representation from the school community and the community-at-large. This Committee should include:

1. The Principal, who acts as chairman. Probably he will delegate authority in normal times but during crisis periods he will make the final decisions on strategy and tactics;
2. An Assistant Principal, who is charged with day-to-day operation of the school safety program. As the Principal's designee, he chairs the Committee when the Principal cannot participate;
3. At least one faculty representative;
4. A student representative of the G.O.;
5. Representatives of any other student constituencies which should participate in safety planning;
6. A representative of the Parents Association;
7. A police liaison officer regularly assigned from the precinct in which the school is located;
8. A Student Service Officer;
9. A member of the local Community School Board;
10. A member of the custodial staff; and
11. One or more community leaders who might be able to contribute to the maintenance of safety in the school by communicating with the neighborhood.

The student and community representatives who do not represent formally constituted groups are an essential element if the safety program is to be truly responsive and important to the community. Without real community involvement in planning, it is unlikely that the community will develop the kind of pride in the school which is its best protection. If successful, such a committee can be a strong force for community commitment to school safety both in school and after hours in reporting vandalism. One school security director attributes the drop in window breakage from $200,000 to $60,000 in one year to the existence of such committees.

One of the first tasks the principal should assign to the School Safety Committee is the preparation of a School Safety Plan which encompasses not only the directives from the Board of Education but those physical, social and psychological factors peculiar to the individual school. The preparation of such a detailed plan is so important to the maintenance of school safety that *the Panel recommends that the Chancellor require each school principal and School Safety Committee to prepare a comprehensive Safety Plan for the school and that this plan be subject to the approval of the School Safety Office.* This plan, which should be reviewed and updated each year, should:

1. Define the overall school safety situation;
2. Describe the resources for safety operations available to the school; and the allocation of specific responsibilities for safety to designated personnel;
3. Determine the various indicators of the school safety situation, and ways of detecting warnings based on these indicators;
4. Prescribe organization and procedure for keeping control of immediate safety operations in the hands of the school administration and/or those individuals to whom the school administration has entrusted all or part of the operations;
5. Prescribe countermeasures to safety problems including precise steps for introducing, deploying, and withdrawing (a) Additional resources from the Central Office of School Safety, and (b) Uniformed police; and
6. Provide a running account of incidents by category.

The Safety Plan for each school, once it has been carefully drawn, should be submitted to the Administrator for School Safety. He and his staff will carefully review each plan and make suggestions and recommendations. Once the plan of a school has been approved by the Central Office, the principal should be held accountable for adhering to it. If he finds it unworkable for any reason, he should consult with his Student Service Coordinators on ways to improve it, but under no circumstances should he revert to the improvisational safety measures which have often prevailed in the past.

Along with the principal's responsibility to promote local involvement and a local plan, is his right and responsibility to select those safety personnel who will relate best to his local school population. Neighborhood people—recent school graduates, older siblings or parents, local Vietnam veterans—are a likely source of recruits.

However since the principal is in the best position to determine who will serve most effectively in a safety capacity in his school, he should feel free to seek whatever manpower he deems suitable, although his selection must, for administrative reasons, be subject to the screening and to the ultimate hiring authority of the Central Administrator for School Safety.

The Panel recommends that in-school safety personnel be selected by each school principal, subject to screening and hiring by the Administrator for School Safety.

VII. ROLE OF OTHERS IN SCHOOL AND IN COMMUNITY

A. ROLE OF THE FACULTY

The teaching staff plays a focal role in establishing both the climate and practice of safety in the schools. To the extent that they respond to their students' needs and establish themselves as benevolent authority figures, they decrease the number of class and school cutters and create an atmosphere conducive to learning. To the extent that they adhere to rigid, often outmoded, curricula and teaching methods and reject disciplinary functions, they contribute to the student disaffection which is responsible for much of the disruption in the schools.

While the UFT takes the position that the teachers, as the professionals with established professional legitimacy, have the primary right to deal with every aspect of the educational process, it has mandated, in its contracts, that the teachers should not play a role in school safety. The Panel views this as an untenable position inasmuch as the way in which the teacher relates to pupils in the conduct of professional activities has an enormous influence upon student behavior.

The presence of teachers in classrooms between classes, in corridors, in using the same school lavatories and lunchrooms as the students, and in attendance at school events tend to have a beneficial effect upon the atmosphere of the schools. In fact, the pedagogical assignments which fragment time into teaching and advising segments contribute to a depersonalization of the relationship between students and teachers. Instead the Panel would prefer to see actual teaching time increased by having paraprofessionals do the administrative and clerical work that teachers now do during their sixth period.

The Panel recommends that teacher contact hours with students be maximized—in the classroom, the halls, the lunchroom, etc.—in order to build better interpersonal relationships between faculty and students.

If a school is disrupted by large numbers of wandering class cutters, teacher visibility in the halls and in patrols, which can only be ordered by the principals in a crisis, has proved effective. It would be desirable if teacher visibility could exist in non-crisis times so that class cutting could be sharply curtailed and the presence of teachers could be viewed as a normal expectation rather than evidence of possible crisis conditions. In several schools, teachers have volunteered to assume responsibility for supervising a corridor or other non-instructional area. This supervision is most effective when plans have been developed cooperatively by the administration and staff. In addition, some schools have assigned teachers to patrol on a compensatory time basis.

One reason teachers have withdrawn from safety functions is that they feel isolated in facing safety problems. Among the first goals of an effective school safety program should be a reduction of this sense of isolation. Every teacher should know that he or she:

1. Will be quickly supported in class, hallways, lunchroom, or rest areas, when confronted with an incident. This may require new forms of communication procedures such as small-unit signaling devices to be carried in pocket or purse.
2. Will be represented as an interest group in all school safety planning, i.e., the faculty representative on the School Safety Committee.
3. Can be removed from police functions during crisis periods, to avoid impressions of faculty as informants or quasi-police personnel, which can motivate retaliation during more stable times.

The Panel recommends that the role and responsibilities of the teachers in the school safety program be precisely delineated and be made clear to both faculty and students.

Teachers and counsellors are also looked to as the people students can talk to about their problems. However, guidance departments are understaffed, supervisors are harried, and teachers are often more concerned with groups than with individuals. When teachers are available, it is usually by appointment and for a very limited time. This often results in a feeling of alienation on the part of the student, which makes the school a likely target for student unrest.

One way to increase teacher involvement might be through a training course such as the one described in a large Western city. Teachers had formerly regarded each defiant remark of flouting of authority as a personal affront. They felt punitive action was required in order to avoid showing signs of weakness. After a series of mock demonstrations, participants not only became desensitized and learned alternative methods of handling confrontation, but they also began to reconsider the previously unalterable and unsuitable curriculum and to take a hard look at some of their teaching methods. After a time, some of the teachers discovered that they could teach differently without loss of classroom control. Several teachers voiced satisfaction about beginning to feel competant and effective again as teachers as their efforts began to pay off.

B. ROLE OF THE CUSTODIAL STAFF

The custodial and maintenance staff frequently are in a position to know more about what is going on in a school than anyone else. As a result, these personnel, who often have a special feeeling of pride in "their" school, can be the first line of defense against bombing, breaking-and-entering, assaults and intrusions. In many cases, they are important sources of information about future trouble.

The Panel recommends that custodial and maintenance staff be given an active role in the school safety program.

In order to prepare them to serve in a safety function, the Student Service personnel should develop a brief program to train this custodial staff in the general techniques and procedures for:

1. Detecting bombs and reporting suspicious objects;
2. Scrutinizing intruders and suspicious individuals without confronting them;
3. Determining physical evidence of unauthorized entry into school premises;
4. Preserving physical evidence of felony behavior;
5. Watching for drug traffic;
6. Deciding when and how a physical change in the school premises would affect future school safety plans and requirements;
7. Reporting immediate physical dangers on the premises;
8. Sensing any unusual mood in the student body;
9. Performing emergency repairs to critical school emergency systems;
10. Referring all parent, community, or mass media inquiries about incidents to appropriate officials;
11. Using community contacts to keep informed about incidents in the school;
12. Maintaining the confidentiality of their activities.

The Panel recommends that the School Safety office develop a training course to make custodial staff aware of the safety-related features of their job.

C. ROLE OF STUDENTS

Those students who do come to school, who are not truant, mass every hour in the crowded hallways, struggle up or down the right staircase to reach classes many floors above or below, and congregate by cliques in the jammed lunchroom where there is noise, heat, bad food, and no ability to get away from people. After circulating each day in this physical and social environment, the students go "home." In probably 5 to 10 percent of all cases, this means no home at all, but a semi-nomadic drifting in the streets. In 25 to 50 percent of all cases, there is an extended family unit in which one or both parents are missing. Thus many live a life that is manic, crowded, tense, and full of what they themselves perceive as difficult problems. That these tensions erupt into disturbances in the school is hardly surprising—and unfortunately the schools are inadequately equipped to soothe these real life situations.

If the key to urban school safety lies in effectively mobilizing those who use the school, then the strategy for enlisting students and their organizations through which loyalty, power, and action are influenced and allocated must emerge from the School Safety Committee and School Safety Plan, in which students must be actively involved.

Hopefully, one result of student participation on the Committee and in drawing up the Plan will be an understanding of their need to take some of the general responsibilities of citizenship upon themselves, and to step out of the isolation that characterizes the relationship of most inner city dwellers to civic life.

The decision to form student patrols or to designate Student Service Aides as support for the Student Service Officers can only succeed if the initiative comes from the students themselves. This will mean that the channels of communication have built an atmosphere of trust between students and the administration. Where such an atmosphere exists, Student Service Aides may be the single best solution to the safety problem.

Ideally, all safety should rest in the hands of members of the regular school community—students, teachers and administration; no special safety personnel or educational funds should have to be devoted to this problem. Taking steps to legitimize what these students do, and taking whatever additional steps that are possible to reduce peer group and community pressures, are absolutely critical in any attempt to establish a student safety patrol. Only a careful assessment of the total school situation by the Safety Committee can determine whether it is feasible to try to take these steps. For instance, community leaders should probably be involved at all stages of the planning process which culminates in establishing the patrol since the community attitude may affect student attitude.

The Panel recommends that students play an active role in the safety program if the students themselves opt to do so through their representation on the School Safety Committee.

Where a school has not encouraged or permitted student rapping or other means for voicing student concerns, efforts to enroll Student Service Aides will be seen by many students as efforts to coopt students by the school administration. It is particularly important that enough student participants be chosen so that the student safety group does not become an isolated, tiny minority in the school and vulnerable for that reason. Any school safety program which makes substantial use of the students themselves must be prepared to cope directly with childhood and adolescent peer group pressures against informing on friends.

Once the decision to use students in the safety program has been made, specific steps should be taken to minimize adverse peer group pressures on the group of Student Safety Aides, such as:

—carefully limiting their role
—prohibiting any use of violence
—outlining clear instructions so that persistent trouble can be quickly referred to the proper authority
—training student safety personnel carefully before they try to do their job.

If students are to be used as Student Service Aides, they need formal training. This training, which might supplement or replace their current civics course work, might provide a new and more relevant type of citizenship training at the high school level. Among the topics and emphasis which might be included in a training program, the following appear crucial:

1. Sensitization to the kinds of personal conflicts and stresses participants will experience as they discharge school safety responsibilities. This sensitization should be specifically directed to deal with peer group pressure problems, and it should emphasize the limits on the activities of participants;

2. Formal instruction and rehearsal in those parts of the School Safety Plan and general operating procedures which will influence the actions of participants, and to which participants will make contributions through their actions;

3. Orientation to the school as a community and to the problems of building a school community;

4. Practice in working jointly with school and police officials under crisis conditions;

5. Analysis of the potential emergency situations which participants may confront;

6. Some formal academic instruction in human relations, conflict and crisis management, and community government institutions.

The Panel recommends that a training program for Student Service Aides be developed.

Several school security directors across the country suggested to the study staff that all students, not only those involved in the safety program, attend a safety-related course which would include information on students' rights and responsibilities; the school's rights; when a policeman or school safety officer may arrest them; what may happen to them if they are arrested; and what are the probably long-range implications of arrest for participating (a) in a criminal act or (b) in a demonstration. Other security directors report that the shock effect of a visit to local jail or even a day spent in court has served to make certain students less prone to be troublemakers.

Staff interviews revealed that students themselves feel that the level of violence in the schools would be reduced if more counseling help were available, if the curriculum were more flexible, if the teachers were more sensitive to student needs, if more alternate programs were offered, and if the "system" were more responsive. One student reported writing four letters to various school, City, and Board of Education officials, none of which were even acknowledged after two months. The primary complaint among students was that teachers gave students the minimum hours and effort and failed to update their teaching approach to meet the needs of students in the '70's.

D. ROLE OF PARENTS AND THE COMMUNITY

The realities of the community, it groups, needs and tensions must be recognized and its strengths utilized to increase building and personal safety. Thus, it is essential that the School Safety Plan involve parents and the community, and students as well. Such involvement will develop in them the proprietary interest in the school which is its best protection. The student or neighbor who stops the vandal from harming "my" school is far more effective than any roving patrol. In order to find ways to inform and involve as many parents and local adults as possible in the life of the school, the administration must become aware of the forces, both established and changing, which play significant roles in the life of the community. Only through such awareness can community leadership be counted on to work for the school and its safety rather than to attack it.

The Panel recommends that the maximum possible number of parents and other persons from the community be brought into the school as school aides, and to serve as members of the School Safety Committee.

The School Safety Committee represents an initial step toward bringing these groups into the planning and execution of a safety program. Hopefully, the leaders who sit on this committee will spread the word among their formal and informal constituencies and interest in the school and its safety problems will grow.

It is clear that enlisting community participation will reflect many dynamic forces which are working to redefine the meaning of the school in local communities. School officials must understand that in maintaining continuing coordination and control of all elements of their security program, they are themselves attempting to influence a process of community-building at several levels.

Once rapport has been established and the School Safety Committee has the active participation of its community members, care must be taken to guard against "leaks" of information or rumors on sensitive subjects. In an atmosphere of trust, the Safety Committee members can provide critical intelligence and can suggest concrete tactical approaches which would never otherwise be part of the mainstream of planning in the school. At a time when community persons increasingly "control the action," this insight and information is indispensable in the safety planning process.

If Committee participants have been carefully chosen and trained, and if they have standing among the community constituencies from which they come, then there may be much they can do to "cool it." On the other hand, they should never be involved in physical attempts to break up a disturbance. Given proper organization and numbers, their mere presence may in some situations be a controlling influence on roving bands of truant youths who come in to disrupt the school.

Even with maximum community support, police will be needed in certain specific security situations. But the key to reducing many safety incidents, particularly at the secondary level, rests in understanding how the schools are changing as communities and as organizational forms, and how the members of these communities can be committed to and involved in supporting and protecting their school.

E. ROLE OF POLICE

To the degree that a school becomes a village which must be patrolled by uniformed constabulary in order to provide safety from physical harm to students and staff, it has ceased being a school which reflects not only New York City's but America's historic values of public education. Thus, the job is to make school safety essentially an educational process rather than to consider it a police function. However, it must be recognized that there are times when police should handle police functions in a school.

Police never surrender their legal rights and responsibilities when entering the school community but they do function, at least temporarily, as members of a school community, and their presence in schools must be understood from that point of view. The entry of police into a school, for example, is at the discretion of the principal unless there is some clear and obvious danger requiring direct police action. A School Safety Plan which is oriented to the school community recognizes that the police role should be limited to those missions for which the police are professionally trained and legally responsible. Police are members of and participants in a total plan, in which they have specific, limited missions at definable times.

One widespread response to the security crises which have occurred in the nations' schools has been the demand for more police in the schools. This demand is likely to be vigorously asserted by some parents, the UFT, and some administrators following every major incident. Indeed, approximately 250 uniformed police were on duty in New York City schools in 1971–1972; some will continue to be there during the foreseeable future. This is not considered desirable either by the police or by the schools. However, Board of Education personnel should not be performing strictly police functions any more than the police should be used to enforce school discipline.

In fact, as a result of the new school safety program announced in August, the Police Department has withdrawn many of the patrolmen who had regularly been assigned to the schools. The Panel, while recognizing the shortage of police, views this as an unfortunate development which may undermine the effectiveness of the new program. While safety personnel in the schools have been upgraded, their numbers have not increased greatly and they have not yet had the experience which will assure that they can provide safety, particularly in the most volatile schools which is where the majority of police had been assigned. *The Panel, therefore, urges the Board of Education to request the reassignment of police to the schools until such time as the principals and the local precinct commander agree that continued police presence is no longer necessary.*

Many police problems can be resolved on the local level between school and precinct. Every school principal is acquainted with the local commander and most principals describe excellent relationships between the school and the police. Where they are not already established, *the Panel recommends that regular meetings be held with the precinct commander, the principal, the staff member in charge of safety, the narcotics coordinator, and the custodian.*

In addition to their law-and-order function, police frequently function in a guidance and pedagogical role in the schools. In many schools, students turn to the policemen for help with incipient or actual criminal activities. This police role has been formalized in two Community School Districts which now have a pilot Police-Liaison program. Originating in Flint, Michigan, this program has trained New York police who are assigned to junior high schools on a full-time basis and who visit the elementary schools to serve as a resource. They are not responsible for patrolling but enter each classroom and have guidance hours available. This approach has enhanced the police image in many communities and has provided youngsters with informed help on police-type problems.

VIII. SAFETY OFFICE AND PERSONNEL

The Interim Report of this Panel, submitted in June to the Chancellor and the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, dealt almost exclusively with the immediate need for safety personnel in the schools when they opened in September.

Following is a summary of the recommendations in that report and a description of the action taken by the Board of Education thus far. The Panel then goes on to make further recommendations to strengthen the safety staff.

1. *Responsibility for the application of the guidelines designed to meet the designated objectives should be delegated by the Chancellor to an Administrator for School Safety whose sole responsibility would be to administer the safety program.*

This recommendation was implemented on July 27 with the appointment of Eldridge Waith, former Assistant Chief Inspector of the New York City Police Department and Commissioner of Public Safety in the Virgin Islands. Mr. Waith is in charge of the safety personnel assigned during school hours.

2. *Specialized personnel should be assigned in the schools to work in the safety program. It is not desirable to build a paramilitary force which would have a tendency to become institutionalized and thus might persist long after the societal conditions which called it into being have disappeared. Personnel should, therefore, be selected for a finite period and the program should have built-in opportunities for them to move up either in the school system or into roles in the City. Personnel to be selected should include:*

   a. *Student Service Officers—in the number to be determined by the Administrator for School Safety in consultation with high school principals and District Superintendents. Present security guards who are requested by a principal should be rehired; others should be selected by the principal from among those persons known in and to the school community.*

   b. *Student Service Coordinators—twenty professionals—former teachers, lawyers, policemen, etc.—to serve in teams of two as sources of information, advice, supervision, and emergency aid. They would provide a continuing liaison between the Central Board and the high schools and Community Districts on matters of safety.*

Approximately 175 of the previous security guards plus 125 new recruits are now serving as Student Service Officers in the 96 high schools. In addition, about 115 guards have been employed in the junior high schools by the 31 Community School Districts. No guards have been assigned to elementary schools by the local Districts but they are clearly needed.

New Student Service Officers are high school graduates although former guards have been retained and are encouraged to get high school equivalency diplomas. Prior to this there have been no formal procedures or criteria for recruitment and selection of security personnel.

The role of the Student Service Officers is unlike that of the former security guards employed in the schools in that the emphasis is on understanding and forewarning of problems rather than primarily on punishment for infractions; that is, the Officers should be more skillful in community relations and people management than the stereotypical security guard.

The job description for Student Service Officers stresses their contribution to the educational mission of the school, their role as supportive of teachers and other staff, and their ability to get along with students. The principal, assistant principal, or student dean determines the tasks to be performed by each Officer. The assignment involves the identification and establishment of a relationship with as many students as possible. Hopefully this will enable the Officer to build a cadre of student aides. However, he must not become so friendly that he is unwilling or unable to stop misconduct on the part of a student/friend.

In addition, there are now 22 Student Service Coordinators. Among them are several community leaders, former police and former teachers. Four are former security guards who, while they do not have the requisite college degree, have demonstrated strong leadership qualities and a high degree of rapport with the students and Student Service Officers.

Coordinators should have a broad spectrum of talent in communications, insight into personal and group dynamics, a keen interest in community relations, and training in mediation techniques. They are expected to develop rapport with members of the school staff, parents and other community leaders, the local police, and students representing the variety of backgrounds within the school register. Among their assignments are:

. . . Providing continuing liaison between several high schools and Community Districts and the Board of Education. They perform the same function for the Chancellor as the Mayor's Education Task Force does for the Mayor.

. . . Serving as a clearinghouse for the sharing of experiences and thus serving as a kind of data bank for the high schools and Community School Districts which now have no common meeting ground on safety matters.

. . . Providing advice and emergency aid to individual schools or District Superintendents as well as to the Student Service Officers.

. . . Reporting regularly to the Administrator of School Safety on what is happening in the schools and in the communities surrounding the schools. Coordinators are learning about local conditions, community meetings, rising crime, incidents likely to be picked up by the media, etc.

. . . Determining which schools lack altogether or have inadequate safety personnel and attempting to improve that situation.

. . . Serving as go-between to handle complaints or grievances that Student Service Officers might have about their job or about their in-school supervision.

. . . Providing training for new Officers, Coordinators and other safety aides.

. . . Making themselves available whenever a principal feels that a school crisis can be calmed or averted with the use of additional personnel. This should be particularly advantageous where the principal determines that the presence of police—in uniform, unfamiliar with the school, and possibly unresponsive to the principal's direction—might exacerbrate a volatatile situation. For the present, the emergency mobile squad of troubleshooting Student Service Officers has also been retained.

3. *All Student Service personnel should be hired on the same basis as other non-teaching school staff. They should have the same job security and fringe benefits.*

This will be provided by a contract with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters which has been agreed upon and is awaiting approval of the Wage-Price Board.

4. *Student Service Officers and Coordinators should not wear uniforms nor carry arms.*

Mr. Waith has directed safety personnel not to carry guns but has permitted them to carry handcuffs since the Police Department requires all those arrested to be brought in handcuffs. The Safety Office does not suggest uniforms but some individual schools have chosen to provide Student Service Officers with identifying blazers.

5. *Separate training programs should be developed at once so that Student Service Officers and Student Service Coordinators can each have a thorough grounding in community relations and people management as well as City and and school laws and regulations before school opens in September.*

With funding and encouragement from the Mayor's Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, the Academy for Educational Development conducted a training program. Because the program was approved on August 1 to start on August 21, the Academy sought the assistance of the Syracuse University Research Corporation (SURC). SURC, through its Policy Institute, designed and implemented the initial training program. Previously the Institute had conducted a nationwide study of disruption in urban public secondary schools. It also had developed considerable experience in the design, development, and evaluation of drug treatment and rehabilitation systems, the reorganization of police departments, and in the training of both kinds of personnel.

In perparation for the program, the SURC staff put together two Duty Manuals, one for the Coordinators and the other for the Student Service Officers; and a book of Reading Materials dealing with relevant conditions and trends in New York City, principles governing human behavior, interpersonal realtionships, principles of social psychology with attention to ethnic relationships and inter-group tensions, and the nature of crime and criminals. In addition, the staff prepared a Discussion Leaders' Guide to Role Playing Exercises.

The first week of the program was directed to training 20 prospective Coordinators who had been selected by the Board's Administrator for School Safety. Throughout the Coordinators' training special emphasis was given to sharpening their communications and leadership skills in preparation for their roles as supervisors and resource persons for the Student Service Officers. They also received preparation as trainers of the Officers who attended the second and third weeks of the program.

Among the topics covered in the training program for both the Officers and Coordinators were the following:

- Introduction to the Student Service concept
- Introduction to the New York City School System
- Sensitivity training
- Ethnic group relations in New York City
- Critical incident exercises on New York City issues
- Intergroup tensions and their resolution
- Introduction to crime and criminality in the schools (narcotics, dangerous drugs, loitering, gang activity)
- Simulation and handling of special problems confronting New York City schools.
- Handling emergency situations
- Selected aspects of New York City law
- Introduction to criminal justice system
- Physical training (group control, search and frisk, police wrestling, etc.)

The training program had two major goals. One was to provide the Officers and Coordinators with useful information regarding (a) the school system and services to students and (b) the police aspects of the job. The other was to equip the trainees with the communication skills needed to facilitate positive relationships between the Officers and Coordinators on the one hand, and among themselves and the students, school personnel and the community on the other.

Since it was decided that the Student Service Officers should have peace officer status and thus would have special powers of arrest while on the job, it was particularly important that they be aware of the lawful and appropriate use of such powers. Several lectures, therefore, were devoted to describing when they could and could not legally make an arrest or frisk a student, the concept of discretion, probable cause, etc. Participating lecturers came from the Board of Education, community organizations, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Syracuse University, and the New York City Police Academy.

The program focused heavily on building skills in human relations and strengthening the relationship between the Student Service Officers and the Coordinators. Each of 10 groups of 20 Student Service Officers were joined by 2 Student Service Coordinators and a member of the training staff. The Coordinators were given the responsibility for leading group discussions with the training staff members functioning as group facilitators. Throughout the training the training staff guided both Student Service Officers and Coordinaors in analyzing their own projected and perceived behavior in the situations covered in the program.

The training staff utilized laboratory learning techniques to assist the Student Service Officers and Coordinators in examining their personal opinions and feelings toward specific issues and problems surrounding student welfare and safety in New York City schools. The Officers and Coordinators were given the opportunity to learn and practice new behavior through their participation in critical incidents, simulations, and role-playing exercises. In many cases, the actual behavior of the Student Service Officers and Coordinators during the training program were topics of guided group discussions. The aim of these exercises was to assist the Officers and Coordinators to increase their behavioral repertories so that they might be more sensitive to student needs and responsive to student problems.

Each room housing the groups was equipped with a television set capable of receiving closed-circuit videotapes. Sets from all ten rooms were connected to a master control room from which were broadcast a few short lectures and several demonstrations and simulations on selected topics. Many of the presentations consisted of role-playing featuring the Officers and Coordinators themselves.

Each presentation was designed to trigger group discussion. Since the Student Service Coordinators and the training staff members had already been exposed to some of the videotapes during the first week of the training program, they were able to comment on them and to engage the Student Service Officers in discussion about the topics and situations covered in the videotapes.

The training program, while apparently generally successful, was beset by certain problems:

a. Answers to such practical questions as pay, fringe benefits, assignments, etc. had not been determined in advance since the Administrator had only begun to organize the program three weeks earlier. This lack of information provided a continuing distraction as the subject recurred.

b. Another major handicap to the success of the training program was the need to retrain former security guards. It would probably have been more meaningful if the program could have been offered to new recruits who were more attuned to the Student Service concept. It was most difficult to work with some of those who had served as quasi-police for months or years. The training staff felt that the Coordinators, most of whom were recruited anew, were far more responsive to the training program. It is possible that too much attention was given to the police aspects of the Officer's role and not enough to the psychological and sociological aspects.

c. Several lecturers, particularly those from the Police Academy, did not offer interesting or relevant presentations. For instance, in describing the concept of "discretion" husband-wife situations were used as examples in lecturing to a group that would be dealing with high school students! The most successful portions of the program took place in the groups of 20. While many tended to wander off, in attention at least, from the mass lectures, the group discussion had almost total attendance—and participation.

d. The trainees, particularly the Officers, would have benefitted from a four-week, rather than a two-week program in order to reinforce the new attitudes and approaches. There will be a brief follow-up session in late November at which they will receive additional guidance and support and will be able to discuss any problems which were not anticipated during the training program. The Officers are also receiving continuing help from the Coordinators as they make their rounds.

In summary, the program was designed to provide the Officers and Coordinators alternative ways of behaving and dealing with disruption and potentially threatening situations in the schools—alternatives to the typical "headcracking," punitive responses of traditional school security personnel.

The Student Service Officers and Coordinators who attended the training program expressed a strong desire for further education to move them up a career ladder. It is hoped that, once the program is finely established, the school safety office will be able to concentrate on establishing a liaison with an appropriate educational faculty. This might be Auxiliary Services for High Schools for the many Student Service Officers who do not yet have their high school diplomas, or higher education for those Officers and Coordinators ready for that level of learning.

Training for the position of Student Service Officer as well as Coordinator, is to be regarded as a stepping stone to further education and experience which could lead to careers in other social service fields—social work, guidance, psychology, personnel, and law enforcement.

6. *Principals should receive special training on how to respond to the new types of problems arising in schools today. The course should include sensitivity training focused on such problem areas as the disaffected student and the community expressing hostility to the school. It should also cover such topics as how to recognize a brewing crisis, how to respond to a non-negotiable demand, and when to call the police.*

There has been no action regarding this recommendation as yet. The Panel has revised its suggestion in this report, as shown in Chapter VI, to propose that the Principals' Associations form a committee to develop a workshop on the subject of school safety.

7. *Principals should be expected to develop a safety plan for their own schools, determining the proper use of police, School Service Officers, teachers, parents, and students.*

The Chancellor should require the principal of each of the 900 schools in the City to develop an individualized safety plan. These plans would be reviewed by the Safety Office at the Board of Education and principals would then be held accountable for adhering to them.

The eighth and final recommendation in the Interim Report dealt with grievance machinery and is discussed in this report in Chapter X on Legal Issues.

The Panel has been most gratified that such a large portion of its interim recommendations have been implemented. As it has continued its study, the need for several other changes in the area of safety personnel and administration have given rise to new recommendations.

Three months of experience since Eldridge Waith became the full-time Administrator for School Safety has indicated that the job is more demanding than could be met by the staff we suggested in the Interim Report. *Therefore, the Panel recommends that the Safety Office include two assistants to the Administrator, one for operations and one for administration.*

Furthermore, both principals and community groups have turned eargerly to the Coordinators in the two months since school opened. While they began to serve as a source of help and information, the number of crises to which they have responded (successfully, according to all reports) has prevented them from making routine contacts both in and out of school. *Therefore, the Panel recommends that the Board of Education and the Administrator for School Safety enlarge the corps of Student Service Coordinators.*

While the new student service personnel has been assigned to the high schools, safety personnel in the elementary and junior high schools under the jurisdiction of the Community School Boards has not been indoctrinated in the new safety concepts nor received special training. *The Panel recommends that Community School Districts be urged to participate in the new safety program and training which is being offered to them by the Central Board.*

Perhaps the most serious administrative problem which has become clear during the conduct of this study has been the lack of reliable data. While reliable statistics will not prevent politicking with the sensitive subject of school safety, they would certainly enable those responsible to deal with the problem rationally. At the same time, hard data would arm the School Safety Administration with arguments against those who distort the facts for their own purposes.

Reliable statistics are a prime ingredient of any safety program. Knowing the number, nature and time of all breaches of security will assist the Administrator for School Safety in deploying staff intelligently. In addition, accurate recording of even minor incidents can protect teachers and others in the school system from later repercussions and may provide warning signals of greater troubles to come if preventive measures are not taken.

The unreliability of existing statistics is not a New York City phenomenon. Participants in a recent conference of the International Association of School Security Directors were unanimous in their agreements that various groups tried to hide or inflate incidents reports—or were just not interested in keeping them—so that few systems laid claim to reliable data.

Not only would the existence of accurate data permit more effective deployment of personnel, but it should make possible the first cost-benefit studies that could be done in this field. Several school systems have been able to prepare cost-benefit analyses of alarm-watchmen programs and the reduction of vandalism, window breakage and school theft, but no such objective data has made possible similar analyses of antipersonal acts committed during school hours.

Because both the principal and the Administrator for School Safety are responsible for the safety conditions in each school, one as the operating chief and the other as the expert, both must have access to all relevant data. Both need to be made aware of any incidents threatening the safety of the school, and the Administrator should also receive the principal's comments on all reports. *Therefore, the Panel recommends that School Safety Officers report all incidents with sufficient copies so that one can go to the Administrator and two to the principal who may forward an amended copy to the Administrator.*

It should be noted that, in addition to the inadequate reporting mechanism previously used by the Board of Education, there are several other groups collecting data on school safety. These groups do not work together nor pool data, nor do any two sets of statistics which were available to the study staff coincide. Groups collecting safety data include the UFT, the High School Principals Association and the Police Department. There are also two groups unique to New York City, the Chancellor's School Stability Team and the Mayor's Education Task Force, which the staff studied and reported on to the Panel.

The School Stability Team, composed of a representative of the Council of School Administrators, a member of the UFT and a police liaison officer, and chaired by an assistant principal selected by the Chancellor, was started in 1969 to look into causes of "instability" in the schools. During periods of relative peace in the schools, the team has visited individual buildings, checked locks, windows, doors, etc. and heard grievances mainly from teachers. However, the majority of its time has been spent responding to crises and serving as an advisory body to harrassed principals. The team reports its findings directly to the Chancellor.

The Mayor's Education Task Force, a group of 20 roving observers, was set up to serve the Mayor as an information network. The 20, who work in teams of 2, each assigned to 3 Community School Districts, concentrate on neighborhood problems and try to alert the Mayor to local conditions which may affect the schools. They also bring to the educational administrators information about City services which may be helpful to the schools.

Because the work of the School Stability Team and of the Task Force in many ways parallels the work of the new safety personnel, *the Panel recommends that a regular channel of communication be established among these three groups.* In this way they can complement rather than duplicate each other's activities.

Information exchange and public relations are a vital part of the safety program, and its success will depend on constant input and feedback from every element in the community. Questions of jurisdiction frequently arise. Parents and students often feel excluded from decision-making according to them and to several Board and City officials. In order to reduce friction and to include as many points of view as possible, *the Panel recommends that the Chancellor and the Administrator for School Safety explore ideas for establishing a broad-based Advisory Committee which should meet regularly with the Administrator to help determine safety policies.*

The Panel also recommends that the Administrator meet regularly with a committee of high school principals and, if they are willing, Community School Superintendents.

In the past there was a high rate of turnover among Security Guards; the 1200 persons called for in the UFT contract may be needed; and the Panel has already recommended an increase in the number of coordinators. *Therefore, the Panel recommends that the Safety Office should begin a careful recruitment and screening process so that it has a list of potential Student Service Officers and Coordinators as vacancies open up.*

The School Safety Office will be receiving and must review 900 School Safety Plans. The Office is already overburdened with day-to-day operations, yet these plans must be intelligently reviewed if they are to provide each principal with the guidelines to which he or she will be held accountable. *Therefore, the Panel recommends that the Safety Office employ appropriate consulting help for as long as it takes to review and help revise each of these plans as necessary.*

IX. PLANT SAFETY

The Panel believes that the same measures it recommended to increase personal safety—curriculum revision, personalization of the school environment and involvement of school and community—are also the best measures to improve plant safety.

Students and communities that feel warm and protective toward their schools will not vandalize them nor permit others to do so. Students who feel they have been abused or frustrated during the daytime may retaliate against the school at night and disinterested neighbors will look the other way.

However, it is necessary to take certain specific steps to protect the buildings just as it is necessary to take steps designed especially to protect people.

At present the physical safety of the school plants in New York City is under the jurisdiction of the Office of School Buildings. In many of the cities surveyed for this study, Baltimore, New Orleans, Seattle, Houston, Los Angeles, among others, the school security office was originally established to reduce vandalism and theft. All of these security departments except the one in New Orleans, have shifted their emphasis to personal safety, but plant safety remains the responsibility of the security director.

Because New York City did not have a school security office until 1972, responsibility for the buildings has remained where it has been traditionally, with the building custodians who report to the Office of School Buildings. The Panel examined this administrative structure and concluded that there was no reason at this time to transfer responsibility to the new Office of School Safety, particularly since the latter is overburdened.

Among the measures the Office of School Buildings has taken to improve plant safety is the introduction of intrusion alarms into most of its schools. Installation is made on the basis of requests from principals. Broken glass is being replaced by polycarbonates and the cost of breakage has dropped steadily over the past three years. In spite of these continuing efforts, there was nearly $4,000,000 worth of damage in vandalism, arson and theft reported during 1971. In addition, there were untold amounts of unreported losses—walls that had to be cleaned of graffiti, thefts too small to report individually but enormous in the aggregate, and immeasurable loss in education when equipment upon which the next day's lesson depended had been stolen the night before.

Like disruption and violence, vandalism presents an ever changing picture. Neighborhoods change; the ambiance of a particular school may improve or worsen; and a program which successfully prevents daytime entry may drive vandals to nighttime attempts. Therefore, *the Panel recommends that the Director of the Office of School Buildings meet regularly with the Administrator for School Safety to share expertise, explore new avenues of protection, and determine responsibility as the situation warrants.* In order to maximize the usefulness of these meetings, break-ins should be reported to both the chief building and chief safety officers.

The Panel recommends that there be continuing research and experimentation with other means of protecting school buildings and equipment.

One possibility for reducing unauthorized entries into school buildings would be the installation of individual alarms on every door except the main one through which everyone is to enter. Such alarms do not prevent a door from being opened, and thus to not run counter to fire regulations, but they do deter unauthorized persons from entering side doors. A central monitor indicates when and where an intruder has gained entry. Such an alarm system, complete with monitor, for a 24-door school, would cost less than a single additional guard to patrol among all the doors.

The Panel recommends that the Board of Education install individual alarms on all but the main school doors rather than adding personnel expressly designated to watch for intruders.

Thus far, the Board of Education has determined that the addition of night patrol personnel would be unjustifiably expensive and that patrolling is properly a police function. However, should break-ins increase to a point where losses would apparently warrant the expense, the Board should reconsider its policy.

Any methods employed in an individual school should, of course, be detailed in the School Safety Plan and be the continuing concern of the School Safety Committee which has been recommended for each school.

X LEGAL ISSUES

A. STUDENT RIGHTS

The developing field of civil rights has been accompanied by a heightened awareness of students' legal rights. These range from their right to peaceful participation in political activity to their right to enroll in a public school until the age of 21. Increasingly, secondary students are coming to have many of the rights of full citizenship during the school day as well as outside the school day. Typical of recent court cases extending and defining student rights is *Tinker vs. Des Moines Independent School District*, in which the United States Supreme Court held that student expression of opinions in schools (in this case, wearing of arm bands and displaying of other symbols) could not be abridged except on clear evidence that this expression is materially interfering with appropriate discipline in the operation of the school or is colliding with the rights of others. Supported by the pressure to grant full citizenship rights in all jurisdictions to eighteen-year-olds, this judicial action is irresistibly redefining the doctrine that schools serve *in loco parentis.*

There are several specific areas in which the legal rights of students reflect directly on school safety. These include the student's right to:

. . . attend a public school

. . . attend a particular school

. . . have his grievance not only heard but fairly adjudicated

. . . confidentially of information given to counselors, particularly police serving as counselors

. . . and on a somewhat less significant level, whether the school should mandate that all students carry an I.D. card and when they must show it.

According to New York State law, a student has a right to be enrolled in a public school until he graduates or until he reaches the age of 21, whichever occurs first. (At the same time students over the age of 16 may withdraw from school if they choose.) The problems surrounding the rights of these students to attend school are typical of all disruptive students but are perhaps more prevalent among the older group. According to several principals and teachers, many students between 16 and 21 who are on the register but do not attend classes regard school enrollment as an entry into a positive social situation. They enjoy the privilege of talking to friends, sitting in the lunchroom, and generally being "where the action is" but do not want to participate in the educational process.

As in other cases where student behavior prevents the orderly operation of the school, the principal may suspend such students. Parents must then be invited to discuss the suspension which cannot exceed five days. In addition, suspension cannot take place more than twice during the school year.

If during the course of such suspensions, the student does not agree to withdrawal or to accept transfer out of the school and the disruptive behavior continues, the principal may refer the problem to the appropriate Assistant Superintendent for High Schools or Community School Board Superintendent. That superintendent may then decide upon a further suspension after notifying the parents or may mandate an appropriate alternate educational opportunity. (This mandate can be appealed to the Chancellor.)

This entire procedure is intended to provide maximum educational and parental concentration on what is best for the students. However, according to students, some school staff, and a report by the New York Civil Liberties Union on "Suspension Procedures in the New York City Schools," principals have in fact suspended students illegally for such reasons as political activity and for more than the authorized two five-day periods. Instead, schools should be made more welcoming, and students given a larger role in decision making since more satisfied students will lead to less disruption.

The Panel recommends that a task force of principals meet with representatives from the Chancellor's office to seek more effective ways of dealing with cases of suspension mindful of the rights of the suspended student and those of the rest of the student body.

There are also students who engage in far more threatening acts such as:

1. possession of a deadly weapon or narcotic.
2. physical interference with the conduct of a class or any other school activity.
3. physical endangerment of other persons.

A student who is suspected of engaging in any such activities should have the right to legal counsel in determination of facts. But if he has committed such acts, he cannot expect automatic continuation in a regular school setting. In such instances, school authorities should have the right to provide an alternative educational program. Truancy on the other hand, while it may be an indication that special educational attention is in order, is not by itself a sufficient basis for reassignment. The case for reassignment should be substantiated by reasonable evidence that the student will be better off educationally and otherwise than at the school where he is enrolled. Students should not be allowed to be present in the school or on school property unless they are there for the purpose of attending instruction. Non-attending students should be readily re-admitted to instruction upon appearing for classes, unless they have engaged in other conduct which may be the basis for suspension or special assignment. But they should not expect to be admitted to the school or its grounds for non-educational purposes.

As for the right to attend a particular school, the principal cannot transfer a student without his consent. In fact, many principals do pressure students to accept a transfer and many students are merely moved from school to school without any plan to eliminate the conditions which necessitated the move.

For a few students such transfers may be beneficial. It does place them in a new environment for learning. By assigning them to a new school away from undue influence of similarly disruptive students, opportunities for success are enhanced.

However, the effectiveness of this practice has been limited and many parents and students are opposed to it, claiming that it is a subterfuge for expulsion.

It should be noted that a student who has been suspended is technically a loiterer if he enters school property while under suspension and is therefore subject to arrest if he refuses to leave when ordered to do so.

All of these procedures for dealing with the disruptive students assume that he is and may continue to be disruptive. There are, however, non-disciplinary approaches which should be taken which may well decrease the number of suspensions and transfers needed to improve the educational atmosphere of each school.

There seems to be no disagreement among any of the groups or individuals queried for the study that many potential disrupters are identified early in the educational process but that referral services are woefully inadequate. The Panel feels that an investment in preventive and remedial services might well reduce the cost of punitive and remedial services at a later date. *Therefore, the Panel recommends the establishment of increased psychological and psychiatric services within the school system, for those students for whom such help is needed.*

B. STUDENT GRIEVANCES

In its Interim Report the Panel recommended that:

An effective grievance machinery should be established in each school. Since school communities vary widely, the principal should be empowered to determine what best meets the needs of his or her school. In making this choice, the principal should keep in mind the need to involve students, teachers, and parents; the need for a way to defuse sudden flareups as well as long-range complaints; and the need for a system which can act on problems brought before it, not just rehash them. Possibilities include broadly representative committees, teacher ombudsmen, etc.

The Chancellor, cognizant of the fact that existing machinery is inadequate at best and nonexistent in many schools, asked Mr. A. William Larson, a legal consultant, to explore the possibilities for what he calls "Procedural Due Process." In his report Mr. Larson outlines several possible methods for adjudicating student grievances, any of which might be selected by a principal in consultation with his staff and students.

Each of the variations proposed by Mr. Larson begins with the student making an initial complaint to a staff member who would attempt to resolve the problem. In the first model an unresolved conflict would then go to the principal, to the assistant superintendent for high schools and then, if still unresolved, to the Chancellor. This is the procedure currently followed—and few in the educational system will suggest that it has been effective and successful.

The second model would have the student take his grievance to a court which could be made up of: the Consultative Council; the officers of the G.O.; or a new body composed of two students elected by students, two teachers elected by teachers, two administrators appointed by the principal, and one parent elected by the Consultative Council. Once again an unsatisfied grievant could apply to the Assistant Superintendent and then to the Chancellor.

Lastly, Mr. Larson suggests consideration of the appointment of an Ombudsman who would have no authority to enforce any action, only the power of recommendation. Reasoned persuasion should be his stock in trade. He might be elected by the students or designated collectively by students, faculty, and administration. If the Ombudsman is unable to work out a solution satisfactory in his judgment, he would refer the case to the Educational Ombudsman designated by the Board of Education, who would also be responsible for the functioning of the Ombudsman in each high school adopting this model for its procedural due process. The Educational Ombudsman should be a highly qualified individual from outside the school system who would submit his recommendation to the principal, the grievant, the appropriate Ombudsman, and the Chancellor.

The following general provisions would apply to whatever form of grievance procedure a school might choose to adopt:

1. The entire procedure should be carefully spelled out in writing so that students, faculty and administration are all clear as to what steps and outcomes are to be expected.
2. The processing of complaints and grievances should be treated as confidential matters with no publicity until a final determination has been reached.
3. All parties to complaints and grievances should be assured that there will be no recrimination or reprisal of any kind.

4. The procedure selected would augment the functioning of a high school principal and would in no way be intended to detract from the proper exercise of his authority.

5. All elements of the high school constituency should participate in the refinement of an adopted form of grievance machinery through periodic evaluations.

6. The school would provide facilities to assist students in presenting grievances and making appeals.

Regarding the confidentiality of information about students, the American Civil Liberties Union has raised a number of questions about whether a police-school community relations program runs the risk of putting police in a position where they can have too easy access to confidential student records. A comprehensive school safety program which joins educators, police, students, and community must be prepared to meet objections and opposition based on the need to protect confidential data. Divulgence of confidences could also destroy any relationship built between student service officers and students. *The Panel recommends that policies concerning confidentiality of data remain flexible since any single policy might not be in the best interest of the individual students in every case.*

C. I.D. CARD

Because one of the major problems in school safety is the unauthorized person who enters the school, most schools post an aide or a student Service Officer at the door to screen visitors. With such large school registers no door watcher can know every one of the 3,000 to 7,000 students legitimately entering the school. Thus, it would be helpful if each student had an I.D. card.

The Panel recommends that the Board of Education acquire the camera and laminating machinery which will enable every student and teacher to have a plastic I.D. card containing both his photograph and program. The Panel is aware that there are certain objections to mandated I.D. cards but feels that the benefits far outweigh the disadvantages. Posited against the possibility of loss (or even intentionally giving the I.D. to a friend) is the advantage of a single card which can serve as a pass to the school, to the bus or subway, as a program card within the school, and as an entitlement to low-priced tickets and other benefits frequently available to students. In the world outside the school—in sensitive jobs, at almost all colleges, at conventions, at theater, or when picking up clothes at the cleaners—one must present proper identification. Thus it does not seem unreasonable to require students to prove their right to the privileges of being in the school. As for the student charge that I.D. cards can be a source of harassment, the Panel feels that a group, including students, should draw up guidelines specifying the conditions, such as presence in the hallways during class hours, admission to school events and the school cafeteria, etc. under which a student may be asked to show his I.D. card.

D. DRUGS

There has been a marked increase in the use and abuse of drugs in recent years (although unsubstantiated reports by school personnel indicate a lessening in the past year). While drug abuse can certainly lead to problems for the individual and the community, it is also a reflection of problems both within the individual and within the community as are the protests or the violence which have unfortunately become part of everyday life in many of our cities.

It is a school's responsibility to provide students with factual information regarding drugs. While the New York City high schools have Drug Education Specialists, the Student Service Officers and Coordinators are and should be knowledgeable in this area as well. Their training included sessions on drugs, how to recognize them and how to handle users.

The drug problem is one which is perplexing not only educators but our entire society at this time. Much has been said and written on the subject but there are, as yet, no definitive answers. Nor does this Panel feel that it is qualified to make expert pronouncements in the field.

Sellers of hard drugs are clearly a safety problem and must be arrested. Users who are disruptive or who are persuading others to become users must be dealt with with dispatch, either by arest or by referral to the appropriate authority for treatment. As for the other aspects of the drug problem such as occasional users and marijuana users, serious as they are, this Panel does not feel qualified to recommend beyond referral to authorities better able to deal with the question. However, it is our opinion that the problem must ultimately be dealt with at its root which we deem to be societal and educational malfunction.

In any case, drug use cannot be ignored. Every known or suspected instance must be followed up by appropriate school personnel. This obviously includes Student Service Officers and Coordinators. Their efforts to end drug use, like their other safety efforts, must emphasize prevention through understanding in preference to punishment after the crime. Where preventive measures have failed or seem to be headed for failure, punitive measures must be used in order to protect both the user and his peers.

There are many drug education programs in the schools and drug treatment programs in the city. It is not the role of this study to comment upon these except to *recommend that safety personnel use every available resource to reduce the amount of drug use in the schools.*

XI. CONCLUSIONS

Urban schools throughout the nation are frequently criticized as depersonalizing institutions. They tend to be oversized and overcrowded, and nowhere more so than in New York City. The safety program of a school system can serve to alienate the students still further or it can be a strong force for humanizing the atmosphere of the schools.

The Panel, after a careful study of the subject of school safety, the New York City schools, and other systems throughout the nation, is unanimous in its judgment that the safety program must emphasize human relations factors and minimize the punitive factors which make up a safety program. We recognize, as we urge this course upon the New York City school system, that there will be many forces that will oppose this approach. Some school personnel, community leaders and members, and police, all well-intentioned, believe that strong repressive measures must be used to make the schools safe. The Panel believes that, while such measures may bring short-term benefits, they can only exacerbate the long-range conditions which contribute to the disorder. If the Chancellor and the Board of Education elect to follow the course we have outlined in this report, their leadership and support must be constantly in evidence to insure follow-through on each aspect of the program.

This reinforcement, and recommitment, must take many forms, including:

1. The allocation of increased funds to support the personnel and programs called for in these recommendations.
2. The establishment of a recognized program of career advancement for safety personnel in order to attract and hold qualified staff.
3. A clear mandate that every school have a safety plan which must be drawn up in consultation with school staff, students, parents and the community.
4. A constant and unrestricted two-way flow of information between the central administration for school safety and the schools.
5. Continuous monitoring and evaluation of the safety program and retraining of personnel in order to insure that the program retains its human relations emphasis and does not adopt the stance and philosophy of a paramilitary organization.

We recognize that the area of safety is one of the most difficult problems a school administrator must face. No school system in the country can claim to have solved these problems which are the result of the complex interaction among the school and community and the weaknesses in the curriculum and physical plants. New York City is to be congratulated for seeking a thorough evaluation and long-range solutions to some of these problems. As an advisory Panel, we are particularly impressed with the manpower and resources already committed by the Board of Education and the Chancellor to implement the recommendations contained in our Interim Report.

While school safety is one of the fastest growing items in school budgets throughout the country, unless it is carefully monitored, it can involve large amounts of scarce school funds for educationally unproductive services. It is our belief that continued efforts to implement the human approach to school safety that we have outlined will enable New York City to insure that its safety dollars will not only make the schools more secure but will also make them better places in which to learn and teach.

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INDEX OF EXHIBITS AND SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

(On file in Academy Offices)

CONSULTANT REPORTS PREPARED FOR THIS STUDY

1. *Protection of School Property*, Edgar B. Dews, Jr.
2. *A School Security Program for New York City*, John Powell
3. *Students and Community in School Security*, S. D. Vestermark, Jr.
4. *Organization, Staffing, and Servicing School Security Programs*, S. D. Vestermark, Jr.
5. *School Security Guard Program: A View*, Harvey Oostdyk.
6. *Problems of Drug Abuse Prevention in Relation to Problems of Schools and Education*, Suzanne Ragin Fried.
7. *Disaffection in the New York City Public Schools*, Elizabeth Burba.
8. *School Security Systems in Five Major Cities*, Joseph Grealy and William Steen.
9. *School Disruption: A Survey of the Literature*, Robert R. Sullivan.
10. *Security Issues in New York City High Schools, Four Case Studies*, Eli Silverman, Jae Kim, Hildy Richelson, and Brian Nagle.

BACKGROUND MATERIALS PERTINENT TO THIS STUDY

1. "*. . . and Others*", ASPIRA, Inc.
2. *Disruption in Urban Public Secondary Schools*, Stephen K. Bailey, Syracuse University Research Corp.
3. *From Confrontation to Collaboration*, Irving N. Berlin, M.D., University of Washington, School of Medicine, Seattle, Washington.
4. *My Dream for Public Education* Victor Bucci.
5. *A Report on New York City High Schools*, (1970), Citizens Committee for Children of New York, Inc.
6. *High School: The Process and the Place*, Educational Facilities Laboratories.
7. *Dissent and Discipline in Secondary Schools*, Institute of Continuing Legal Education, University of Michigan.
8. *Dissent and Disruption in the Schools*. Institute for Development of Educational Activities, Inc.
9. *Bomb Incident Procedures*, International Association of Chiefs of Police.
10. *Approaches to the Study of Violence*, Terry Ann Knopf, Lemberg Center, Brandeis University.
11. *Profile of the Large-City High School*, National Association of Secondary School Principals.
12. *Vandalism and Violence*, National School Public Relations Association.
13. *High School Student Unrest*, National School Public Relations Association.
14. *Student Rights Handbook*, New York Civil Liberties Union.
15. *Suspension Procedures in New York City Public Schools: A Report on the Failure to Implement Legal Rights of Students*, New York Civil Liberties Union.
16. *Violence in the Schools*, Public Education Association.
17. *End of Year Report*, (June 1972), School Stability Team.
18. *Stability and Disruption in the Public Schools of New York City*, School Stability Team.
19. *Anatomy of A Crisis*, School Stability Team.
20. *School Vandalism: A National Dilemma*, Stanford Research Institute.
21. *Violence and Safety in the High Schools*, Student Action Committee for Safety.
22. *Urban School Crisis*, Task Force on Urban Education, U.S. Department on Health, Education, and Welfare.
23. *The Need for Immediate Action*, Interim Report by the Panel on School Safety appointed by the Academy for Educational Development, Inc. also,

Testimony on Safe Schools Act before General Subcommittee on Education, U.S. House of Representatives, Sept. 17, 1971.

Testimony on School Violence in 17th Congressional District (New York City) before Congressman Edward I. Koch, May 12, 1972.

Testimony delivered to the Select Committee on Crime, U.S. House of Representatives, June 20, 1972.

School Safety Manuals of Chicago, Cincinnati, Seattle, New Orleans, San Diego, Spokane, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Atlanta, State of Maryland, California, and Connecticut, and,

Relevant communications from the Board of Education 1970-72, including Chancellor's Regulations.

Relevant newspaper clippings April 1—October 15, 1972.

REPORTS OF FIELD TRIPS TO

Washington, D.C.
Chicago, Illinois.
Flint, Michigan.
Prince George's County, Maryland.
International Association of Security Chiefs Meeting, Jacksonville, Florida.

TRAINING MANUALS PREPARED BY THE POLICY INSTITUTE OF THE SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORPORATION

Reading Materials for Student Service Personnel of the New York City School System.

Duty Manual for Student Service Officers of the New York City School System.

Duty Manual for Student Service Coordinators of the New York City School System.

Discussion Leaders Guide to Role Playing Exercises for Student Service Officers of the New York City School System.

THE STUDY STAFF INTERVIEWED THE FOLLOWING PERSONS AT THE BOARD OF EDUCATION

Louis Cenci, Chairman, Advisory Council for Occupational Education.
Sanford Gerlernter, Director, High School Student Activities.
August Gold, Director, Division of Planning and Research.
Alexander McIntyre, *et al*, members of Mobile Security Force.
Edwin Muir, UFT Representative on School Stability Team.
Michael O'Dwyer, former Director of Training, School Security Program.
Jerome Parker, Coordinator for Junior High School Student Activities.
George Patterson, Assistant to the Deputy Chancellor.
Harvey Scribner, Chancellor.
Daniel Schreiber, Assistant Superintendent for Elementary and Junior High Schools.
Leonard Simon, Acting Director of Department of Curriculum Innovation.
Hilary Thorne, Director of Central Zoning Unit.
Walter W. Williams, Coordinator, Office of Intergroup Education.
Charles Wilson, Chairman, School Stability Team.
Harold Zlotnik, Deputy Superintendent for Curriculum Innovation.

THE STAFF ALSO INTERVIEWED:

Paul Balser, President, Academic High School Principals Assn.
Mrs. Irving Bierenberg, Executive Committee, Queens Council of Parents.
Sally Bowles, formerly Mayor's Assistant for Educational Affairs.
Marilyn Braveman, Institute of Human Relations.
Brother James Carney, Director of Secondary Schools, Archdiocese of New York.
Chief Inspector Michael Codd, New York City Police Department.
Sergeant George Collins, Gang Intelligence, New York City Police Department.
John Daly, Director, Bureau of Ethical Security.
P. C. De Brabander, Assistant Director of Security, Pinkertons, Inc.
Captain Richard Dunne, New York City Police Department.
Manuel Falco, Assistant Director, Youth Services Agency.
Norma Flood, Director of Insurance, Archdiocese of New York.
Waldemar Gonzalez, *et al*, Directors of ASPIRA.
Brother Guihan, Principal, Rice Catholic High School.
Betsy Hogan, Mayor's Assistant for Educational Affairs.
Carl Irish, Director, Mayor's Education Task Force.

Leroy Jones, Student at F. D. Roosevelt High School.
Alan Levine, New York Civil Liberties Union.
Bertram Levine, Community Relations Service, U.S. Department of Justice.
Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy, New York City Police Department.
Michael O'Rourke, Chief of Security, American Broadcasting Company.
Sophie Price, Chairman, Community School Boards.
Simpson Sasserath, President, Vocational High Schools Principals Association.
Patrolman Robert Sheridan, 28th Precinct, New York City Police Department.
Jeffrey Sunshine, Student at John Dewey High School.
Murray Sussman, Safety Chairman, United Federation of Teachers.
Charles Stover, *et al*, Mayor's Budget Bureau.
Deputy Commissioner Benjamin Ward, New York City Police Department.

OBSERVATIONS ON VISITS TO

Jane Addams High School.
DeWitt Clinton High School.
Canarsie High School.
Eastern District High School.
Far Rockaway High School.
Fashion Industries High School.
Benjamin Franklin High School.
Haaren High School.
Jamaica High School.
Franklin K. Lane High School.
Morris High School.
Julia Richman High School.
Adlai Stevenson High School.
George Washington High School.
Community School District 8.
Community School District 29, and
Training Program for School Security Guards, April 1972, and
Training Program for Student Service Officers, August-September 1972.
Completed questionnaires for 65 high schools and 61 junior high schools.

Mr. MOON. I appreciate this opportunity and we stand ready to be of further assistance to the committee this morning.

Mr. BINGHAM. If I could make a brief comment on some of what you have heard here today. I think it is clear that the problem of crime in the schools is broader than the approach of security measures, and that it does require improvements in the educational system itself.

I certainly would agree with that. But I think that it cannot be limited to that either, and the particular focus of this legislation would be in the areas where the educational process can be furthered and improved by providing up-to-date modern sensitive security measures.

I would like to mention one subject that was discussed in detail at the hearings we had in New York last year by a representative of NASA. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has done research in a variety of fields.

One of these was in the field of school security. They have developed a very interesting device, a system for providing almost instantaneous alarms to teachers if they have difficulty in a class room or if there is any difficulty in the corridor. It is a sonic device that cannot be heard by the ear. There is a little pin that sets off the alarm and locates on a board in the principal's office where the trouble is and there is no noise, no fuss, but the security chief or the principal knows right where the trouble is and can send assistance immediately.

This device has been very successfully used in Sacramento, Calif., where the original installation was made and New York City is now proceeding on a pilot basis to put them into three schools, hopefully four. Other school districts are using this sort of thing. This is the kind of technological device which we feel can enormously improve the atmosphere and permit the educational process to take place.

If you have a kind of terror pervading the school, education is not going to take place. So what I am stressing is that while these problems of security and educational reform are linked, they are also to a degree separate. I think that the evidence is ample that this needs a special emphasis and a special categorical approach such as this legislation would provide.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Bingham, if I understand your statement correctly, you said that you oppose special revenue sharing for education and that you favor categorical aid, since that approach allows the Federal Government to target its funds on particular problems.

Assistant Secretary Marland told you that the administration would oppose your bill. I would like to have your views, Mr. Bingham, as to how you feel about this remark of Mr. Marland, the Assistant Secretary; whether it is peculiar since the Nixon administration has long advocated law and order?

Mr. BINGHAM. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think it is rather peculiar. I think that it is insensitive to say that this particular problem does not require a special approach, a focused approach, and I do think that probably Mr. Marland's remarks reflect the administration's feeling generally that they don't like categorical programs and that they would rather move in the direction of broad discretion.

That may be all right in certain cases but I think it is not the correct approach to take with regard to crime in schools. I am not sure that if the Congress goes too far in that direction, it is living up to its responsibilities.

I think Congress has a responsibility to try to see that taxpayers' funds that it funnels into various programs are properly and appropriately used.

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Kelly, you suggested that a congressional committee conduct a study on crime in the schools. I would like for you to elaborate on the need for this study and tell us what kind of data this study ought to collect?

Mr. KELLY. I and Mr. Moon both pointed out that there is no adequate data presently available on crime in the schools. So they may want to respond also. Go ahead, Mr. Grealy.

Mr. GREALY. Yes; I think it is obvious from comments everybody has made here today that complete data is sorely needed. Most crime in the schools statistics that have been compiled are not complete. Only by knowing the real picture can we attack the problem.

We discussed this at our last national conference. I have put a program based on the FBI uniform crime reporting system into effect. This is with our membership. We are getting from them their losses in vandalism, theft and arson; the number of assaults that their schools experience. The number of bombings, the number of bomb threats, the number of disturbances.

From this program we hope to get a clearer picture. I think it will be an astounding picture far different from the ones we have now that are incomplete and old. I don't think people realize what is going on in our school systems today. They will know far more from this.

Our idea in soliciting the help of your people is that they can do this on a far broader scale.

I think we will get a real complete picture from our own organization. We will be glad to cooperate on this task.

Mr. KELLY. I would like to point out as active as Mr. Grealy's group is, that it represents only a few hundred out of approximately 17,000 or 18,000 districts because the others simply don't have security oriented people. They are struggling with it through the principal or some administrator. I think that this other vast group, who the police are relating directly to, must be kept in mind, because that is the next step. I think we need to keep them in mind and I think it would be useful if they could be brought in to explain their problems.

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Moon, any other reaction?

Mr. MOON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. This matter of collecting data about the personal aspect of school safety, as opposed to the physical building or property aspects, is a very complicated matter. School systems have been very reluctant to publish such data. In fact, many have been quite reluctant to even include it in the first place.

I think the matter of gathering such data is an important one on any level at which it can be carried out. If the Congress was to do this, it should certainly do so promising confidentiality because the systems themselves are terribly worried about making such data available to the public.

But it seems to me the wisdom of the proposal of Congressman Bingham addresses this problem by suggesting the need of support for planning purposes, the need for more leadership to school systems on how to approach the problem of school safety.

One of the great absences is the matter of accurate data, intelligent data, data in a form that can be used for further planning and further positive reaction. It seems to me that leadership that would come from this kind of an enactment would go a long way to fill an important void.

Mr. PERKINS. Thank you, gentlemen, very much. You have been very helpful to the committee. The more I think about the legislation, Mr. Bingham, the more I feel that we ought to separate it from ESEA because, as you know, our fight there is whether we should continue with the categorical approach or go to the special revenue sharing approach of consolidating several programs.

I am very much in favor of this legislation. I think it is very healthy and sound legislation. But it is my judgment, from a strategical point, that it should be a separate bill. At the appropriate time, I will bring this matter before the full Committee on Education and Labor.

Your witnesses have made a great presentation and have pointed out the need for further study by the committee. We will consider all aspects of this important proposal of yours. I want to congratulate you for introducing legislation calling problems of this kind to the attention of the committee. It is certainly a tremendous problem and it deserves consideration by this Congress.

I thank all of you very much for your appearance here this morning. Do you have any questions, Mr. Cross?

Mr. CROSS. The bill does not have any authorization figure. Do you have estimates of how much we are talking about in the way of money to accomplish the kind of security that is necessary?

Mr. **Bingham**. It seemed best to leave that to the inquiries of the committee as to what might be a reasonable figure. Last year we did have a figure of $50 million in the original proposal and since this was a figure that was kind of pulled out of the air, so to speak, it seemed best to leave this matter open for the committee in its wisdom to determine after its study of the matter.

Mr. **Cross**. Do any of the other gentlemen have any suggestions on what authorization might be appropriate?

Mr. **Grealy**. We were thinking of larger sums of money to attack this as part of the overall bill and then when we get the package we want, to explore it further into the sums we are talking about.

Mr. **Cross**. Congressman, in Section 143(b)(3) of the bill, page 3, you speak of the program having support of parents, professional employees and the community at large. Would you also expect that program to have the support of students in the school?

Mr. **Bingham**. That is a very interesting question. To the extent that there is machinery for that, I think that would be desirable. Not all school districts, I would suppose, would have such machinery.

We do have guarantees in the bill to protect the civil rights of the students. But I think it is an interesting suggestion and where feasible I would certainly be in favor of it.

Mr. **Cross**. In that same section, another subpart, you talk about the need for assistance taking into account the degree to which measurable deficiencies in quality of public education in that district exceeded those of other districts.

How do you suggest we determine when a measurable deficiency exists?

Mr. **Bingham**. That, of course, would be up to the Commissioner rather than the Congress to determine. I would think that there are standards that are available, reading ability and such.

I think that this is an area where increasingly standards are being developed and I would suppose that experts in the office of the Commissioner could determine a deficiency.

Mr. **Cross**. You would not have any objection to something like the use of achievement test scores or something of that sort to determine educational deficiency?

Mr. **Bingham**. No, I think that is what we have in mind generally.

Mr. **Moon**. I think you could also examine level of personnel staffing of various kinds of services in the school, which would be another indication of deprivation, such indices as student-teacher ratio, number of counselors per student. This should be done probably on a school by school basis rather than city wide statistics.

There could be other staffing positions too that could be examined with respect to this problem and I think they would indicate relatively high relationship where you have high student-teacher ratio and I think the incidents of disruption and unpleasantness would be greater than in an opposite situation.

Similarly with counselors and availability of other kinds of programs.

Mr. **Cross**. Another question along this same line. You speak of the need for assistance taking into account the financial need of the school district. That is again something that varies a great deal among states and among districts, depending on how revenue is raised and whether local elections are needed. As we move to full State funding for education the complexity of determining financial need will be enormous. I think that this is one area that needs a great deal of thought.

Mr. BINGHAM. I certainly agree. It could not be measured in absolute terms, in terms of resources of the community. It also has to be measured in terms of relationship of the resources of the community to the total problem.

In other words, the severity of the problem is also a factor and the degree to which the local community can meet the need.

Mr. CROSS. On page 9 of your statement, Congressman, you mention the $500 million vandalism figure and you compare that as being about one-sixth of what is in ESEA currently.

That certainly is an accurate comparison, but I suggest that another possible comparison is to compare the $500 million to total national expenditure in elementary and secondary education, which is about $50 billion. In that case, it is about one percent and I don't think the figure is quite as horrifying as it would appear as 15 percent of the Federal share.

Mr. BINGHAM. You are quite right. In a way though you might say that, and I would not want to emphasize this too much, but it is an additional safeguard that the Federal Government's contribution would not go down the drain. In other words, a way of protecting its investment, if you will.

Mr. CROSS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PERKINS. Thank you and all of your witnesses very much this morning Congressman Bingham. It was an excellent presentation.

Congressman Lehman has been delayed in flight this morning, but he has asked me to insert in the record the following statement made by him in support of the Safe Schools Act. Without objection, Mr. Lehman's statement will appear at this point in the record.

[The statement referred to follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM LEHMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

I would like to go on record as being in support of the Safe Schools Act of 1973. From my experience as Chairman of the Dade County school system, I see a definite need for this type of program.

For the past several years, Dade County has been operating a school security program, funded from local sources. One of the more successful corrollary programs was the use of parents of students enrolled in the schools as paraprofessional personnel. These parents were employed on a part-time basis and were paid rates comparable to other part-time personnel, such as cafeteria workers. The greatest advantage in hiring these parents who patrolled corridors, rest rooms, cafeterias and playgrounds was that they were able to distinguish between the real troublemakers in the school and those children who were simply being troublesome, and as well, could relate to them on a personal basis.

These parents knew most of the children in the school and the children knew them, and therefore there was direct community involvement in maintaining order in those school buildings. If, instead of these parents, we had hired professional security personnel, most of whom would have lived outside the neighborhood of their schools, we would not have had the same success.

Therefore, I would like to announce my intention to offer an amendment to the Safe Schools Act, whenever the Subcommittee considers it, which will require that a substantial amount of each grant be used by each school district for employing parents as security personnel.

[Whereupon at 10:45 a.m., the hearing adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]

[The following material was submitted for the record:]

THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL SECURITY DIRECTORS,
Fort Lauderdale, Fla., August 2, 1973.

Mr. CARL D. PERKINS,
Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, General Subcommittee on Education, Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The following official position is presented by the National Association of School Security Directors in regard to the Safe Schools Act of 1973.

The National Association of School Security Directors, in national conference assembled on July 18, 1973, consisting of school security directors of these fifty states, who are directly responsible for the safety and security of both students and faculty, and the protection of the physical plant of the school systems, respectfully call upon the power and influence of your office to support the Safe Schools Act of 1973, which you and others have introduced, to a successful conclusion in order to combat the national problem of controlling and reducing the rapidly increasing crime in schools, which now seriously threaten the primary mission of the public schools and the safety of our children.

This resolution in its entirety and exact form is attached, also for the record.

We believe the Safe Schools Act should be amended to provide selected demonstration projects covering a cross section of school systems both geographically and by type with resulting data and report to the Congress in the first year, and with a cost of no more than 7.5 to 10 million dollars, if that much.

We also feel that full scale hearings involving our members and the input of other major organizations such as AASA; NEA; AFT; PTA, The Chief State School Officers and others are needed in the relatively near future.

Recent surveys reveal a terrifying increase in violent crime in schools throughout the country.

The incidents involve people and facilities. Naturally the greater concern is for the safety of students and school personnel. However, the crime involving facilities, estimated by some to total half a billion dollars a year, does drain from the funds for quality education and in many instances leaves the teachers and students without their schools and equipment.

The latest FBI uniform crime report covering the first three months of 1973 reflects that violent crimes were up 6 percent. Aggravated assaults increased 9 percent, forcible rape 7 percent, murder 6 percent and robbery 4 percent. I'm sad to say a good portion of this took place right in our schools with out students and teachers the victims.

At a recent meeting of educational experts at the National Urban Coalition Conference in Washington, D.C., their survey of school problems concluded that the increasing crime rates in the Nation's urban schools reflect acts ranging from extorting lunch money to murders and rapes of students and teachers.

George Jones, Director of the National Education Association Center for Human Relations, surveyed some of the larger school systems and a comparison of current problems with those of 1970 revealed:

In-school assault and battery cases up 58 percent.
School Robberies up 117 percent.
Sex offenses up 62 percent.
Drug problems up 85 percent.

These incidents occurred throughout the country from coast to coast.

News media daily report such incidents of assault, rape, robbery, arson and other crimes in our schools.

In Oakland, California, a mother waiting for her daughters at King Junior High School was shot by two teenaged boys. She later died of head wounds.

A sawed off shotgun and two pistols were found in student lockers at Mt. Vernon, New York Junior High School where they were stored in preparation for a battle between rival gangs.

In Atlanta, Georgia, a 16 year old student was shot and wounded when youths in two crowded cars sprayed rifle and pistol fire into a group of students in front of David T. Howard High School.

A 15 year old Westinghouse High School student in Pittsburgh was stabbed in the chest following a football game leaving him in critical condition.

The son of a Baptist minister was shot in the stomach outside Garfield High School in Seattle. Two brothers, aged 15 and 17, students at the school, were held in connection with the shooting.

In Tampa, Florida, an 8 year old girl was lured away from the Tampa Bay Elementary School and raped.

In nearby Pensacola, Florida, a 15 year old girl was abducted by gun point from Pensacola High School and raped.

A month long confrontation between rival gangs in Los Angeles Locke High School involving such weapons as guns, steel natural combs, chains, bricks, concrete blocks, walking canes and sticks resulted in death, wounding, beatings and destruction. Several guns were confiscated. One administrator commented that school officials found themselves using methods almost akin to gestapo tactics to deal with the situation.

The crime picture with regard to facilities is just as frustrating.

A recently conducted survey by School Product News was reflected in its June issue.

Schools with enrollments of 5–10,000 students showed an average of $12,415 cost of vandalism; 10–25,000 an average cost of $21,417 and those over 25,000 an average cost of $243,952.

This is more shocking when you realize that these statistics compiled from 331 schools must be applied to almost 15,000 school systems in the United States.

Fire damage or arson was by far the most expensive of all the vandalism costs. Again this type of crime is not limited to any one area as reflected in daily news media stories.

An arsonist's attempt to destroy 182 school buses in West Palm Beach, Florida was unsuccessful when a trail of gasoline failed to ignite.

Arsonists are blamed for the $200,000 fire on Christmas eve that virtually destroyed Warrington Elementary School in Pensacola, Florida.

A 13 year old schoolboy who "screamed like a panther and fought like a tiger" was charged with six counts of burglary and one count of arson involving schools in the Atlanta, Georgia area.

Two boys, aged 13 and 14, were responsible for a $50,000 blaze at Dorsey Junior High School in Miami, Florida.

In Scottsbluff, Nebraska, two men were arrested in connection with the fire bombing of the Scottsbluff Junior High School.

Fire fighters attempted to put out a blaze that destroyed a Ballard High School portable in Seattle, Washington.

The San Diego, California school system reported vandalism, arson and burglary costs as having increased five times in five years to a total of almost one half million dollars. More than half the loss was due to fires.

Acts of arson, burglary and malicious mischief cost Los Angeles 2.5 million dollars in 1970–71 school year up from 2.2 million the previous year. The school system can no longer afford to carry insurance since premiums are astronomical with a deductible of $100,000 for each incident.

After 100 Seattle, Washington parents voluntarily painted the Wedgewood School, young vandals broke in and smeared unused paint through the building.

After breaking into Dana Junior High School in San Pedro, California, four boys turned on a fire hose and flooded classrooms. They then dumped books in the school library and destroyed a number of band instruments.

Vandals did thousands of dollars damage to Tacoma, Washington Schools. The New Whitman School was an ink-stained, equipment a strewn mess. At Stanley Schoool they ransacked two storerooms leaving the contents in mountains on the floor. Candle burning vandals sacked and burned a chunk of Lincoln School.

At La Jolla, California High Schools, vandals broke as many things as they could get their hands on. They knocked typewriters off desks, sprayed contents of fire extinguishers on intercoms and emptied papers and contents of desks.

Dr. Norman B. Scharer, President Elect of the American Association of School Administrators told the National School Directors Conference—"A conservative estimate of the cost of vandalism, thefts and arson to schools in this country this year will reportedly be over a half billion dollars. I say conservative because out of the almost 15,000 school systems the top five account for 15–20 million dollars of this cost.

"Daily news media headline the sad stories taking place in our schools. Vandalism is described as a national tragedy. School property losses have reached record heights. Insurance costs are prohibitive.

"In 1968, 13,200 school fires resulted in damages of over 52 million dollars. I hate to think what a current survey would reflect."

These stories, Mr. Chairman, appear everywhere and are all too familiar. For example, during the past school year a brutal attack of vandalism left Tilicum Junior High School, Bellevue, Washington, a paint-stained shambles, festooned with debris and broken glass. Police stated juveniles broke into the school over the July 4th weekend, then rampaged through classrooms smearing paint, destroying equipment, scattering books and smashing windows.

Three juveniles were caught in J. J. Daniells Junior High School, Marrietta, Georgia, at 1:30 a.m. while emptying fire extinguishers on classroom floors and breaking school windows.

Four juveniles, three boys and a girl were arrested and charged with the New Year's weekend break-in at Oak Grove Junior High School, Clearwater, Florida.

An 18 year old girl and a 15 year old boy were charged with breaking into six portables at Pacific, California Prevocational School during the early morning hours and completely destroying all of the school equipment.

The third major school fire in less than a month charged to arson hit Wedgewood Middle School, Pensacola, Florida, late Saturday or early Sunday. Total damages were estimated at over $300,000.

Four strategically placed firebombs ignited a fire that raged out of control and destroyed Truman Junior High School, Tacoma, Washington, causing an estimated $260,000 damage.

The second major school fire in less than a week gutted Blount Middle School, Pensacola, Florida. Damages were estimated at $300,000.

Three teenagers were taken into custody in connection with four fires at three schools in Clairemont, California over the weekend resulting in $60,000 worth of damage.

A four alarm fire raged through Bowie Junior High School, Irving, Texas, gutting the structure and causing an estimated $750,000 in damages. A former student, 18 years of age, and two accomplices, aged 16 and 13, were charged with the arson.

School crimes, as evidenced by the headlines, are not limited to any area of the country. In Los Angeles, during the first four months of this year, assaults on students and teachers increased nearly 50 percent over the previous year. Miami, on the opposite coast, experienced almost exactly the same percentage of increase in assaults.

But statistics do not begin to relate the personal and human tragedy. In Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a dedicated music teacher, visiting school during the Christmas holidays, was shot in the head and killed when she apparently either resisted being robbed or recognized the culprit, who had previously been a student at that school.

Assault, murder, guns and other weapons make the headlines.

For the third time this semester, a teacher was raped on the school grounds. This time the incident occurred at Bruce Elementary School, Houston, Texas, and, as in the other cases, the intruder was an outsider who had no business on the school grounds.

A kindergarten teacher at the 95th Street Elementary School, Los Angeles, was robbed in front of her students by an armed youth who took her money, engagement and wedding rings .

Two teenagers were held in the shooting of a sixteen year old student at Martin Luther King Junior High School, Detroit, Michigan.

Two brothers, aged 14 and 16, were shot and wounded Wednesday on the third floor of the science building at Carver High School, Atlanta, Georgia.

A deputy was stabbed in the chest and fifteen students were arrested at Dixie Hollins High School, St. Petersburg, Florida.

A sixteen year old student of Hutchinson Technical High School, Buffalo, N.Y. was fatally stabbed by three youths.

A seventeen year old honor student, preparing to enter Claremont, Calif. College on a full scholarship, was attacked and stabbed to death by six youths Wednesday at John Glenn High School.

A sixteen year old boy was killed and a fourteen year old girl was wounded Tuesday when caught in a gun battle between two youths in a corridor at Armstrong Junior High School, Richmond, Virginia.

An Associated Press survey reflected an upsurge of cases of pupils carrying and using guns in classrooms, corridors and schoolyards during the past year. As a result of this survey the NBC "Today" show invited me, as your president, to appear on that show and discuss "Crime in the Schools" with Frank McGee before a 100 million viewing audience.

A news story, earlier this year, told how a teacher in her early twenties, in the Southwest part of the country, related that she was doing what she always dreamed of because she enjoyed helping children. Yet she kept a knife and a can of mace in her desk drawer. For insurance she kept a second knife in her purse. She feels so threatened she plans to resign her post and perhaps abandon her profession.

Parade, in a March 1973 issue, headlined an article "Teachers Beware!" It related that. . . . "Time was when the teaching profession was a safe and secure one. No more. In many communities it's become highly dangerous to teach."

Thirty-seven percent of the Nation's public school teachers report cases of student violence directed at teachers in their schools during 1971–72.

Two percent say they were attacked by students, and 9 percent report their personal property was maliciously damaged by students.

Violence against teachers is more widespread at the secondary than at the elementary school level. Fifty-two percent of secondary teachers, compared with 25 percent of elementary teachers, report attacks on teachers or damage to their property.

In school systems with enrollments of more than 25,000 one teacher in 25 reports having been attacked by a student.

The statistics are from a nationwide survey of public school classroom teachers as reported in the National Education Association Research Publication.

It concluded by stating that in some cities school teachers should be awarded hazard or combat pay.

A May issue of the New York Times headline read "Crime in Schools Laid to Inaction". A committee recommendation called for a proper national security school plan.

President elect Sharer also told the school directors—"I know what you people have accomplished in the short time your association has been in existence. The pending federal legislation known as the 'Safe Schools Act' authored by Education Committee Chairman Carl D. Perkins, Congressman Jonathan Bingham and some twenty other members and by Senator Ed Gurney of Florida and co-sponsored there by Senator Alan Cranston of California, are a tribute to your untiring efforts. I know you will continue to work for the enactment of such legislation, not only nationally but also on a local level. You should also continue to pursue other sources of local and federal funding to help you fight school security problems.

"I want you to know that I, and my fellow superintendents throughout the country, wholly support you in your efforts. I urge you to continue so that, hopefully through our mutual support, we can eliminate these impossible conditions and be able to fulfill our primary function . . . quality education in a safe and secure atmosphere."

A report by the House Select Committee on crime "On Drugs in our Schools" released on June 29, 1973 states that we are a Nation suffering from a deadly disease. Our Nation's youth is being decimated and slowly destroyed by a drug epidemic.

The National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse recently found that 6 percent of our high school pupils had used heroin. This means that 1½ million of our schoolboys and schoolgirls are already gravely endangered by that menace. The survey of high school pupils showed 8 percent tried hallucinogenic drugs—LSD mescaline, peyote, 5 percent cocaine, 8 percent "speed", 7 percent barbutuates and 5 percent had tried painkillers such as morphine and codeine.

The report cited that in the last two years in New York City, 500 teenagers died because of narcotic addiction. Walter Vandermeer, age 12, was the youngest child in the city to die of a drug overdose. His body was found in the floor of a bathroom. Beside the body were two glassine envelopes that appeared to have contained heroin, a syringe, a needle and a bottle cap. All the necessary paraphernalia to prepare heroin for intravenous injection.

In reviewing the problem the House Select Committee concluded that drug abuse in our schools has become so extensive and pervasive that it is only the uniquely gifted and self-possessed child who is capable of avoiding involvement with some form of drug use.

It was estimated that the trail of devastation being left will take a decade to remedy.

Many school systems are reacting to these serious problems which are draining funds from their primary purpose quality education by instituting a school security system headed and manned by experienced and competent personnel. However, these people cannot cope with these vast and costly problems without sufficient funding and equipment.

In response to the plight of school systems and the fears of concerned parents, Congressional leaders have responded. Safe School Acts which would provide federal funding to combat these school problems are presently pending.

As you know, the bill in the Senate is co-sponsored by Senators Edward J. Gurney of Florida and Alan Cranston of California. Hearings on this bill are scheduled for the fall of this year.

The State of Florida, probably the first in the Nation, in its recent session passed a "Safe Schools Act" that will provide assistance on the local level for each of its 67 school systems to deal with school security problems.

Thank you for your most extensive help already, Mr. Chairman. We now submit to you and pray for the action of your Committee and the House of Representatives.

You will note that the National Conference has changed our official name to "National Association of School Security Directors".

Most respectfully,

JOSEPH I. GREALY,
President.

Attachment: Resolution.

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, the safety from crime for children, employees, and property is an essential prerequisite for teaching and learning in the elementary and secondary schools of our Nation; and

WHEREAS, the school children and employees in elementary and secondary schools are entitled to an atmosphere free from violence and threat of crime in which to work, study, and play; and

WHEREAS, the incidents of crimes against children, employees, and property in elementary and secondary schools is such, that in many schools the educational process is seriously jeopardized and the rights of students to pursue learning is severely restricted; and

WHEREAS, the loss of school property due to theft, arson, and vandalism is in excess of $500,000,000 annually; and

WHEREAS, security in the schools poses special problems and requires special techniques, training, and materials which are often not available to the educational process; and

WHEREAS, the specially qualified personnel and the special professional skills provided by School Security personnel have demonstrated that problems of crime and violence in the schools can be effectively met by school security specialists who are trained in the complex investigative, counseling, and law enforcement requirements of providing safety and security in the contemporary public schools;

NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved that the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL SECURITY DIRECTORS, which consists of School Security Directors from these fifty states, and who are directly responsible for the safety and security of both students and faculty, and the protection of the physical plant of school systems, respectfully call upon the power and influence of your office to initiate and or support legislation and programs, as well as to direct revenue from existing programs, toward helping us combat the national problem of controlling and reducing the rapidly increasing crime in schools which now seriously threaten the primary mission of the public schools and the safety of our children.

BALTIMORE CITY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Baltimore, Md., May 29, 1973.

Hon. CARL D. PERKINS,
Chairman, House Committee on Education and Labor, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PERKINS: This is to inform you that the Board of School Commissioners at the Board Meeting on May 24, 1973, approved the attached resolution supporting HR 2650, "Safe Schools Act."

Sincerely yours,

ROLAND N. PATTERSON,
Superintendent, Public Instruction.

RESOLUTION OF H.R. 2650 SAFE SCHOOLS ACT

WHEREAS, H.R. 2650, the Safe Schools Act, is presently before the House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor; and

WHEREAS, this bill would amend Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to provide financial assistance to aid local educational agencies throughout the nation to meet special needs incident to providing security for children, employees, and facilities in elementary and secondary schools by reducing and preventing crimes against them; now therefore be it

RESOLVED, that the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City endorses H.R. 2650 and recommends its passage; and be it further

RESOLVED, that copies of this Resolution be sent to the Chairman, House Committee on Education and Labor, and to Representatives Parren Mitchell and Paul Sarbanes.

Approved by:
BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS,
May 24, 1973.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Trenton, N.J., May 2, 1973.

DIVISION OF FIELD SERVICES MEMORANDUM

To: General Subcommittee on Education, House of Representatives, Congress of the United States.
From: John Rosser, Director, Division of Field Services.
Subject: Training for School Security Guards.

BACKGROUND

The Department of Education has long been aware of the growing problems of providing a stimulating and secure learning environment in the schools of New Jersey. Recently, under the auspices of the Director of the Division of Field Services, an investigation into the constructing of more effective training programs for security personnel has been initiated. The responsibility for conducting this project has been assumed by the Bureau of Emergency Preparedness Education. A team composed of specialized divisional staff has been assembled to organize, conduct, and evaluate a pilot project which has been assigned to provide effective training for security guards.

The need for this type of training exists in New Jersey. A recent sampling of selected states has revealed the existence of numerous programs which are more comprehensive than any training presently being offered in New Jersey.

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

In an attempt to increase the proficiency of security personnel, the Department of Education will sponsor a training seminar during the Summer of 1973. The objectives for this workshop include:

1. To train participants in administering first-aid to students, faculty, and other school staff.
2. To train participants in the techniques of unarmed self-defense.
3. To familiarize participants with school law and policies and students' rights.
4. To evaluate the effectiveness of this training seminar through the analysis of the growth of trainee knowledge in the content areas.

The inclusion of these content areas resulted from a thorough synthesis of existing programs. The Bureau has attempted to gather the finest instructional staff available and has also consulted with the Divisional research coordinator in an effort to validly measure the effectiveness of this workshop.

IMPLICATIONS

The Department hopes that this initial effort will be a demonstration of an effective means of training Depending upon the success of the project and the availability of suitable funding, the Department will endeavor to sponsor similar sessions at selected sites across the State. Upon the analyses of the data gathered from these seminars, a systematic and state-wide program of training for security personnel will be introduced.

J. R.

Minneapolis Public Schools,
Minneapolis, Minn., April 27, 1973.

Hon. Carl D. Perkins,
Chairman, General Subcommittee on Education, Committee on Education and Labor, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Perkins: The interest of the Minneapolis Public Schools in the Safe Schools Act of 1973 is based on the increasing arson, glass breakage, burglary and vandalism in our 106 school locations and in schools across the nation.

Acts of vandalism against the Minneapolis Schools occur on the average of twice in any three-day period, and have increased nearly 90% from 1960 to 1970. The public schools provide choice targets for terrorists, vandals, arsonists, and thieves. The older buildings were not designed for security and frequently have hundreds of windows and easily compromised locking systems. Enclosed is a weekly break-in report which shows the wide variety of crimes which occur in our schools, both during and after regular school hours.

In 1965 glass breakage, burglary and vandalism *repairs* cost the Minneapolis Schools $67,266.55 compared to $143,791.59 in 1971. As shown in the enclosed "Statement of Glass Breakage, Burglary and Vandalism Comparative Costs", the major portion of these expenditures is for glass breakage. During the period July 1972 through February 1973, the Minneapolis Schools expended $18,628 for *replacement of stolen equipment.* These figures do not show the loss in effectiveness caused by interruption of the educational process.

In 1967 we began a window guard protection program. Since that time our trades crews have installed 5,829 window guards, beginning with the schools having the highest need. The present estimated average cost (including labor, materials and installation) of these guards is $60 each.

In November 1971, the Board of Education approved the proposal of Security Analysts (a consulting firm providing guidance on safety and security) for preparation of plans and specifications, and the inspection and related work for the installation of fire, intrusion/vandalism, mechanical failure detection systems and monitoring services at a fee based on $25 per man hour, not to exceed a total of $9,800.

Within several weeks we anticipate starting operation of our district-owned security system (with an installation cost of $137,320) which consists of 18 schools on burglary/vandalism detection, 61 schools on boiler surveillance and all schools on fire alarms and sprinkler system surveillance. The budget estimate for equipping the remaining 82 schools with burglary/vandalism surveillance equipment would average approximately $2,200 per building, or a total cost of $180,400. It is anticipated that the cost for remote monitoring of the security system will range from $13,000 to $17,000 per year.

In March 1973, the Board of Education approved a program for the identification of our equipment (audio visual, office equipment, musical instruments, etc.) by engraving and decals. It is felt that such marking will be a deterrent against the theft of equipment. This program is coordinated with the police department, all markings to have both Minneapolis Public Schools identification and a police identification number. The estimated cost for this program is $15,000.

We have also directed our efforts into using unbreakable glass, such as G. E. Lexan, fiberglass and Plexiglas wherever possible. However, its use is restricted due to the great amount of contraction and expansion with this type of glass in our particular geographic location. There are also problems of adjusting sash balance weights in operable windows, spraying volatile fuels on the glass and igniting, thus melting and destroying the glass.

Glass block construction, as was popular in the 1950's, has been a vulnerable target area for vandals, is extremely expensive to replace on an individual basis, and is being repaired by slugging with cement or paneling off an entire area where the breakage has been extensive.

All exterior doors that are worn out or have been damaged beyond repair are being replaced with hollow steel doors and frames with the best hardware and locks that are available. Areas of high security, such as audio visual storerooms within the building are being replaced with hollow steel doors and frames also.

I hope these facts will help to illustrate the great need for assistance in the area of security in the schools. If you have further questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely yours,

Donald D. Bevis,
Associate Superintendent of
Schools for Business Affairs.

Enclosure.

MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS

DEPARTMENT OF BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS, WEEKLY BREAK-IN REPORT

Date	School	Damage	Detection system
Oct. 4, 1972	Central	During the day while classes were in progress, 3 Sunbeam steam irons were stolen. 1972 models SD-36, serial No. 24-181-D-196-746. Cost $15 each. 2 of the irons were in a locked cabinet and 1 was being used at the time.	Security alarms (building open).
Oct. 5, 1972	do	During the morning of a regular schoolday a walkie-talkie was stolen. Johnson, model No. 109 A062 0, serial No. 53015, value $159.95.	Do.
Nov. 30, 1972	do	Stolen after 4 p.m.: Bell & Howell tape recorder—Educator 406—serial No. 9117449; Bell & Howell tape recorder cassette—Educator 406—serial No. 9117319; stereo head phones—Koss (4 sets)—model 727-B; blank cassette tapes TDK (50 tapes)—model C-60.	Do.
Dec. 2, 1972	do	After school hours, when building was still open, a Smith-Corona Electric portable typewriter (tan colored) was stolen. Model No. 225—serial No. 6 SV324096. 1 pane of glass in the door of room No. 313 was broken. Repaired by custodian.	Do.
Dec. 7, 1972	do	During the evening when after-school activities were in progress a Hitachi tape player was stolen—model No. TPQ—201 serial No. 0211 was stolen. 2 thermometers damaged. Value, $3 each.	Do.
Between Dec. 15 and 18, 1972.	Edison	Xylophone stolen—serial No. 29. Value $150; building was open for a senior class party on Dec. 16, 1972.	Sonitrol (building may have been open).
Feb. 13, 1973	Central	Car damaged—window on driver's side smashed out completely, $25 damage (1961 Dodge Lancer—license No. 3 MB 812). Stolen: Light meter—Weston Master IV—value $40; light meter—Seconic Auto Leader III—value $20.	Security alarms (building open).
Mar. 8 or ———	Jordan	During time building was open a gas mask was stolen	Sonitrol (building open).
Mar. 20 or Mar. 21	Bryant	During reading class in room 136 a cassette recorder was stolen. Model Craig 2621—serial No. 50427398.	Security alarms (building open).
Mar. 28	Vocational	During time school was in session a Singer calculator (electronic) was stolen—model 1115—serial No. 75888. Value $389.88. The calculator was in the math resource room, available any hour of the day for use by any student.	No system.

MINNEAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS—Continued

DEPARTMENT OF BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS, WEEKLY BREAK-IN REPORT—Continued

Date	School	Damage	Detection system
Mar. 27	South	During night school classes someone used keys for 2 classroom doors, then left them unlocked. Storage cabinet doors were damaged. Stolen: Combination transmitter-receiver (no crystal included) with AC power cord; 1 C.B. radio—Johnson Viking—model—Messenger 128-A059, serial No. 23014; Combination transmitter receiver—Midland 2 channel, (crystals for channels 10 and 11) model No. 13-700, serial No. 22963.	Security alarms (building open).
Mar. 31 or Apr. 1	Dowling	Entry to building was gained by forcing playground door by jerking. Stolen: Stereo record player—Newcomb—serial No. 628104, value $159.95; cassette 6 station duplicator Voice of Music model 704/AV, serial No. 91793, value $750; cassette tape recorder—player—Hitachi, serial No. 73202-396C, value $50; cassette tape player. Hitachi, serial No. 8824, value $23. Overtime put in by custodial force for cleaning and minor repair; locksmith repaired locking mechanism.	No system.
Mar. 27	West	During evening intramural activities someone took mullion from around window on door in room 404, broke open a brief case, apparently nothing missing; room 310 apparently broken into with no apparent prying so they must have a key. Desk torn apart, everything emptied out, cassette tape recorder left on floor after removal from desk; probably looking for money, not merchandise. Office was entered with no apparent prying, some desks opened, lights left on in conference room, nothing apparently missing.	Security alarms (building open).
Mar. 30 or Apr. 1	do	Sometime during the weekend pop machine was damaged; office desks all pried open and gone through—some award pins (Page) taken from 1 counselor. There was no obvious means of how they got into the office. Desks pried open with scissors. Broke into kitchen. Took out ice cream, ate a couple of ice cream bars, left rest to melt. Ate cookies.	Security alarms.
Reported by telephone:			
Mar. 31	Greeley	Broke out entrance glass on the south and north sides, but did not gain entry.	Sonitrol.
Apr. 1	Dowling	Neighbors called that some boys were going into the school building. Police caught 2 juveniles inside. The police could shake the door and in so doing get it open. Locksmith has worked on the lock but will chain it also now.	No system.
Do	Hall	Window in room 104 was broken, entry was made. Nothing has been reported missing as yet.	Do.
Do	Mann	Assistant engineer was called at 2 a.m. by police as they saw kids standing on the boiler room roof, prying window screens. The police came with dogs but did not catch anyone. They found the windows still locked. Carpenter shop had to send the iron worker out to repair and weld window screens at a cost of $55. 6 window screens were damaged.	Do.
Apr. 4	Pratt	At 9 p.m. Ken Hess received a security call. The boiler room door was open but nothing was missing. It is not known how it was opened. Both the head man and the second man said they didn't receive any security call on this.	Sonitrol.
Apr. 5	Standish	Door glass was broken to gain entry into school. 3 sets of janitor's tools are missing. Other things were disturbed but nothing else missing so far. Police were called.	No system.
Reported by tradesmen:			
Apr. 2	Bancroft	Repair of skin on the portable which was damaged by vandals, sheet metal shop—$60.	
Do	Northeast	Debris was thrown in 4 toilets. They had to be taken off of the wall to clean them out. Pencils, paper cups, and tree branches had been thrown in toilets. Plumbing shop repairs were $50.	Do.
Apr. 3	Central	Bradley wash fountain was torn apart. Plumbing shop—$35.	
Do	Lincoln	Panic hardware torn off of entrance doors. Carpenter shop—$40.	
Apr. 5	Lehmann Center	Someone used a heavy rod or some other instrument and ran it right through one of the toilets. A new toilet had to be installed. There was a lot of difficulty matching up fittings. Plumbing shop cost—$125.	

SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1—MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., STATEMENT OF GLASS BREAKAGE, BURGLARY, AND VANDALISM, COMPARATIVE COSTS FOR THE YEARS 1965-71

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Senior high	$9,154.41	$13,553.02	$12,400.49	$23,446.49	$20,942.51	$28,508.15	$32,723.71
Junior high	16,189.53	14,402.82	17,103.75	26,741.41	19,540.69	28,481.94	28,925.11
Elementary	39,454.19	44,423.24	38,311.02	68,536.11	58,902.55	60,318.07	74,653.20
Administration building	1,797.56	394.59	1,660.79	1,365.71	2,082.04	2,672.40	4,879.04
North Pyramid			124.76	1,359.77	589.73	540.11	1,370.84
South-central Pyramid							24.91
Lincoln Learning Center	22.69	10.59	413.37	128.48	23.95	14.18	102.07
North Basic Skills				11.01	122.91		69.33
Neighborhood Youth Corps							26.04
Dowling						917.53	625.57
Holmes						356.91	188.08
Washington S.R.C.			40.99	275.73	162.58	78.52	23.51
Skills Training Center							133.17
Work Opportunity Center							47.01
Metropolitan Senior College		858.30	102.62				
Undistributed	648.17	110.85	2,434.06	1,591.48	1,159.22	1,052.78	
Total	67,266.55	73,753.41	72,591.85	[1] 123,455.19	103,526.18	122,940.59	143,791.59

[1] This amount includes a nonrecurring charge of approximately $38,000 to set-up glass inventories in the schools.

SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1—MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. STATEMENT OF GLASS BREAKAGE, BURGLARY, AND VANDALISM, SUMMARY FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1971

	Total cost of glass breakage, burglary and vandalism repair	Glass breakage repair expenditures	Burglary and vandalism repair (not including glass breakage)		
			Vandalism expenditures	Burglary expenditures	Total cost
Summary:					
Senior high (p. 3)	$32,723.71	$30,688.47	$2,020.24	$15.00	$2,035.24
Junior high (p. 3)	28,925.11	24,612.70	4,268.91	43.50	4,312.41
Elementary (p. 4-6)	74,653.20	62,258.58	12,394.62		12,394.62
Administration building	4,879.04	4,879.04			
North Pyramid	1,370.84	1,370.84			
South-central Pyramid	24.91	24.91			
Lincoln Learning Center	102.07	102.07			
North Basic Skills	69.33	15.67	53.66		53.66
Neighborhood Youth Corps	26.04	26.04			
Dowling	625.57	625.57			
Holmes	188.08	54.42	133.66		133.66
Washington S.R.C.	23.51	23.51			
Skills Training Center	133.17	133.17			
Work Opportunity Center	47.01	47.01			
Total	143,791.59	124,862.00	18,871.09	58.50	18,929.59

TUFTS UNIVERSITY,
LINCOLN FILENE CENTER FOR CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
Medford, Mass., April 23, 1973.

Re: Safe Schools Act of 1973

Rep. CARL D. PERKINS,
Chairman, Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, General Subcommittee on Education, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE PERKINS: Rather than supply you with data about norm-violative behavior in the schools, I am enclosing a series of clippings which, taken together, indicate the seriousness of crime in the schools.

We are particularly interested in "proposed or already implemented solutions to the problem, including any appropriate activities or role for the federal government." In our opinion, law education in the schools may provide one significant approach to solutions. I use the word approach because it would be presumptuous to suggest that law education programs, per se, will reduce norm-violative behavior in the schools. On the other hand, education can and must do much to prevent the actual norm-violative behavior from taking place, and the Lincoln Filene Center is concentrating much of its resources toward this end.

The vast majority of educators who reach young people, especially teachers, have little or no knowledge of what the law of torts, larceny, and morals (with reference to sex crimes) procedure actually are. Rarely do teachers and the process of education touch upon the psychology or sociology of crime, or have dialogues about what is a crime and what is not, and what the consequences of criminal behavior are. Too often, young people do not know when fooling around ends and a crime begins. They know so little about the adversary process in the courts, the actual roles performed by lawyers and prosecuting attorneys, and the police in our society.

We have had sufficient success with our programs and materials to convince us that law education can definitely make an inroad toward crime prevention in our schools. Most assuredly, in our opinion, the "Safe Schools Act of 1973" or some other legislation should provide for modest Federal funding for law education programs which deal directly with crime prevention in school and the society. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the Department of Justice has allocated many millions of dollars toward reduction of crime; however, less than one percent of those vast funds (if that) have been channeled toward preventive law education programs in the schools. Those of us in the United States who administer law education programs in the schools feel strongly that the disgraceful statistics relating to adolescent crime in the schools and society can be redressed through training and curriculum which deal directly with a truly pressing national problem.

If we can be of any assistance to you or the Committee, I do hope you will let me know. Thank you again for your kind consideration of us.

Respectfully yours,

JOHN S. GIBSON,
Director.

Enclosures.

SECURITY DIRECTORS AIM TO PREVENT SCHOOL INCIDENTS

(*By the Associated Press*)

Fort Lauderdale, Fla.—Educators don't know how to deal with violence in the schools and often resort to calling in armed police who only inflame the situation, says a former FBI agent who now heads the International Association of School Security Directors.

Joe Grealy, who has a report based on the experiences of association members in 165 cities, says "guns and uniforms" are not the solution.

"Calling the police in is too late," says Mr. Grealy, who is also security director for the Fort Lauderdale public school system. "That's like locking the barn door after the horse is already stolen. Our feeling is that it is better to avoid a problem than to inherit it."

Large schools need a security director to provide a line of communication between the students and administrators, he says.

TO PROVIDE UNDERSTANDING

"The purpose is to provide understanding and keep the student out of detention homes and help him get back into the classroom where he belongs," Mr. Grealy says.

Trained security directors can help prevent large-scale racial incidents similar to the ones that erupted in three Florida schools recently—Escambia in Pensacola in the Florida panhandle, Boca Raton on the east coast, and Boca Ciega on the Gulf coast.

"Administrators need to face up to the fact there is a problem and that it is a separate one educators are not trained to handle," he says.

Prevention comes from understanding and "knowing the problem before it gets out of hand," Mr. Grealy says. Most of the nation's 45,000 school systems where problems occur "are hoping they'll just go away."

Arson and violence in schools cost the nation at least a half billion dollars last year, he says.

Security directors must have a close working relationship with law enforcement agencies and community services to keep ahead of the game," he says.

In Fort Lauderdale, he says, "As soon as we get rumbles of something going on, we go in and talk to the people involved right away. Many times it's just a matter of finding out what the problem is and handling it. Our biggest problem is rumors of things that never happened," says Mr. Grealy.

[From Time, Dec. 25, 1972]

CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE LATEST CRUSADE

Young Gerald Gault may have thought it was just a joke. He telephoned a housewife who lived near by in Globe, Ariz., and made what the Supreme Court subsequently called "remarks or questions of the irritatingly offensive, adolescent sex variety." The boy had no lawyer, the housewife never publicly testified, no hearing transcript was kept and no appeal was possible. It took a writ of habeas corpus to get a review of the case. Gault could have received a maximum jail term of two months if he had been an adult; since he was 15, he was committed to the State Industrial School until he became 21. Two years passed before the Supreme Court turned him loose in 1967, declaring that "neither the 14th Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."

That landmark ruling extended to a juvenile offender many rights that an adult can take for granted: the right to prompt notice of the charges against him, the right to consult a lawyer, to avoid self-incrimination and to cross-examine hostile witnesses. But though it was a breakthrough, the *Gault* ruling hardly signaled full legal status for children. "Children are the last 'niggers' of our society," says Larry Brown, director of the Boston Task Force on Children Out of School. But *Gault* at least got something started. As Brown observes: "We're on the verge of the last and greatest frontier in civil and legal rights—the rights of children."

Such rights are still relatively few. The problem is complicated by the differences between an infant and an adolescent, but the basic legal principle for all minors is that the parent knows best. In broad terms, says William Aikman of the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, "the child's legal status is an amalgam of non-citizen, slave, overprotected pet and valuable chattel." He has no legal right to work, to choose his own friends, or to decide on his religion. Adds Henry Foster, who teaches family law at New York University: "Women used to need a guardian before they could enter a court. Now that feudal concept applies only to children."

Dangers. The concept is not simply arbitrary. "Aristotle separated parental rule from constitutional rule for good reason," observes Monrad Paulsen, dean of the University of Virginia Law School. "He said parental rule is superior because it is based on the personal wisdom of the parents, and because it is guided by love." Unfortunately that is not always the case. Says Professor Sanford N. Katz of the Boston College Law School: "It is in the home that a child's rights are least protected."

Back in 1646, a Massachusetts Bay Colony statute decreed that if a man had "a stubborn or rebellious son" of at least 16 years of age, he could bring him to the magistrate's court where "such a son shall be put to death." The times have grown milder, and yet in many cases the principle of parental rule has continued to defy common sense. Early in this century, for example, the Washington State Supreme Court threw out a suit by a girl named Lulu Roller against her father, who had raped her. The court's ground: "The rule of law prohibiting suits between parent and child is based on the interest that society has in preserving harmony in the domestic relations." As recently as last year, a 14-year-old Filipino girl in Los Angeles sought legal help because her parents ordered her to go back to the Philippines and marry someone they had picked out for her. "She asked me what legal recourse she had," recalls Attorney Riane Eisler, "and I had to tell her she had none."

Far worse can happen when parents are unable to raise a child at all. Consider the case of Pam, now 16. Her mother was struggling to make ends meet after her husband deserted her, and Pam was difficult to handle. So the mother gave her up to the state. "Pam is very bright and fastastically sensitive," explains Chicago Attorney Patrick Murphy, "but she's not very attractive and that made it hard to find foster parents. So she was sent to a home for delinquents, where she had nothing much to do except watch TV. Then she was sent out to a foster home for a year, then back to the delinquent home, then to the Elgin State Hospital. She'd gotten into fights because other kids taunted her about her looks. At Elgin, things got worse, so they tied her to her bed for 28 days. When they let her go, she hit a matron, and they put her back in restraints for another 30 days. By this time she really needs psychotherapy . . ."

Pam's story is particularly tragic, but it is only one among the many noncriminal cases the law must deal with. In Chicago's Cook County Juvenile Court, the 28,740 cases handled last year included only 3,500 serious offenses but fully 9,200 instances of parental neglect and juvenile runaways. In many cases, the runaways had reason to flee—cruelty, indifference or neglect. "Parents are allowed to beat children," says Sanford Katz, "and no action may be taken unless the child is seriously injured." Nationwide, there are more than 500,000 runaways each year.

Rule. The courts are increasingly puzzled by their responsibilities. In Massachusetts, one intractable 15-year-old girl in a foster home was taken to court after she disobeyed her foster parents' rule that she could not talk to boys. She was held to be a "depraved child," but the court could not decide on any punishment. "What can you do," asks Dean Paulsen, "with someone who commits no crime but won't behave? We're starting to realize that training schools don't work. They don't train, and they breed crime. So there's a move toward letting these children go free, especially the 16- and 17-year-olds."

But younger children cannot simply be turned loose, and that can lead to even bigger problems. Chicago was shocked recently by the case of Johnny Lindquist, age six. He was living happily in a foster home after his parents declared they could not provide for him. Then his parents changed their minds, and social workers returned the boy—even though he expressed fear of his father. Four months later, according to police, the father beat the boy senseless. Johnny's skull was crushed. After lying for four weeks in a coma, he died. As a result, an Illinois senate committee has been holding hearings on whether to change child-care laws to resemble those of California, where "due weight" is given to the child's own wishes about custody if he "is of sufficient age and capacity to reason."

[From Newsweek, Jan. 15, 1973]

THE NEW THREE R'S

In St. Louis, 18-year-old Don Harris was studying quietly in his high school's study hall when an intruder demanded he give up his new black leather coat; when Harris hesitated, he was shot to death. In New York City, two teachers were raped on the same day in two different elementary schools. In San Francisco, a 17-year-old boy was stabbed to death after he teased a classmate about losing a game of dominoes to a girl.

U.S. schools are fast developing an ominous new set of the three R's: rape, robbery and riot. "For teachers and students alike," says Sidney Thompson, principal of Los Angeles' Crenshaw High School, "the issue is no longer learning but survival." In one sixteen-day period last fall, fourteen New York City teachers were robbed or assaulted in school. Nearly 1,000 assaults on students and teachers were reported during 1972 in Miami, more than twice the total three years before. Los Angeles officials confiscated guns from no fewer than 40 students during one recent month, and the homecoming parade at the city's Jefferson High School ended with a shoot-out in which five students—including the homecoming princess—were wounded.

As most school administrators see it, their agonizing safety problem springs from forces outside their terrain. "Our whole society is based on violence, even within the family," says one San Francisco principal. "Then people expect that youngsters should be above all this." More pointedly, schoolmen insist that the overwhelming percentage of violence in and around schools is perpetrated by young people who are not students and have no positive outlets for their time and energy. In Los Angeles, for instance, the unemployment rate for black nonstudents between the ages of 16 and 19 is a whopping 62 per cent. One of the reasons for this idleness, Crenshaw's principal Thompson remembers with special sorrow, is that the new tutoring and recreational youth programs that followed the Watts riots of 1965 were for the most part eliminated by 1969. "So much of the program's rating depended on demonstrable improvement in reading-test scores," complains Thompson. "But improvements like that don't show up for years. Shouldn't improvement in attitude count for something?"

Shakedowns: Part of the problem is that dropouts are dropping back in to school buildings. Despite their distaste for learning, unoccupied young people find schools a natural gathering place. In many cities, the drug trade flourishes on corners near school buildings. Bands of knife-wielding nonstudents roam school corridors almost with impunity; they shake down 7-year-olds for their lunch money and use rest rooms for sexual assaults. "The kids are afraid to go to the bathroom," a St. Louis mother complains bitterly, "so they have to hold themselves in all day long."

To deter such invaders, desperate educators are trying to turn their buildings into fortresses. In many New York schools, classroom doors are now kept locked once class begins. The city also plans to hire 1,200 new school security guards and will soon give students identity cards in order to weed out intruders. The city of Detroit has made it a crime for an unauthorized person to refuse to leave a school building or an area 250 yards around a school when ordered away by the principal. In Baltimore, where police recently shot to death a man who had stabbed two school security guards and held a 17-year-old girl hostage, officials are now allowed to search student lockers for weapons.

Perhaps the nation's most comprehensive security plan exists in Chicago, where the incidence of school violence has been trimmed 11 per cent since 1969 (a year in which 65 of the city's schools were closed by disorders). Only the outside door closest to the principal's office is kept open at any Chicago school; every student must carry a laminated card containing his photograph and a copy of his complete schedule, and armed guards patrol nearly half of the city's 550 educational institutions.

"Basically, a school security system has to be largely preventive," observes Edward D. Brady, Chicago's full-time educational safety chief and the founder of the fast-growing International Association of School Security Directors. "It used to be that most school systems never got worried until there was a crowd of people in the principal's office with a rope around his neck. Any school board operating that way today is playing with fire." The president of San Francisco's school board, George Chin, ruefully agrees. A student's safety, Chin laments, is "the *least* we should be able to guarantee." Within the nation's inner cities today, it is the rare school that can.

LOS ANGELES CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Los Angeles, Calif., April 25, 1973.

Hon. CARL D. PERKINS,
Chairman, Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, General Subcommittee on Education, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PERKINS: As Superintendent of the Los Angeles City Schools, I appreciate the opportunity to describe the nature and extent of violence and vandalism in our schools. The solutions to the problem of crime in the schools are expensive, draining away from the limited resources available for the educational program. The concern shown by Congress for assisting in the solution of this difficult and disruptive problem is welcome indeed.

The crime problem in the Los Angeles City Schools can be divided into two categories: Problems relating to off-hour protection of school property from vandalism and other malicious and destructive acts, and campus related problems occurring during school hours which affect the educational process.

The nature and scope of both these problems—not unlike those encountered in most urban school districts today—in the Los Angeles City Schools are severe, and are of extreme concern to administrators, teachers, parents, and Board of Education members.

Off-hour attacks against school property, i.e., vandalism, burglary, arson, etc., resulted in over $2.2 million loss and damage during the 1971–72 school year. The effects of these losses on the educational program are tremendous. Taxpayers, already overburdened, are reluctant to approve much needed bond measures and tax overrides involving school financing when, almost daily, the media report destruction of school property. Teachers facing demolished classrooms and stolen or damaged property are demoralized and unable to teach effectively. The turnover of teachers in these schools is far greater than in those where incidents do not occur, and recruitment of qualified teaching personnel to fill these assignments is much more difficult, further contributing to the task of trying to maintain meaningful educational programs.

The problem of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning in schools daily beset with such incidents as unauthorized persons entering the classrooms and disrupting programs and assaulting administrators, faculty, and students; the use of narcotics and alcohol, the constant threat of armed members of gangs invading the campus to kill or maim indiscriminately, has in effect, quoting one high school principal, ". . . reduced the campuses to armed fortresses."

Crimes of violence in the Los Angeles City Schools—that is assaults on faculty and students many involving deadly weapons—have increased by approximately 78% over the same period last year; a year marked by extremely significant increases in crimes of this nature. Narcotics violations, which encouragingly were showing a decline in 1971–72, are again on the increase.

We have not accumulated data relative to the possible causes of these problems, other than to acknowledge the generally accepted beliefs that they are a socio-logical phenomenon, indigenous to our culture, requiring long-term solutions. This school district is deeply involved in programs which attempt to provide those long-term solutions within the educational process.

Some of the proposed or already implemented solutions are as follows:

OFF-HOUR PROBLEMS

1. The District is committed to the intrusion alarm concept for proving off-hour protection to the schools.
2. Reliable systems, supplemented by security patrols have proven to be the best deterrent. Unfortunately, these systems are costly, and the District has had to bear the entire financial burden for providing these installations without State or Federal assistance. Consequently, this program has not proceeded as rapidly as we would like.

CAMPUS-RELATED PROBLEMS

1. Security personnel assigned to the campuses of most secondary schools have improved the condition somewhat. Federal Assistance through the Emergency Employment Act has also been helpful; however, the problem remains one of not being able to provide sufficient, trained, personnel to accomplish the task.
2. An application for Federal Funds (LEAA) is currently pending to provide for a security alarm system in five secondary schools to evaluate the effectiveness of such a system for the personal safety of faculty and student alike.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. JOHNSTON.

SECURITY ANALYSTS,
Minneapolis, Minn., April 1, 1973.

Hon. CARL D. PERKINS,
Chairman, General Subcommittee on Education, Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN PERKINS: Thank you for allowing us to present our comments on the "Safe Schools Act of 1973." Security Analysts is solely a consulting firm, we do not sell nor promote any product or security service. Our function is to provide unbiased guidance on safety and security. We have developed numerous school protection programs and have designed hundreds of security systems for schools. These systems are then competitively bid by the school district. Using professionally prepared specifications, school districts save thousands of dollars in procuring properly engineered systems at the lowest cost and with the protection of contracts written to protect the school district from poor workmanship and the deceptive claims of many security contractors.

We have spoken before the International Conference of Educational Facility Planners, the School Security Conference sponsored by the IACP and the IASSD, and other educational groups. Our message is:

1. *Protection of any institution requires a careful study of both social-psychological and physical factors.*

Failure to understand the important relationship of these factors and their application results in wasteful expenditures and ineffective protective measures.

2. *Cost effective protection of schools requires professional assistance.*

If the Safe Schools Act does not provide for professional unbiased guidance in developing protection programs, School Districts will be the prey of numerous unscrupulous firms with grandiose claims regarding their products and services.

School Districts do not possess the expertise to determine which products and services are worth the cost and which are a waste of money—many school districts have wasted hundreds of thousands of dollars on junk.

3. *The most elaborate security system without an equal emphasis on internal harmony and communications, inventory control, rational security procedures, an enforceable disciplinary code, and community support is not going to be effective.*

4. *Protection of students and faculty requires more than just protection from crime!*

Fire, boiler explosion, tornadoes, unsafe stairs, etc. must be considered in any properly developed protection program. It is far more economical and effective to provide comprehensive protection than to attempt piecemeal remedies.

In your letter you ask several questions regarding the crime problem in schools. Our organization is familiar with the problem having frequent contact with school district personnel throughout the nation. To answer these questions would take a book. We are in the process of writing such a book; it will not be ready for publication until December. We will be glad to answer any specific questions your committee may have regarding this subject.

We are presently involved in developing some model programs and will provide data on the results of them should you desire. One of our projects includes the development of the most comprehensive security system in the nation which is being installed in the Saint Paul Public Schools. This system will detect fire, smoke, intrusion, and mechanical failures while reducing operating costs.

Specifically we recommend the legislation provide for the funding of professional protection guidance to study districts through the Office of Education. This will vastly improve the effectiveness as well as total economy of the proposed legislation. If we can be of additional assistance, please contact us.

Most sincerely,

Security Analysts,
Stephen A. Carlton,
Director.

State of California,
State Military Forces—Military Department,
California Specialized Training Institute,
Camp San Luis Obispo,
San Luis Obispo, Calif., April 17, 1978.

Chairman,
General Subcommittee on Education, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Perkins: In the process of performing my duties as Director of Instruction, California Specialized Training Institute, and in presenting the California Civil Disorder Management Course (CCDMC) to more than 3,000 responsible officials of law enforcement, fire services, the military and school administrators at all levels. I have had considerable opportunity to hear of and to witness the absolute necessity for safe-schools legislation

The seemingly innocent fact that, in California, school administrators and law enforcement officials are attending the same professionalization courses (including (CCDMC) is tacit admission of the scope and depth of the "school" problem. Law enforcement is openly asking school administrators how they may help—and, school administrators are finally admitting that they need help.

A recent survey conducted by a Task Force on Vandalism Prevention and Control under the auspices of the District Attorney's office of Los Angeles County is most revealing in respect to cost and severity of this problem and in profiling the vandal.

Excerpts from this report for Los Angeles County for 1971 only are provided for your possible use:

Cost of vandalism:

Elementary school districts	$60, 059
High school districts	46, 772
College districts	10, 508
Unified school districts	3, 221, 816
Subtotal	3, 339, 155

Other vandalism costs attributed to the school aged person and much of it accomplished on the way to or home from school are as follows:

Parks and recreation	$248, 161
Housing projects	11, 500
Private property damage	1, 901, 364
Subtotal	2, 161, 025
Total	5, 500, 180

It must be noted that these figures are approximations in some categories because not all jurisdictions make full, dollar-cost disclosures on vandalism incidents. Further, juvenile offenders are handled most informally and there is no central data bank from which to draw computerized statistics or trend analysis. Establishment of such a central depository of vandalism and juvenile offender information heads our list of recommendations for helping to curb these problems.

As is true in most police related incidents, only 3 percent of the incidents reported resulted in an arrest and an even lower ratio of court induced corrective actions in favor of victims and school districts.

It would appear that no single, corrective measure will assist in preventing the spread of this rejuvenated social illness and that implementation of sweeping, all-encompassing programs at each school district level is in order. Naturally such programs would be scaled to meet existing threats with provision to prepare for the future. Programs should include, but not be limited to:

1. Establishment of a vandalism and juvenile offender central index.
2. Establishment of coordinating committees of representatives of all agencies working with the vandalism problem and with juveniles to insure uniform policy and corrective action.
3. Establishment of an integrated security system, realizing that no single measure is a panacea, and, which would include:
    a. Patrols (private, police, custodial or PTA)
    b. Night lighting
    c. Intrusion detection devices
4. Use of student organizations.
5. Emphasis on community awareness of the scope of the problem and roles each citizen can play in assisting schools and law enforcement.
6. Media involvement to include exploitation of prosecution information.
7. Establishment of alternative programs for youth.
8. Soliciting increased use of school facilities by civic organizations for any activity other than political or seditious.
9. Establishment of community task forces and advisory councils to consider the problems. Maximum student representation should be emphasized.

To the dollar statistics one must certainly add the acts of violence which, when perpetrated by adults, are extortion, kidnapping, assault with intent, murder, arson and grand theft.

Gang warfare has once again caused major police departments re-tool to meet this threat. Unlike the 1950's when the gangs were last a major issue, gang membership today involves youngsters of junior high school and elementary school ages.

It is unreasonable for school authorities to place all of the burden on law enforcement. These problems are for *local government*, of which school districts are a part. No agency can stand alone in countering our contemporary social problems and each arm of local government must have higher echelons of government support available to assist.

Taxes cannot be the only means of providing funds to support these programs. As it has done with The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for the betterment of the overall Criminal Justice System, the Federal Government must consider "Safe Schools" as a high priority, domestic problem needing immediate congressional attention. As taxpayers, each citizen should demand fiscal responsibility from government and I certainly support such citizen demands. However, no subject is more volatile at the local level than schools and youths and for the federal government to overlook its obligation to protect schools and youth is for it to exceed the resopnsibility for fiscal austerity and enter into societal negligence.

Thank you for considering this statement and I beseech you to urge your legislative contemporaries to give early passage to the "Safe Schools Act of 1973."

Sincerely,

ROBERT L. WYNGARD, JR.

JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Louisville, Ky., April 20, 1973.

Hon. CARL D. PERKINS,
General Subcommittee on Education,
Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PERKINS: I am Ashley Farmer, Director of Security, for the Jefferson County Board of Education, Jefferson County, Kentucky. We have 97,000 children, 106 schools and, we think, quite a successful school security program in operation.

In answer to your questions on crime in the schools:

1. We run the gamut—theft, vandalism, physical attacks, arson and bombings. Due to hard work on the part of the County Police, school officials and our security department, inroads are being made and incidents are decreasing. As an example, we had 5 bombings last year one very serious, all culprits were apprehended and punished; we have not had another bombing in the past 11 months. For the first 7 months of this fiscal year our theft and vandalism is down 40%.

2. Crime in the schools causes disruption of classes due to redistributing teaching materials, vacating for clean up and search and waste of essential monies for replacements which should be used for initiating and augmenting projects.

3. Any financial factor has to be figured by three:
   a. The value of the product either damaged, destroyed or stolen.
   b. Replacement cost.
   c. The robbing of some other program just to maintain status quo.

4. Our records, thus far, have not shown any definite pattern. A well publicized apprehension acts as a deterrent for a while in a given school, but eventually wears off. Socio-economical factors do not have the weight society has falsely placed on values.

5. One hindrance is money; however, allocation should be left, at least in part, to the individual security agents. Too tight control leads to over spending in some facets and gross neglect in a local essential field.

A national program of basic training would be invaluable, with traveling consultants shaping up departments.

Sincerely,

ASHLEY FARMER,
Director of Security.

State of Nebraska,
Department of Education,
Lincoln, Nebr., April 17, 1973.

Hon. Carl D. Perkins,
Congress of the United States, House of Representatives,
Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Perkins: We have been contacting the schools of the state and working with school security problems since last year in April when I attended a special school on School Security. Nebraska crime in the schools hasn't reached a point where a great deal of crime can be reported. Scottsbluff recently had a fire bombing of their Junior High during the trouble with the Indian movement activities in that city. In our larger cities—Omaha, Lincoln, Grand Island, Scottsbluff—we have rather a large segment of Indian and Mexican groups which have started to give a great deal of trouble. When these groups start protesting, the schools are forced to hire extra police or have parents help protect children and property.

I have written all of these larger centers and asked for a statistical report. The only statistical report received is one from Scottsbluff, excerpts of which we are enclosing. I joined the International Association of School Security Directors in order to stay in close contact with the people who are attempting to solve these problems. Omaha Public Schools have decided to prosecute students who cause trouble and commit crimes against the school, teachers and general school property.

We in the Department of Education have included school security as a topic in a number of workshops. We bought the film BOMB THREAT—PLAN, DON'T PANIC and are attempting to help the schools think through this problem with a special outline—several copies enclosed. Dr. Francis Colgan, member of our staff in the planning section, and I would like to see a full-time staff member working with this problem to help Nebraska schools plan for general school security. We at the department level would like to see the federal government pass the Safe Schools Act to help the nation's schools meet this tremendous problem.

Sincerely,

Amzie V. Grass,
Administrative Director,
Civil Defense Education.

Enclosure.

SCHOOL SYSTEM, SCOTTSBLUFF (PERIOD COVERING SEPT. 1-FEB. 1)

	I Number of offenses	II Cost	III Offenses cleared	IV Recovery
I. Vandalism:				
(a) Facilities	28	$852	0	0
(b) Windows	54	722	0	0
II. Thefts	24	756	4	$250
III. Arson	2	80	0	0
IV. Assaults:				
(a) On teachers	2	0	Yes	0
(b) On students	0			
(c) On nonstudents	0			
V. Drug involvement:				
(a) Legal:				
1. Possession:				
(a) Marihuana	2			
(b) Inhalants	0			
(c) Other drugs	5			
2. Sale:				
(a) Marihuana	0			
(b) Inhalants	0			
(c) Other drugs	0			
(b) Medical—Social	0			
VI. Extortion	0			
VII. Disruptions	2			
VIII. Bus incidents	(1)	40	No	No

[1] Four seats cut, 7 seats broken, writing on side and seats.

Note: Current enrollment, 3,720; number of security staff, none.

SCHOOL SYSTEM, SHS (PERIOD COVERING SEPT. 1–FEB. 1)

	I Number of offenses	II Cost	III Offenses cleared	IV Recovery
I. Vandalism:				
(a) Facilities	25	$800	0	0
(b) Windows				
II. Thefts	20	700	3	$250
III. Arson	0	0	0	0
IV. Assaults:				
(a) On teachers	0	0	0	0
(b) On students	0	0	0	0
(c) On nonstudents	0	0	0	0
V. Drug involvement:				
(a) Legal:				
1. Possession:				
(a) Marihuana	0	0	0	0
(b) Inhalants	0	0	0	0
(c) Other drugs	0	0	0	0
2. Sale:				
(a) Marihuana	0	0	0	0
(b) Inhalants	0	0	0	0
(c) Other drugs	0	0	0	0
(b) Medical—Social	0	0	0	0
VI. Extortion	0	0	0	0
VII. Disruptions	0	0	0	0
VIII. Bus incidents	0	0	0	0

Note: Current enrollment, 948; Number of security staff, none.

THE PROBLEM OF SAFETY IN OUR INNER-CITY SCHOOLS: A VIEW FROM THE BOTTOM [1]

(I. Ira Goldberg, Ph. D., Associate Professor of Education and Clinical Psychology, Harvard University)

The dual problems of rebellion among students and unrest within the community are what we generally attribute to be the underlying factors in the current situation of progressively diminishing school safety. What we usually fail to take seriously is the fact that unrest in our public schools is one of the many social ills which reflects rather than causes the current state of turmoil and value conflict within our society—particularly within our major and often deteriorating urban areas.

Given the above (and for the purposes of this paper), *school unrest, either as an isolated individual act or as a pattern of group and community behavior, can be defined as a condition of being in which the "offenders" make clear the marginality of their existence and serve notice on the world that they will no longer be contained or deluded by a social system which fails to take them or their needs seriously.* Put another way, rebellion and unrest are adaptive and predictable acts, acts of desperate and cumulative contempt on the part of those whose level of despair has been pushed and manipulated beyond the point of endurance.

But why is it that the schools, rather than many of our malfunctioning social institutions, have become the primary focus of this contempt? The answer, unfortunately, is all too clear: by strategic design it is our public schools, more than any other setting, that possess the legal mandate which enables them to initiate and monitor the cycle of human subjugation in a society which, for all its rhetoric, is a tightly controlled corporate enterprise. Thus, it is the schools, through their educational theories, policies and practices, which have become the primary symbol—certainly, at least, to those who have the least economic resources and political leverage—of a racist, sexist and elitist society; a society bent not on creating the conditions for individual and group liberation, but on perpetuating, in a highly systemative and often cynical manner, the containment and exploitation of the poor, the black, and the powerless.

But let us be more specific. What of the inner-city youngster and his ghetto-dwelling parents—people who, all evidence to the contrary, persist (at least initially) in believing the media-supported school message that "education is the way out and up" and that "learn, baby, learn is better than burn, baby, burn?" What do they actually find in "their" public schools? They find two things. First, that their schools are physically repulsive, totally uninterested in dealing (both in content and in style) with the historical, political and economic nature of their existence, and fully committed to the process of continually "blaming the victims" for the often barbaric conditions under which they are forced to live. And second, they find that even if they submit themselves with muted patience to the archaic and often dehumanizing practices that characterize the educational process (e.g. dimly-veiled racist tracking systems, irrelevant curriculae, uninspired teaching, and containment-oriented administrative practices), that their actual chances of altering the conditions of their own captivity (e.g. getting a decent and meaningful job, acquiring political and social power, etc.) are summarily negated by the very same institutional forces that created their problems in the first place. For in reality, the social access promised by education's seductive rhetoric is largely illusory and rarely available to any but the chosen powerless few who are allowed to succeed in order that they might be pointed to as "living examples" of the system's general openness, viability and trustworthiness. It is, in short, a situation in which our inner-city youngsters and his parents, "true believers" though they once may have been, are quickly transformed and take their place among those whose disrespect for and subsequent violence against the schools we find either puzzling or predictable on the degree to which we ourselves have either been seduced by or become a part of the myth of America's openness.

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[1] Paper presented at the HEW (Office of Education) Conference on School Safety, Washington, D.C. Jan. 29–30, 1973.

As a psychologist, especially one who has spent several years working in our inner-city schools, I can no longer accept psychologically-oriented explanations of school unrest, explanations that invariably focus attention (and implicit blame) on so-called "irrational behavior" of individuals and groups who are supposedly "inadequately, incompletely or pathologically socialized." Rather, I have come to view the problem of diminishing school safety as one whose tentacles reach deep into the very fabric of America's mythified past and duplicitous present. This being the case, school safety will not substantially increase through the development of new and more imaginative policies and practices whose real agenda is to further the containment (it is often called "adjustment") of the students (and faculty) who inhabit our schools and the communities in which our schools are embedded. Rather, true safety in our schools will only become a reality when we begin to predict our conceptual and planning efforts on the following clear assumption: that there exists a substantial and demonstrable difference between our national rhetoric and national reality—that our existing political goals and social processes (particularly as they are embodied in the practices and orientations of the public schools charged with their protection, promulgation and perpetuation) are not only unsound, but also nonconducive to and non-supporting of individual liberation and collective self-determination. Only then will we be freed-up enough to turn our attention to the core issues which ultimately determine the degree to which our schools become both safe for its inhabitants and productive for its community—and those issues revolve around the simple question of how and why our society continues to be fractured along lines of race, sex and class.

THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

(Safety Personnel and Pratices for the New York City Public Schools)

Academy for Educational Development, Inc., June 30, 1972

An interim report submitted by a Panel on School Security appointed by the Academy for Educational Development

I. INTRODUCTION

TOWARD A POLICY OF SCHOOL SAFETY

Students cannot learn and teachers cannot teach in an atmosphere where they fear for their personal safety. Whether their fears are grounded in reality or are a reaction to exaggerated rumors, they must be overcome or reduced to a minimum if the education provided by the schools is not to be seriously impaired.

An effective program to resolve problems of school safety must involve both responses to crisis and ongoing provisions aimed at preventing the development of crises. At the same time, actions taken to deal with sudden emergencies must be consistent with plans to meet long-range safety objectives and must not merely delay attention to alleviating the causes of unsafe conditions. It is equally important to avoid the build up of a security structure which could prevent the development of more effective safety measures. Reasonable safety for all who go to the schools on legitimate business or who attend school functions is a right and not a privilege. Requiring pupils to attend school by law places upon public safety officials, budget authorities, school administrators, and other school employees a mandate to provide essential safeguards for the person and property of pupils and school employees while in school or on their way to and from performing their required responsibilities.

Schools are obligated to provide protection against possible harm from physical violence of individuals or from civil disturbances by a group, against possible fire, flood, violent storm or explosions, against vandalism, theft or extortion; against disease or food poisoning, against drug abuse or illegal acts committed by students or non-students at or near school property; against traffic hazards that might endanger lives of those who come to the schools, and against accidents resulting from preventable hazard conditions. The allocation of responsibilities among employees and students, cooperation with public safety officials in other branches of government, the design, location, and equipment of school buildings, and the presentation of facts before budget and policy-making bodies and the public are all important elements of a school system safety program.

In seeking a solution to this problem, the New York City Board of Education asked the Academy for Educational Development, Inc. to evaluate the present school security program and to make both short-range and long-range recommendations for its improvement. The Academy, in its turn, recruited a Panel of distinguished citizens to review the findings of its staff studies and to make recommendations. This is an interim report on security personnel. The Panel will submit a final report on the overall security program for the New York City Schools in November.

In considering ways to establish a fear-free learning environment, the Panel was unanimous in its feeling that the emphasis must be on an understanding and forewarning of problems rather than on punitive action against perpetrators. Recognizing that most trouble in the schools is a reflection of the society beyond the schoolroom door, the Panel agreed that the primary emphasis must be on community involvement to engender community respect for its educational institutions. Such involvement and respect will provide more security than any number of police, guards, or other security personnel.

A school safety program must, therefore, involve definition of and acceptance of some responsibility not only by the school administrators and public and school safety officials and specialists but by school employees, parents and the students themselves all of whom must understand and accept their share of responsibility. At the same time, it is important to insure protection of individual rights of alleged offenders as well as to safeguard possible victims and to recognize that human values take precedence over property where it is necessary to make such a determination.

Design of a safety program, allocation of responsibility, providing training of personnel and students in their responsibilities for safety measures and for their role in different kinds of crises, "requires a strong leader with specialized knowledge and status. He must have ready access to the Chancellor and be able to represent him effectively in dealing with public safety, public health school employee organization, budgetary, and transportation officials. He must be recognized through the school system as an expert in school safety whose primary concern is to advance education through improved safety conditions, not to build a school system security force empire.

These are considerations which the Panel believes should take into account when formulating a program of action designed to improve safety and security in New York City schools, to assure parents, employees and pupils that school attendance is as safe as it is possible for it to be, and to designate where responsibility lies for different aspects of safety so that those who are responsible may be held accountable.

The Panel became increasingly confident as it examined available facts from New York City, however insufficient or clouded by emotional reactions, that the problem of school safety required prompt and effective action of several types. Students, parents, and employees need to see immediate action on known problems as an assurance that a long-range effective school safety program is on the way to becoming a reality.

This interim report contains a series of recommendations many of which can be implemented for the Fall 1972 term. The Panel believes that these recommendations are consistent with the philosophy which will guide the long-range recommendations to be contained in their final report. In that report, the Panel, in addition to discussing specialized personnel, expects to deal with broad areas as: reducing per-school enrollment; provisions for educational choice; the relationship of the school plant to school security; restructuring some curriculum; and suggestions for measures to reduce vandalism and theft.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

At the present time New York City must have personnel in the schools whose primary concern is to promote safety in the schools. However, if there is to be immediate action to improve the atmosphere of the schools, everyone—teachers and students as well as special personnel—must participate actively in the school safety program.

Today's school security program grew in response to a crisis situation and has been molded to meet a series of ad hoc directives. One of the purposes of this study is to help the Chancellor to develop a cohesive set of objectives and guidelines which will enable the high schools and Community School Districts to achieve a high level of safety. These objectives and guidelines will establish benchmarks against which to evaluate the safety program of each school and District.

The Panel's major recommendations which should undergird an effective program of school safety are as follows:

1. Responsibility for the application of the guidelines designed to meet the designated objectives should be delegated by the Chancellor to an Administrator of School Safety whose sole responsibility would be to administer the safety program.

2. Specialized personnel should be assigned in the schools to work in the safety program. It is not desirable to build a paramilitary force which would have a tendency to become institutionalized and thus might persist long after the societal conditions which called it into being have disappeared. Personnel should, therefore, be selected for a finite period and the program should have built-in opportunities for them to move up either in the school system or into other roles in the City. Personnel to be selected should include:

(*a*) Student Service Officers—in the number to be determined by the Administrator of School Safety in consultation with high school principals and District Superintendents. Those of the present security guards who are requested by a principal should be rehired; others should be selected by the principal from among those persons known in and to the school community.

(*b*) Student Service Coordinators—twenty professionals—former teachers, lawyers, policemen, etc.—to serve in teams of two as sources of information, advice, supervision, and emergency aid. They would provide a continuing liaison between the central board and the high schools and community districts on matters of safety.

3. All Student Service personnel should be hired on the same basis as other non-teaching school staff. They should have the same job security and fringe benefits.

4. Student Service Officers and Coordinators should not wear uniforms nor carry arms.

5. Separate training programs should be developed at once so that Student Service Officers and Student Service Coordinators can each have a thorough grounding in community relations and people management as well as City and school laws and regulations before school opens in September. In the future, arrangements should be made with one or more institutions of higher education to enable this staff to increase competencies and to earn degrees in order that they may move up one of a series of career ladders.

6. Principals should receive special training on how to respond to the new types of problems arising in schools today. The course should include sensitivity training focused on such problem areas as the disaffected student and the community

expressing hostility to the school. It should also cover such topics as how to recognize a brewing crisis, how to respond to a non-negotiable demand, and when to call the police.

7. Principals should be expected to develop a safety plan for their own schools, determining the proper use of police, School Service Officers, teachers, parents, and students.

8. An *effective* grievance machinery should be established in each school. Since school communities vary widely, the principal should be empowered to determine what best meets the needs of his or her school. In making this choice, the principal should keep in mind the need to involve students, teachers, and parents; the need for a way to defuse sudden flareups as well as long-range complaints; and the need for a system which can *act* on problems brought before it, not just rehash them. Possibilities include broadly representative committees, teacher ombudsmen, etc.

II. PRIORITIES AND BUDGET

The Immediate Need referred to in the title of this report calls for leadership at this time from the Chancellor and the Board of Education in establishing a comprehensive program of school safety. Assuming that it would be very difficult to implement the entire program at one time, the following priorities are suggested:

1. Announcement of the inauguration of an overall school safety plan as outlined in this report. (Early July)

2. Appointment as Administrator of School Safety of a man with the expertise and political awareness to oversee an effective program. Appointment of small supporting staff. (End of July)

3. Identification by principals of those who were security guards in 1971–72 whom they want rehired and trained as Student Service Officers. (The number for training is estimated to be 100 to 150.) (End of July)

4. Development and conduct of two training programs, one for Student Service Officers and one for Student Service Coordinators. Given the short time available, it might be advisable to contract for training with professional experts. (During August and early September)

5. Selection of 20 Student Service Coordinators. Leave-of-absence arrangements to be made where appropriate. (In August)

The cost of these steps is estimated as follows:

	Central board	Districts
Administrator	$32,500	
Support staff	20,000	
Expenses	8,500	
20 coordinators at $12,500	250,000	
300 student service officers at $6,500	1,950,000	
150 student service officers at $6,500		$975,000
Training program:		
100 student service officers at $750	75,000	
50 student service officers at $750		37,500
20 student service coordinators at $750	15,000	
Contingency	25,000	
Subtotal	2,375,000	1,112,500
Grand total	3,487,500	

Following the opening of school in September 1972.

Once the foregoing steps are underway, the remainder of the program can be implemented as follows:

1. Identification by principals of an additional 300 persons suitable for training as Student Service Officers in all schools.

2. Establishment of an arrangement with one or more two- or four-year colleges to enable Student Service Officers to use their in-school assignment as the first rung of an educational and career ladder.

3. Conduct of a training course for new personnel. Once they have been checked and hired, they can start work and attend training course after school hours. (See suggestions below with respect to use of Coordinators as trainers.)

4. Development and conduct of a training course for principals in all aspects of school safety and people management.

5. Insistence that every principal develop a comprehensive plan for his or her school covering all aspects of safety.

6. Establishment of some form of effective student advocacy machinery in every junior high and high school.

Since the Student Service Coordinators, once trained themselves, should be qualified to conduct a major portion of the training for new Student Service Officers, the cost for implementation of these steps is estimated as follows:

	Central board	Districts
Training:		
200 student service officers at $500	$100,000	
100 student service officers at $500		$50,000
75 principals at $450	33,750	
100 principals at $450		45,000
Grand total	228,750	

The training budget will not recur in anything like that magnitude. The ongoing annual budget for personnel is $3,300,000, which is comparable with $1,700,000 spent for security in the Chicago public schools which have a student register of 560,000, or half of that of New York City. The District of Columbia spends over $500,000 for salaries for a system of 144,000 students, or 13 percent of the New York City register.

III. PERSONNEL

The success of the school safety program to be outlined by the Panel in its final report should result in a lessening of the need for personnel primarily devoted to "security". Also, so-called security problems stem from a variety of causes which lend themselves to a variety of solutions. Thus, the Panel is recommending several types of personnel to fulfill different functions.

ADMINISTRATORS

There are several interrelated factors which make a school a safe place in which to teach and learn. The Panel felt that it should be concerned with fire hazards, health standards, and safety rules in order to provide complete safety for both buildings and personnel. In order to coordinate these functions, the Panel recommends the creation of a new position in the New York City Schools of Administrator of School Safety. In recognition of the importance of safety, the person so designated should not only have a thorough knowledge of the laws and regulations in areas pertaining to safety, but should be a person of enough distinction and political sophistication to be able to communicate with officials at the highest level. The new Administrator of School Safety should have regular and emergency access to the Mayor's office, the Police and Fire Commissioners, the Transportation Authority, the Presiding Judge of the Family Court and key City officials such as the head of the Youth Services Administration.

Because safety and security in the schools is a nationwide problem, the study staff examined the school systems of 26 other cities. Each of them had one or more citywide administrators who devoted full time to security and related problems. The problems are so pervasive, so volatile, and so complex—in New York as elsewhere—that the Chancellor should appoint a full-time Administrator of School Safety. The Administrator would be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the school safety program seeing to it that there are proper training opportunities for Student Safety Officers, that the Principals are adhering to their safety plans, that proper action is taken on the information provided by the Student Service Coordinators and that the program for student grievances is working effectively.

In addition he would be responsible for selecting and supervising professional help to develop and conduct a training program for Student Service staff, for principals and possibly for other school personnel. He may wish to contract for these training programs from specialists rather than to enlarge his permanent staff.

STUDENT SERVICE COORDINATORS

Present personnel who have been hired to perform a narrowly defined security function are supervised solely by the Assistant Principal or other school-related official designated by each principal. However, an additional staff of skilled professionals is needed. They should perform an intelligence function for the Chancellor similar to the function performed for the Mayor by his Education Task Force. In addition to providing a communications network between the schools and the Board of Education, the Coordinators would serve as a clearinghouse for the sharing of experiences among the City's 92 high schools and 31 School Districts, and could offer continuing advice and emergency aid to individual schools or District Superintendents.

The Panel suggests 10 two-member teams of Student Service Coordinators. Each team would be responsible for three Community School Districts and nine or ten high schools. They would visit each District or school on a regular basis, and would respond at once to an emergency call from any school to which they were assigned.

They would be expected to develop rapport with members of the school staff, parents and other community leaders, the local police, and students representing the variety of backgrounds within the school register.

The personal and experiential qualifications for this staff of coordinators should be flexible. They should have a broad spectrum of talent in communications, insight into personal and group dynamics, a keen interest in community relations, and training in mediation techniques. As the eyes and ears of the administration as well as the emergency operating team, the coordinators must be a multi-talented diplomatic corps. The Administrator of School Safety should experiment with several types of personnel, all of whom should be college graduates. Among those who might be used are teachers or former teachers, community leaders, and police or former police. Teachers and policemen who volunteer and are selected to serve on these teams might be given a 2-year leave of absence from their present assignments.

Because the role of Coordinator could serve as an excellent training ground for those interested in youth work, school administration, or other community service, funds to train personnel for this new type of position might well be forthcoming from sources such as the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

As communications specialists, the Student Service Coordinators could serve many functions. First, they would report daily to the Administrator of School Safety with a running account of what is happening in the shools and the communities surrounding them as it affects the schools. They would know about local conditions, community meetings, rising crime, incidents likely to be picked up by the media, and so forth. They would also be aware of schools that lacked or had inadequate personnel and could see to it that the situation was improved. More importantly, they would learn first hand about safety programs that seemed to be working particularly well. Thus they could serve as a kind of data bank for the high schools and Community School Districts which now have no common meeting ground on safety matters.

Second, the Student Service Coordinators could consult with the principal and the person directly in charge of safety in each school to discuss his or her problems and personnel, and with his guidance (and permission) work with individual staff members to improve their performance. For instance, Student Service Officers should have an opportunity to ask how a specific incident should have been handled—or could alert the Coordinators to an anticipated situation. They would also have an opportunity to use the Coordinators as a go-between to handle complaints or grievances they might have about their job or about their in-school supervision.

Finally, these Coordinators should be called in whenever a principal feels that a school crisis could be calmed or averted with the use of additional personnel. This would be particularly advantageous in a situation where the principal determines that the presence of police—in uniform, unfamiliar with the school, and possibly unresponsive to the principal's direction—might exacerbate a volatile situation.

It should be noted that the establishment of these teams would obviate the need for present mobile squads. Their members could form the Student Service staff at specific schools—or be trained as members of the communications teams if the Administrator of School Safety feels they have the proper qualifications and attitudes.

STUDENT SERVICE OFFICERS

The title security guard is not really suitable for the in-school staff proposed. The Panel prefers Student Service Officer, which would more closely describe the role envisioned in this report. Their function would be to service the needs of the school population, particularly the students, and it is important that their title reflect this important responsibility.

Recognizing that the principal has the ultimate responsibility for the safety of his or her school—and that safety is directly related to the school's relationship to the community, the Panel proposes that the principals immediately be empowered to determine which of the present guards are to be rehired and to select any new personnel to serve as Student Service Officers from the local community or persons known to it.

Where the principal does not choose to rehire—or does not have his allotted complement of guards—he should begin immediately to seek the requisite number of men or women from his school community. Parents and siblings of students, graduates of the school, street leaders, and returned veterans are all likely sources of recruitment.

Like the high schools, the local school districts should be informed that all funds for the safety program will be available only for personnel that meet the Board's guidelines and have taken the Board's training program. They will, of course, retain the right and be encouraged to hire community people as Student Service Officers.

The Student Service Officers, unlike the present guards, should have the same job security and fringe benefits as other paraprofessional school staff members. New Personnel should be carefully interviewed and investigated, ***particularly for acceptability to students.*** (The principal might well use a group of students to help interview prospective Student Service Officers.) While additional checks will be made by the Central Board and the police, the prime responsibility for selection of Student Service Officers compatible with the community and the students must rest with the principal.

The job description for Student Service Officers should stress their contribution to the educational mission of the school, their role as supportive of teachers and other staff, and their ability to get along with students. Qualifications should be flexible. Since it is hoped that the training program will be tied into an institution of higher education, it would be preferable if Service Officers were high school graduates. Older people who desire to further their education and to move up a career ladder should not be ruled out.

The principal and student deans and advisors will determine the tasks to be performed by each Officer. A minimum assignment should involve the identification of and building a relationship with as many students as possible. Hopefully this would enable the officer to build a cadre of student aides. However, he must not become so friendly that he is unwilling or unable to stop misconduct on the part of a student/friend.

All guards who are retained as Student Service Officers should be required to attend the training course outlined below, along with any new Officers appointed by the principals. It is anticipated that the first Training Program will start on August 7. Since many principals will not make their appointments until fall, Officers hired after September 1 should be carefully screened and should be allowed to start work under close supervision. A second course should offered after school hours in November and December to train these new officers.

IV. TRAINING

One of the most important components in the success of the safety program for the New York public schools will be the training provided for Student Service Officers. The present training course is an informal improvised program touching on human relations, school rules, law, police training, narcotics, self defense and first aid in a four-week period.

Training programs across the country vary in length and content. Los Angeles Public Schools, for example, has a ten-week training program in police sicence, legal theory and human relations; Baltimore runs a six-week program in cooperation with the Maryland Police Academy; in Detroit, guard training is conducted part-time for 30 hours; in Dade County, Florida, guard training is in-service only; and in Chicago, since guards are almost all off-duty policemen, they do not receive additional formal training.

Since the Panel is recommending a new concept in people management for safety purposes, it is recommending that four-week training programs be conducted for Student Service Coordinators and Officers. In addition, the program schedule provides two weeks of field experience and two more weeks of performance evaluation, review and on-the-job orientation. This plan can be reduced, if necessary, to meet time and budgetary considerations. What is most important is that the program equip Student Service personnel to assume a preventive, service-oriented role rather than that of enforcers of the law.

It is not desirable to have Service Officers attend police academies, mix with police officers and acquire a police philosophy. A successful school safety program must contribute toward the educational process and the improvement of group and interpersonal relations.

Some of the instructors for the proposed program could be drawn from principals, deans, and counselors, as well as from the New York Police Academy, youth organization representatives, NYCLU, parent groups, students, Community Action Groups, UFT Teacher Centers, narcotics experts, and private security representatives. There should also be a number of behaviorial scientists included, especially some who are known as community psychologists. Training, to be effective, must be a continuing procedure. This might be accomplished through bulletins, in-service sessions and conferences.

Because a new training program must be devised and conducted to meet the immediate need, it is recommended that outside professional help be employed to develop this unique program. Funding for such a contract might well be available from the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council.

1. *Student Service Coordinator Orientation* (146 hours, 4 weeks)

A. Introduction to the Board of Education, the New York City public school system, and the school community.

Board's functions, structure; philosophy; structure and functions of a typical school and school district; community control; identification of nonschool personnel significant to school—local police, community leaders, etc. 5 hours

B. Introduction to the Student Service Coordinator function.

Student service department, function, structure; philosophy of Student Service Coordinator role; relationship to educational function; channels of communication, educational hierarchy; job description and performance standards 5 hours

C. Interpersonal skills development.

Principles governing human behavior; urban environment; current trends in New York City affairs—population, economic and social conditions, and the school as a focal point of social change; introduction to nature of crime and criminals principles of social psychology with attention to ethnic relationships and intergroup tensions 40 hours

D. Introduction to the criminal justice process.

Relationships between federal, state, and city governments; basics of a law suit, civil and criminal court proceedings; role of the police, district attorney, judges, jury, legal aid and the defense attorney; note taking and report writing; interviews, interrogations, statements; emergency aid to persons; recognizing and handling abnormal people; New York City Police Department functions and structure, rules and regulations 10 hours

E. Selected aspects of New York penal law.

Statutes most frequently used by patrolmen and detectives, including: assault, conspiracy, sex offenses, damage to and intrusion upon property, larceny, robbery, bribery, official misconduct, drug offenses, gambling offenses, offenses against public order, firearms and dangerous weapons 10 hours

F. Physical training and law enforcement techniques.

Calisthenics; handling emergency situation (bombs, bomb threats, etc.); search and frisk procedures; group control; first aid 36 hours

G. Sensitivity training.

T-Group experience with emphasis on group interaction and values related to behavior 40 hours

2. *Student Service Officer Orientation* (141 hours, 4 weeks)

A. Introduction to the Board of Education and the New York City public school system.

Board's function, structure; philosophy; community control; structure and functions of a typical school 10 hours

B. Introduction to the Student Service Officer function.

Student Service Department, function, structure; philosophy of Student Service Officer role; relationship to education function; job description and performance standards 5 hours

C. Interpersonal skills development.

Principles governing human behavior; urban environment; current trends in New York City affairs—population, economic and social conditions, and the school as a focal point of social change; introduction to nature of crime and criminals; principles of social psychology 50 hours

D. Introduction to the criminal justice process.

Relationship between federal, state, and city governments; basics of a law suit, civil and criminal court proceedings; role of the police, district attorney, judges, jury, legal aid and the defense attorney—20 hours.

E. Selected aspects of New York penal law.

Selected statutes most frequently used by patrolmen and detectives, including: assault, conspiracy, sex offenses, damage to and intrusion upon property, official misconduct, drug offenses, gambling offenses, offenses against public order, firearms and dangerous weapons—20 hours.

F. Physical conditioning.

Calisthenics, defensive tactics—36 hours.

3. *For Both Officers and Coordinators*

A. Field experience (80 hours, 2 weeks).

Trainees will perform the duties of a Student Service Officer or Coordinator in selected public schools and district under the supervision of a training instructor and school officials involved in security.

B. Training evaluation, review and orientation to permanent assignment (80 hours, 2weeks)

1. Human behavior and civil rights.

A socio-psychological view of social change and its impact on public schools in New York City—16 hours.

2. Review of unarmed defense techniques.

Reinforcement of established physical fitness habits—18 hours.

3. Self-critique seminar.

Self evaluation of curriculum, instruction and field experience—6 hours.

4. Orientation to permanent assignment.

During the first week at the school or district to which the recruit is permanently assigned, school officials will orient the new Service Officer or Coordinator to the school, the geography of the neighborhood, any policies peculiar to the school or District, the sociology of the school and its community populations, and local crime patterns—40 hours.

4. *Principals*

Because many of the problems which have brought about this pressing need for safety personnel are relatively new to those in the New York City schools, a training program for principals (and a subsequent course for teachers and other school staff) should deal with school-community problems, riots, political activities, confrontations, how to deal with (not how to avoid) the drug problem, as well as interpersonal relations.

Extensive research by the study staff disclosed no existing courses to prepare principals to assume their responsibility to deal on a day-to-day basis with safety problems. Principals need training in how to respond to political activists, how to recognize a brewing crisis, what to do with a non-negotiable demand, when to call the police, how to select the in-house or community personnel to deal with certain situations and sensitivity training which focuses on such particular problem areas as the disaffected or frustrated student and the community which is expressing hostility to school policy. The Panel believes there is a great need for such training on the part of most principals and that if it were expected of them they would cooperate.

One result of the training should be the preparation by each principal of a total safety plan for his or her school to deal with the safety of persons and with necessary building improvement (locks, window replacement, etc.) as well as the role of personnel, including students, teachers, Student Service Officers, and the police. Since such a training program would have national implications and usefulness, its development ought to be underwritten by one of several governmental or foundation sources.

IV. ADVOCACY OF STUDENTS' RIGHTS

All of the Student Service personnel in the world will not curb disorders nor stop vandalism in schools where students feel increasingly hostile to the administration and the faculty and have no outlet for expressing that hostility. These angry emotions sometimes arise from single misunderstandings, but more often they result from frustration with an unsuitable curriculum, a depersonalized, oversized school register, an uneasy or even hostile staff.

While long-range planning will be required to alleviate many of the ills that make schools unstable, machinery could be established at once which would enable students to defuse their anger and to air their grievances before a group that can adjudicate them in their own school.

Since each school has a different mix of students, teachers, and parent and community input, each principal with the aid of parents, teachers, and students will need to determine the mechanism best suited to the climate of his or her school. In making the decision it is important to remember that often a single affront—a jostle, a wrong name called, or a challenge felt to be unfair—can flare up into a schoolwide incident. Only if the person or persons charged with hearing this complaint have the strong backing of the principal and enthusiastic acceptance by the students, teachers, and parents can they function in any meaningful way.

Among the devices that have been used successfully in other school systems are ombudsmen and school safety committees. If a committee is to be selected, it is recommended that students select student members, teachers select teachers, and parents select parents. In any case, the principal must remain in charge so that those aggrieved know that they can get *action*, not just an opportunity to be heard.

V. CONCLUSIONS

If the steps regarding personnel, training, and advocacy of student rights outlined in this report are taken at once, the Panel believes that the students, staff, and parents will view the September 1972 opening of school with greater optimism. Once the school year is safely under way, planning to improve many other areas that contribute to a healthy learning atmosphere can begin. Such basic steps as the training of principals and the installation of anti-vandalism equipment should produce quickly visible improvements while revisions of school registers, plants, and curriculum can only occur after lengthier consideration.

However, it is the firm belief of the Panel that concentration on involvement of the community and response to the needs of the students can quickly begin to reduce negative incidents in the schools and build a positive atmosphere in which education can be maximized.

APPENDIX A

The Academy for Educational Development staff for the study are Rexford G. Moon, Jr., Senior Vice President and Director of Studies (Director); and Mary Ellen Goodman, Associate Study Director. Under the direction on this staff, the following major activities have been undertaken to date:

1. Visits to 18 schools, including three in Community School Districts. In each school the principals, the administrator in charge of security, and several security guards were interviewed.
2. Interviews with the Chancellor, Police Commissioner and 28 other people interested and involved in the schools. These included 11 officials at the Board of Education, presidents of two professional organizations, two students, the president of the Association of Community School Boards, 4 police officials, 4 city officials, and staff members of the Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee, the American Jewish Committee, and the New York Civil Liberties Union.
3. Visits to four cities: Chicago; Washington, D.C.; Flint, Michigan; and Prince Georges County, Maryland. In each city the Director of School Security, school officials, and guards were interviewed. Examination of the data on security programs in 22 other cities.

4. Interviews with leaders of the Mayor's Task Force on Education and a day spent with a Task Force team.
5. Consultants' reports from: John Powell, former Director of Security and Assistant Dean of Students at Yale University; Joseph Grealy, President of the International Association of School Security Directors; Harvey Cosdyk, Director of Hollow, Inc., a training institute for street workers; S. J. Vestermark, Jr., a consultant on controlling collective violence; and Elizabeth Burda, Director of the Alliance for a Safer New York.
6. A questionnaire survey sent to the principals of 92 high schools and to the Community School Boards for distribution to the 163 junior high school principals. There has been about a 60% response so far.
7. Search of the literature, including books on educational philosophy as it relates to security, reports from individual school systems, and data on antivandalism devices and how to handle riots and bomb threats.
8. Case studies in depth of a number of troubled schools during which 250 students, 35 administrators, 51 teachers, and 27 security guards were interviewed.

PANEL ON SCHOOL SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE NYC BOARD OF EDUCATION

Stephen Bailey, Professor of Political Science, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; Chairman, Policy Institute of the University Research Corporation, Syracuse University; member, Board of Regents, State of New York; author, *Disruption in Urban Public Secondary Schools*.

Samuel Brownell, *Panel Chairman*, Professor of Urban Educational Administration, Yale; Chairman of the Board, Academy for Educational Development; formerly: Superintendent of Schools, Detroit; U.S. Commissioner of Education.

Eugene Callender, President, New York Urban Coalition: former Executive Director, New York Urban League. While at League established Harlem Prep and street academies; at Coalition inaugurated minischools now a part of New York public high schools.

Biagio di Lieto, Chief of Police, New Haven; formerly Director, New Haven Police Academy; Director, Youth Division, New Haven Police Department; graduate in Police Science Administration, New Haven University; graduate F.B.I. National Academy; graduate Delinquency Institute, U.C.L.A.

Edmund Gordon, Chairman, Department of Guidance, Teachers College; Director of ERIC on the Disadvantaged; Research Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, Albert Einstein College of Medicine; Director, National Center for Research and Information on Equal Educational Opportunity.

Mary Kohler, Executive Director, National Commission on Resources for Youth; formerly: Director of Neighborhood Youth Corps; member New York City Board of Education; Juvenile Court Judge, San Francisco.

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Rexford G. Moon, Jr., Senior Vice President and *Study Director*. Director of numerous studies being conducted by the Academy for Educational Development. Formerly Director, College Scholarship Service of the College Entrance Examination Board; Consultant to colleges and universities, the Ford Foundation, U.S. Office of Education, various states, and Puerto Rico; Member, Governor's Committee on Scholastic Achievement (New York).

Mary Ellen Goodman, *Associate Study Director*. Formerly Executive Editor, Greenleigh Associates; Researcher, Nelson Associatese (analyst for Select Committee on Future of Private Higher Education in New York State, McGeorge Bundy, Chairman).

NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION INSTITUTE,
SCHOOL OF POLICE ADMINISTRATION,
Louisville, Ky., July 26, 1973.

Hon. WALTER D. HUDDLESTON,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HUDDLESTON: Thank you very much for the copies of H.R. 2650 and S. 485 pertaining to elementary and secondary school security. There is no question that a need exists to increase the crime prevention efforts within our school system. The Act appears to be fairly broad in scope. The nine specifically designated priorities all cover areas that have been identified as emerging from the increased incidences of crime in our elementary and secondary schools. I would, however, suggest that some provisions be made to encourage liaison with the local police departments, specifically those that have programs in Crime Prevention.

Because this proposed Act is so broad, the possibility exists that the major emphasis of grant funds may be used to turn schools into virtual prisons by the use of security devices. There is no question that in many cases security hardware is needed, however, hardware alone does not eliminate the basic problem of why we have crime in our schools. This has been demonstrated by pilot projects in Kentucky, particularly those of Dr. Newman Walker, Superintendent of schools in the city of Louisville.

I suggest the possibility that initial grants under this Act would be considered pilot projects and restricted to cities whose police departments have implemented a crime prevention unit with officers trained to give security advice and also to coordinate programs of community relations and public education.

Many of our graduates have developed a strong relationship with their local school system, providing security surveys and making recommendations for the improvement of security in their schools. As a result of their work there has been a significant reduction in school related crime.

As you know, the National Crime Prevention Institute is a division of the School of Police Administration of the University of Louisville and is the only project funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to train police officers in crime prevention techniques and to maintain a continuing relationship with graduates. We have, therefore, been in a position to view the success of security programs and also some of the undesirable side effects. There is a severe shortage of people trained in security techniques and with increased interest in security programs, a host of unqualified people are working as security consultants, and an extremely large amount of inferior equipment is being peddled to the public. Enactment of this Bill could possibly provide a real field day for security hardware salesmen and consultants.

Police departments which have implemented crime prevention programs are in an excellent position to provide consumer protection and advice and can offer their objective security surveys to their school districts at no cost.

To summarize, I do believe the Bills, if enacted, could provide a vehicle to improve the safety of students and teachers and ultimately reduce the cost of police protection and vandalism in our schools. The main criticism is the fact it stands by itself and does not recognize the efforts provided by the "Safe Streets Act" or the role of local police departments.

Sincerely,

WILBUR RYKERT, *Director.*

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